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Chapter 1
General Introduction
Family economics is a growing field of research, analyzing decision-making within the family
using economic theory. The foundation has been laid by the seminal work of Becker (1973,
1974). Many decisions on different topics are made within the family, including labor division
and consumption, as well as marriage, fertility and investment in the children. Thus aggre-
gated outcomes such as demographic change, marriage rates as well as the overall education
level are influenced by family decisions. Besides preferences and income, the driving forces of
these decisions are the interaction within families, underlying gender roles and gender differ-
ences. In particular, gender differences seem to be very pronounced in developing countries,
which also becomes evident in the third millennium development goal to "promote gender
equality and empower women" (UN, 2013). In many countries, women are still discriminated
in political, social and economic activities, through reduced access to education, the labor
market, political participation and less influence on family decisions. Furthermore, many dif-
ferent forms of violence against women are observed, ranging from domestic violence, rape to
female genital cutting. Understanding the reasons for gender differences and discrimination,
as well as their influence on other economic outcomes, has emerged as an active economic
research field, to which this dissertation aims to contribute.
This dissertation covers two topics within the research area of family economics: violence
against women in the form of female genital cutting and gender differences in fertility choices.
In Part I of my dissertation, I analyze the harmful tradition of female genital cutting (FGC)
from an economic perspective. It is estimated that 80 to 130 million women are circum-
cised/mutilated worldwide, with 3 million girls at risk of undergoing this procedure every
year. Chapter 2 starts with a cross-country analysis and connects FGC rates with women's
status in different countries. Chapter 3 places its emphasis on within-country variation and
1
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the interaction of FGC with marriage and education. In both chapters, the analysis and
discussion of policies to reduce FGC play an important role. Part II focuses on fertility out-
comes, in particular on differences in completed fertility by gender and the role of polygyny
for potential fertility gaps in developing countries. All chapters use information from the De-
mographic and Health Surveys, which are household surveys that focus on health and fertility
outcomes.
In Chapter 2, I show that FGC rates vary strongly across countries in sub-Saharan Africa
and the Middle East, which prompts seeking an explanation for this variation. Therefore,
my research questions are: what can explain cross-country differences in FGC rates? Which
policies could reduce FGC rates? Analyzing the first question, I document a negative cross-
country correlation between women's status and FGC prevalence rates, i.e. FGC rates are
larger in countries with relative higher gender inequality (women being disadvantaged). I
provide a simple model with FGC as premarital investment for the marriage market, which is
able to generate this relation. Parents decide on the circumcision of their daughter, trading-
off the negative health consequences in the form of disutility for their daughter against the
potential utility gain from marrying a rich man. Since men prefer circumcised women and
women in turn prefer rich to poor men in this model, a stable matching outcome involves
a higher probability of circumcised women marrying a rich man. I interpret cross-country
differences in the status of women as different levels of female bargaining power within a
household, which influences women's consumption. For a large parameter space of the model,
an increase in the bargaining power reduces a woman's potential utility gain from marrying
a rich man, which in turn reduces the benefits of FGC and thus the FGC prevalence rates.
In this model, the equilibrium FGC rate can be inefficiently high, since it is not influenced
by the actual level of the male utility from being married to a circumcised women. Only
the assumption that men value circumcised women is relevant for the results. Therefore,
I analyze two distinct policies with the aim of reducing the FGC rate: first, I introduce a
penalty fee for parents who circumcise their daughter; and second, I analyze the effect of
a direct consumption subsidy to women financed by a proportional tax on men's income.
Both policies succeed in reducing FGC rates with different distributional effects. However,
general equilibrium effects in the marriage market dampen the reduction of the FGC rate in
the case of penalty fees. If FGC rates fall, the probability of circumcised women marrying
a rich man increases. For some rich families, this increase can outweigh the additional cost
of FGC, thus inducing them to circumcise their daughter. In contrast, the FGC prevalence
3among daughters born into a poor household will be reduced since the costs are too high for
the parents. This leads to a redistribution from poor to rich households, as opposed to the
second policy, which redistributes from rich to poor families, as well as from men to women.
Turning from the cross-country perspective to the within-country variation, the goal of
Chapter 3 is to answer the following research questions: how do FGC, marital status and
education interact? Could education subsidies to women reduce FGC rates? For Burkina
Faso, I find that, first, uncircumcised and single women are better educated than circumcised
and married women, respectively. Second, circumcised or non-educated women are more
likely to be married than their counterparts, and third, better educated parents are less
likely to circumcise their daughters. To answer the question of whether subsidies to female
education costs could reduce FGC rates, I augment the model from Chapter 2 to a dynamic
model with equilibrium search on the marriage market. Parents not only decide on the
circumcision of their daughter but also on the education of their children. The calibrated
model is able to replicate the empirical patterns of Burkina Faso. In the model, education
and FGC are two potentially competing investments for the daughter. Education not only
fosters economic independence but also marriage market prospects, since better educated
women have a higher income, which is attractive to men. By contrast, FGC only improves
marriage market prospects. If the costs of better education are high, parents may decide
to circumcise their daughter instead of investing in her education. This is most likely the
case for no or low educated parents with low income. The policy analysis shows that the
introduction of female education subsidies first of all increases the female education level, as
well as leading to a considerable reduction of the FGC rate. However, even high subsidy rates
cannot eradicate FGC prevalence. This is due to the fact that for sufficiently high subsidies,
almost all women are highly educated and can only differ in their FGC status. Thus, those
women with low costs of FGC will be circumcised to improve their marriage market prospects.
Nevertheless, the FGC rate would be lower than in the initial (current) situation. Overall,
women are the winner of this policy in welfare terms, partly at the expense of men. For all
subsidy rates, the welfare of men is lesser than in the starting situation. For low subsidy
rates, their welfare even decreases with the level of subsidy, although it flattens out with an
upward trend for higher subsidy rates.
Part II of this dissertation analyzes gender gaps in fertility and represents joint work with
Erica Field and Michèle Tertilt. A large strand of the literature in family economics focuses on
understanding fertility choices. Information on fertility and particularly "completed fertility"
4 CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
or "children ever born" is a crucial ingredient for building theories on this. At present, this
information is predominantly based on surveys about the reproductive behavior of women,
whereas almost no work exists measuring the number of children ever born per men. This
makes statements about male fertility choices difficult and speculative. In this chapter, we
start by analyzing whether and to what extent average fertility is different for men and women.
We use survey data from several recent waves of the Demographic and Health Surveys in six
developing countries in which men and women were each asked about their reproductive
histories. We document a number of novel differences in the fertility outcomes of men and
women. First, while one might have assumed that the average rates of completed fertility for
men and women must coincide, we document that this is not the case. Comparing completed
fertility for men and women of the same birth cohorts, we find that men have more children
on average than women in four out of the six countries considered. Positive gaps mean that
men must be having children with more than one woman. Indeed, we find that the size of
the gap is positively related to the degree of polygyny. Second, we find a higher variance
of fertility for men than women: in other words, women are more equal to each other in
their reproductive behavior than men are. Third, we find that differences in the desire to
have children can to a large extent be explained by differences in realized fertility. Thus, the
differences in fertility preferences often emphasized in the literature do not necessarily need
to cause conflict, since men and women can realize their fertility individually. Fourth, we
document that the demographic transition started earlier and was steeper when considered
from a male perspective.
Part I.
Female Genital Cutting: An Economic
Perspective
5
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Chapter 2
Female Genital Cutting and Women's
Status Across Countries
2.1. Introduction
Female genital cutting (FGC) is a harmful tradition that is predominantly prevalent in the
northern countries of sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.1 Nevertheless positive preva-
lence rates are also observed outside of Africa (e.g. Indonesia, Peru and Pakistan). The
estimated numbers of circumcised women range from 80 million (Yoder and Khan, 2008) to
more than 130 million (UNICEF, 2005b). Figure 2.1 presents prevalence rates among 15 to 49
year-old women in Africa and Middle East, highlighting the high variation of prevalence rates
across countries (ranging from 5% up to 94%).2 Anthropological and sociological literature
has focused on explaining the existence and persistence of FGC, identifying economic consid-
erations as one of the potential driving forces.3 This is also supported by Marixie Mercado,
spokeswoman of UNICEF:
"The main reason that parents have their daughters cut or mutilated is really to provide
them with economic and social security in a sense. It is to make sure that their daughters
are accepted by society, that they can get married and have a chance of a normal life. In
many of these cultures and traditions, not being 'cutted' is sanctioned.4"
1Alternative expressions are female genital mutilation, as well as female circumcision. In this paper, I will
refer to this tradition as either FGC or female circumcision.
2The worldwide distribution of prevalence rates are shown in Figure 2.A1 in the Appendix.
3See e.g. Mackie (1996, 2000), Shell-Duncan and Hernlund (2000), Yount (2002) and Skaine (2005).
Freymeyer and Johnson (2007) analyze the attitudes towards FGC in Nigeria.
4http://www.voanews.com/content/unicef-reports-progress-in-eliminating-female-genital-mutilation-
108914169/130753.html (accessed June, 2013).
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Source: OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database 2009
Figure 2.1.: FGC Prevalence Rates in Africa and Middle East
This paper focuses on the economic perspective and aims to shed light on the following
two questions: what can explain cross-country differences in FGC rates? Which policies can
reduce FGC rates? The overall goal is to provide a formalized framework for policy analysis.
For policy interventions, it is important to analyze the underlying forces of this tradition and
its interactions with other economic variables. This is exactly where the economic perspective
and methods can provide a helping hand. Given that there are almost no program evaluations
available to date, the effects of certain policies remain ambiguous, which calls for models to
investigate possible interventions.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, I present cross-country evidence of a
negative correlation between the status of women within a country and female circumcision
rates. The smaller the inequality between genders, i.e the higher the women's status, the
lower the FGC rate. This has not been recognized in the literature so far. Second, I provide
a theoretical model that generates this empirical link by modeling FGC as premarital invest-
ment, reflecting an explicit decision of parents, to improve the marriage market prospects
9of their daughter. Third, the framework is used for a systematic policy analysis, including
penalty fees and consumption subsidies to women, financed through a tax on men's income.
The model allows for the analysis of general equilibrium effects in the marriage market, which
turn out to be important for evaluating the effectiveness of different policies in reducing the
FGC prevalence rate.
As a first contribution, I find that countries with higher gender inequality towards women
have higher female circumcision prevalence rates. As a measure of gender inequality and
women's status for different countries, I use the Social Institution and Gender Index (SIGI)
2009 for non-OECD countries, constructed by the OECD. The OLS estimates suggest a posi-
tive correlation between gender inequality and FGC prevalence rates. Given that this empir-
ical analysis cannot identify any causality, the model explores the causal link from women's
status to the FGC rate.5
The second contribution lies in the model, which is able to generate a negative correlation
between the status of women and female circumcision rates. The model builds upon the work
of Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010), who model FGC as a form of premarital investment
such that circumcised girls have a higher chance of marrying richer men. In contrast to the
model in Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010), parents decide upon the circumcision of their
daughter. Their utility is based on dynastic preferences in line with Barro and Becker (1988,
1989). In general, a circumcised daughter will suffer negative long-term health consequences
in the form of disutility. Marriage to a man provides her with access to resources through his
income. All children will be matched to a spouse in the marriage market. While women can
differ in their circumcision status (not circumcised versus circumcised), men differ in their
wages. I further assume, as in Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010), that men value having
a circumcised wife, i.e. if they are married to a circumcised woman, they derive positive utility
from such a match. With these assumptions, a stable matching in the marriage market involves
an assortative mating, whereby the underlying matching process follows the Gale-Shapley
algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962). Therefore, a circumcised woman has a higher chance of
marrying a rich man, which potentially increases her consumption. This consumption gain
not only depends on the FGC specific match probabilities, but also the bargaining power of
the woman. A female's bargaining power influences her consumption since a couple makes
consumption decisions in a collective way through cooperative bargaining.6 For the FGC
5In the model, the effect of the women's status on the FGC rate in equilibrium is analyzed. A possible
reversed causality is not analyzed in this paper.
6The collective decision process is linked back to the work by Chiappori (1992) and Bourguignon and Chi-
appori (1992).
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decision parents trade off utility costs (negative health consequences) against utility gains
(more consumption) of their daughter's circumcision. Despite the marriage market being
large and frictionless, the level of the FGC rate in equilibrium can be inefficient.7 The reason
is that parents do not take the actual utility gain of the potential husband into account when
deciding upon the circumcision of the daughter.
I interpret cross-country differences in the status of women as different levels of bargaining
power for women, in line with Doepke and Tertilt (2009).8 The model can generate a negative
interaction between the female circumcision rates and the status of women: an exogenous
increase in the bargaining power of women leads to a decrease of the FGC rates in equilibrium.
As a direct effect of a bargaining improvement, the consumption increases for all women.
However, for a large parameter space of the model, an increase in the female bargaining
power reduces the potential utility gain of a woman from marrying a rich man and hence the
benefits of FGC. In turn, this leads to a drop in the FGC prevalence rates. Thus, the model
may explain part of the observed cross-country correlation between FGC rate and the Social
Institution and Gender Index (status of women).
The third contribution of this paper involves the extended policy analysis of two distinct
interventions: penalty fees and direct consumption subsidies to women, the latter of which are
financed through proportional income taxes for men. Both policies are able to reduce FGC
rates, albeit with different distributional effects. The general equilibrium model uncovers a
novel implication of penalty fees, whereby their reducing impact on FGC is attenuated by the
general equilibrium effect in the marriage market. When the FGC rate drops, the probability
of marrying a high type man increases for circumcised daughters. For rich households, this
increase in the probability can outweigh the additional cost of FGC, such that more rich
families circumcise their daughter. By contrast, many poor households stop doing so, leading
to a redistribution from poor to rich families to some extent. The acknowledgment of this
potential effect is highly relevant for policy implementations. The second policy is also able to
reduce the FGC rate, comprising two components: a redistribution from rich to poor house-
holds and a redistribution from men to women. It is important to stress that a redistribution
from rich to poor households does not drive the results alone; rather, it is the combination
of both components that reduces the FGC rate even more. Such a detailed policy analysis
7Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010) detect a comparable inefficiency in their model on top of search
frictions in the marriage market.
8In the model of Doepke and Tertilt (2009), the bargaining power of husbands and wives is set by the women's
legal rights.
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would not be possible within the model of Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010).9
Besides them, there are only a few economic papers that attempt to formalize potential
reasons for FGC. Coyne and Coyne (2014) apply the identity model proposed by Akerlof and
Kranton (2000) to this tradition. In their model, FGC is a crucial part of the ethnic identity
and if a group member challenges this identity by refusing FGC, the rest of the group will
punish this behavior to protect their identity. Using data from 13 African countries, Wagner
(2013) not only presents empirical evidence of the relevance of ethnic and religious identity,
but also of an interaction of the tradition with the marriage market. Rai and Sengupta (2013)
explore the latter link, relating FGC to the marriage market as a form of signaling postmarital
behavior. Men value feminine virtue but are unable to observe this before marriage due to
asymmetric information. Female circumcision is seen as a premarital confinement that signals
a docile behavior after marriage. The authors conduct some comparative statics to analyze
the rules of descent, wealth inequality and production technology, but do not focus on policy
analysis. Ouedraogo and Koissy-Kpein (2014) and Bellemare et al. (2014) also explore the
underlying economic forces of FGC. While Ouedraogo and Koissy-Kpein (2014) focus on
the interplay of education, FGC and the marriage market in Burkina Faso, Bellemare et al.
(2014) analyze data from Senegal and the Gambia, finding that individual- and household-
level factors can account for a large share of the FGC persistence, whereby this share is largest
in the Gambia. Furthermore, village-level factors play a more important role for FGC support
in Senegal compared to the Gambia.
This paper also belongs to a broader strand of literature on the interaction between violence
and economic considerations, since I focus on economic forces for a harmful tradition.10 For
example, Miguel (2005) finds evidence that negative income shocks increase the number of
witch killings, a form of religious violence, in Tanzania. Bloch and Rao (2002) analyze bridal
violence as a bargaining instrument in India. Further related problems are those of missing
women in India and China (Sen, 1990) and gender differences in resource allocation and excess
female mortality (Rose, 1999). The analysis of the interaction between women's status and
female genital cutting also links this paper to the literature on the empowerment of women and
development (see Doepke and Tertilt (2009), Duflo (2012), Doepke et al. (2012), Fernández
(2014), amongst others).
The paper further contributes to the economic literature on the marriage market, linking
9They only very briefly propose as policy interventions an increase in the cost of circumcision and a change
of the marriage market expectations.
10Most of the following papers in this literature review are also mentioned by Chesnokova and Vaithianathan
(2010).
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back to the work of Becker (1973, 1974), which represents the foundation of many papers on
stable matches in the marriage market (see e.g. Laitner (1991), Burdett and Coles (1997),
Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2005) and Lundberg and Pollak (2008)).11 The premarital in-
vestment nature of FGC in this paper relates it to the specific strand of the marriage market
literature on premarital investment, e.g. Fernández et al. (2005), Nosaka (2007), Bjerk (2009)
and Bhaskar and Hopkins (2011). Many of the papers analyze whether the individually de-
termined investment levels are socially efficient. Depending on the circumstances, it can be
the case that the level is efficient (e.g. Cole et al. (2001), Peters and Siow (2002), Iyigun and
Walsh (2007), Chiappori et al. (2009) and Bhaskar and Hopkins (2011)), as well as inefficient
(e.g. Peters and Siow (2002), Peters (2007) and Burdett and Coles (2001)). The inefficiency
can go in both directions, with over-investment, a form of a rat race, or even under-investment.
Many of these papers concentrate on education as a premarital investment, but not on FGC,
which in contrast to education is a harmful investment. The work of Mariani (2012) on the
value of female virginity within the marriage market is also closely related to my work. In
this paper, female virginity is the premarital investment instead of FGC and higher male
inequality leads to a higher prevalence of virginity, given that the returns to being married to
a rich men are relatively larger. This is similar to the underlying mechanism in this paper.
Another related paper along these lines is Lee and Ryu (2012), who find evidence for a large
beauty premium in labor and marriage markets, using Korean data, but a small premium for
plastic surgeries.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides empirical
background information and cross-country evidence regarding female circumcision. The model
is presented in Section 2.3, followed by a discussion of the inefficiency in Section 2.4. The
influence of female bargaining power on FGC rates within the model is discussed in Section
2.5. Policy implications are analyzed in Section 2.6, before I conclude in Section 2.7.
2.2. Empirical Analysis
2.2.1. Background Information
Female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) refers to several different harmful practices
involving the cutting of the female genitals. It is estimated that about three million girls, the
majority under 15 years of age, undergo the procedure every year. FGM/C is a practice
11Browning et al. (2014) provide an extensive overview of the marriage market literature.
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deeply rooted in tradition and persists because it is a social convention upheld by underlying
gender structures and power relations. (United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA))12
Many attempts to identify the origin of FGC have failed to paint a clear picture. Some
documents point towards Egypt as country of origin for this procedure (Skaine, 2005).13
Yoder and Khan (2008) estimate that around 8 million women are infibulated and exposed
to the most severe and harmful form of FGC, which corresponds to 10% of the circumcised
women in Africa.14
The circumcision usually takes place at a young age between 4 and 14 years, although it is
even performed on infants. In some ethnic groups, the circumcision can also take place just
before marriage or during the first pregnancy (Skaine (2005) and UNICEF (2005b)). Female
circumcision at early ages indicates that girls cannot influence the decision, which is made by
their parents or family.
FGC is predominantly performed by traditional practitioners, midwives and barbers, most
commonly without medical training (Skaine (2005) and UNICEF (2005b)).15 Chesnokova
and Vaithianathan (2010) cite the US Office of Senior Coordinator for International Women's
Issues, which states that excisors receive around USD 2-3 per female circumcision in urban
areas, while in rural areas payment is mainly made in grain or other agricultural goods.
The instruments used by traditional practitioners vary across countries, but range from saw-
toothed knives over pieces of glass, scissors, sharp stones to razors (Skaine, 2005). This
can lead to immediate health consequences such as severe pain, shock, excessive bleeding,
infections, and psychological consequences. Possible long-term health risks include chronic
pain, infections, sexually transmitted infections, birth complications, danger to newborn, as
well as psychological consequences, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (Skaine (2005),
Shell-Duncan and Hernlund (2000) and Dorkenoo (1999)). Adam et al. (2010) estimate the
costs of obstetric complications related to FGC in six African countries, namely Burkina Faso,
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and the Sudan, as ranging from 0.1 to 1% of the governmental
12http://www.unfpa.org/topics/genderissues/fgm, accessed on May, 08, 2013.
13Female circumcision in Egypt is mentioned on a Greek papyrus from 163 B.C. (Skaine, 2005).
14The World Health Organization categorizes female genital mutilation/cutting into four groups: 'Clitoridec-
tomy' is the partial or total removal of the clitoris, 'Excision' describes the partial or total removal of
the clitoris and the labia minora, 'Infibulation' refers to the most severe form of circumcision where the
vaginal opening is narrowed through the creation of a covering seal and 'Other' refers to all other harmful
procedures to the female genitalia (WHO (2008), WHO (2012)). The 10% is based on the estimated total
number of circumcised women from Yoder and Khan (2008), which is around 80 million and not above 130
million, as estimated by UNICEF (2005b).
15However, there seems to be a trend towards a so-called medicalization, whereby the procedure is relocated
to hospitals and health clinics (UNICEF, 2005b). The qualified health professionals are in particular
employed by richer families (Skaine, 2005).
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health spending for women (in total I$ 3.7 million).16 Jones et al. (1999) also find evidence
of a positive correlation between the severeness of FGC and obstetric complications.
In the last 10 to 20 years, the tradition of female genital cutting has attracted large inter-
national attention, leading to many campaigns against FGC by international organizations
such as UNFPA, UNICEF and WHO.17 The goal of eliminating this tradition is justified by
two prominent arguments, one pointing out the discussed negative health consequences and
the other categorizing the tradition as a violation of human rights (WHO, 2008).18 The most
recent report of UNICEF (UNICEF, 2013) finds evidence of lower FGC rates among adoles-
cents compared to the older cohorts in some countries, thus indicating a downward trend.19
Nevertheless, the prevalence rates are still significantly different from zero.
The perceived benefits of FGC range from direct benefits for man, such as ensuring fe-
male virginity and more sexual pleasure, to indirect benefits for women, among which better
marriage prospects and social acceptance, hygiene and religious approval are stated. In Côte
d'Ivoire, Niger and Eritrea, 25% to 36% of the women think that female circumcision improves
the marriage prospects (UNICEF, 2005b), which is also true for around 14% of all women in
the African countries analyzed by Wagner (2013).20 Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010)
also show that in Burkina Faso in 2003 circumcised women were more likely to live in a
wealthier household, which is supported by Sipsma et al. (2012) for Burkina Faso, Nigeria,
Niger, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. These empirical observations support the hypothesis that
better marriage market prospects are one of the underlying forces of the FGC tradition.
2.2.2. Cross-Country Differences
The OECD Gender, Institution and Development Database (GID-DB) gathers FGC preva-
lence rates for non-OECD countries. Most of the FGC rates are based on surveys, such
16I$ stands for international (purchasing power parity) dollars.
17In 2008, the UNFPA and UNICEF started to work together on a Joint Programme on Female
Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change. The focus lies on strengthening the legisla-
tion outlawing FGC and supporting communities to coordinate on agreements to abandon FGC.
This includes community conversations, education about human rights and fundamental values
(http://www.unicef.org/protection/57929_58002.html, accessed August, 2013).
18The international point of view does not necessarily coincide with the perception of the people involved,
which is actually documented by the fact that FGC still exists and persists.
19The sharpest difference is observed for Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania. In countries like Benin,
Central African Republic, Iraq, Liberia and Nigeria the difference of the prevalence rates is around one
half. In the Chad, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Sudan and Yemen such a difference is
not observed.
20Wagner (2013) analyzes 13 African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Guinea, Kenya, Mali,
Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Ghana. In Table 2 of her paper she shows the self-declared
advantages of FGC, while not having information for the last two countries. The 14% of women includes
the stated advantages: better marriage prospects and virginity.
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as the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) and the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
(MICS). Furthermore, the GID-DB provides different measures of the economic development
of women for various countries, e.g. the Social Institution and Gender Index (SIGI). The SIGI
is a measure of gender inequality, capturing discriminatory social institutions and inheritance
practices, violence against women, son preference, restricted access to public space and re-
stricted access to land and credit.21 Later on, I interpret cross-country differences in gender
inequality, represented by the SIGI, as different levels of bargaining power for women in the
model (as in Doepke and Tertilt (2009)). The Social Institution and Gender Index was cal-
culated for 102 non-OECD countries in 2009. Note that FGC is also part of the sub-index of
Physical Integrity. Therefore, I adjust the SIGI by excluding this information, which is used
yet referred to as SIGI in the following.22 The SIGI 2009 is based on information that has
been available before but closest to 2009 for the different countries. For details on the data,
I refer to Section 2.A.2 in the Appendix.
Figure 2.2 shows the correlations between FGC prevalence rates and the Social Institution
and Gender Index, whereby 0 indicates equality between genders and 1 inequality, with women
being disadvantaged. More precisely, Figure 2.2a includes all countries for which information
on FGC and the Social Institution and Gender Index exists. The fitted line is based on a linear
regression of FGC rates on the adjusted index. Figure 2.2b only shows countries with positive
FGC rates. In both cases, the correlation between FGC rates and the index is positive.23
This correlation is robust to including further controls. I estimate two cross-country OLS
regressions, one including all countries and another conditional on positive FGC prevalence
rates:
FGCc = α0 + α1SIGIc + x
′
cα3 + εc and (2.1)
FGCc = α0 + α1SIGIc + x
′
cα3 + εc
for FGCc > 0, (2.2)
21The index consists of 14 variables, which are grouped into five categories: Discriminatory Family Code,
Restricted Physical Integrity, Son Bias, Restricted Resources and Entitlements and Restricted Civil Lib-
erties. The index formula is SIGI = 1
5
Family2 + 1
5
Physical2 + 1
5
Son2 + 1
5
Resources2 + 1
5
Civil2(see
http://genderindex.org/content/team, accessed September, 2013).
22The adjusted SIGI is calculated as SIGIadjust =
1
4
Family2 + 1
4
Son2 + 1
4
Ownership2 + 1
4
Civil2. All the
following analysis are based on this measure, which I refer to as SIGI.
23Excluding Afghanistan and Sudan, which are outliers with respect to the SIGI, does not change the signifi-
cant positive correlation. The correlation of countries with positive FGC rates reduces slightly to 0.42.
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with x
′
c capturing controls, namely GDP p.c., GDP growth over the last 10 years, Gini
coefficient of income and fraction of Muslim in the country, while the error term is denoted
by εc.
24 As a robustness check, I also consider the observed FGC rate as a censored latent
variable and estimate a Tobit model of the following form:
FGCc =

FGC∗c if FGC∗c > 0
0 if FGC∗c ≤ 0,
(2.3)
where FGC∗c is the latent variable: FGC∗c = α0 + α1SIGIc + x
′
cα3 + εc with εc ∼ N(0, σ2).
Furthermore, almost all countries with a positive FGC prevalence lie above a SIGI value of
0.1 (SIGI). To account for this, I include this threshold to allow for different relationships
(Column 4 of Table 2.1). The estimation equation across all countries c is given by:
FGCc = α0 + α1(SIGIc ≤ 0.1) + α2(SIGIc > 0.1) + x′cα3 + εc. (2.4)
In all four estimations, I allow for heteroskedastic error terms and the results of the estimations
are shown in the Table 2.1. The coefficient of the Social Institution and Gender Index has a
significant positive coefficient in all regressions, supporting the positive correlation in Figure
2.2. Considering the whole sample, in Column 1, an increase in the inequality measure (SIGI)
by 0.1 points is accompanied by a 12 percentage points increase in the FGC rate. Besides the
SIGI, only the fraction of Muslims has a significant positive coefficient, i.e. higher FGC rates
are observed in countries with a higher fraction of Muslims. The other variables are mainly
insignificant.25 Table 2.A1 (in Appendix 2.A.2) provides the estimates of the same regression
models as presented in Table 2.1, but without the information of Sudan, given that it is an
outlier with respect to the SIGI index.26 The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients slightly
change, but importantly the signs of the coefficients remain the same. A further robustness
check is presented in Table 2.A2, whereby additional controls are included. The significant
positive interaction of the FGC rate and the SIGI remains stable. Clearly, the results do not
allow a causal interpretation, which is left to the model.
24Not all controls are available for the year 2009, therefore the information which is based on years before
and closest to 2009 is used. Information on GDP p.c., GDP growth and the Gini coefficient is taken from
the World Bank Indicators and the fraction of Muslims from Alesina et al. (2003). For more information
on the data I refer the reader to the Section 2.A.2 in the Appendix.
25It might be the case that the Social Institution and Gender Index partly captures such factors.
26This is also true for Afghanistan, but it is already excluded from the regression since there is missing
information on some controls.
 
?????????????????????
?
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
??
??
??
??
?
? ?? ?? ??
????????????????????????????????????
?????????????? ?????????????
???????? ??????????
    	

?????
????????????
????????
????????????????????????
????
?????
?????????????
????????????
????????
??????
?????
??????
?????????
????
?????
???????
??????
????
??????????
?????
???????
????????
????
???????
????????????
?????
????????????????????????????
????
??????
????????????????????
?? ?????
??????????????????????
?
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
??
??
??
??
?
? ?? ?? ??
????????????????????????????????????
?????????????? ?????????????
???????? ??????????
  	
 	  		
  


  

 		  


 

  	     	
 
    	

 
    	

 	
 	 
 
  	  	 

  	 	 
	

 	 
 
 
    
  

	

 		   	 
  	
	      

    
	  
 

! "   	
 fi  $%  	 		 	
    
	

	

  	 	 &     	 
' %	       	    	 $% 	
 	
(   	
 
 	 ) 
   
	

  	 
	     *$
  + , 	  	  ff	  	
 
 
    
	

 *$
 +  	 	
  $%   
	  		 	& 	
   %&  . */ /+  0 
1 */ !+     	 	    2 
	   

     		 	& 3  
 ff	  	  
  $% 
ff	  	  *	 + , 		        
	


    		   
	

   	   	 
  


   
	
     (     
	


   	 

  		  	
  
 
	 	 
 
 *$
 !+ 1
 	 	 	
      	 	 	
18 CHAPTER 2. FGC AND WOMEN'S STATUS ACROSS COUNTRIES
Table 2.1.: Regression Results: FGC Prevalence Rates
OLS OLS (FGC>0) Tobit OLS
SIGI 1.182*** 1.283*** 2.031***
(0.205) (0.312) (0.354)
SIGI>0.1 1.130***
(0.228)
SIGI<=0.1 0.623
(0.729)
Fract. of Muslim 0.00137* 0.00359** 0.00398*** 0.00141*
(0.000817) (0.00128) (0.00149) (0.000835)
GDP p.c. 0.000000363 0.00000244 -0.000130** 0.000000146
(0.00000161) (0.0000519) (0.0000561) (0.00000175)
GDP growth 0.00289 0.0334** -0.00746 0.00368
(0.00834) (0.0154) (0.0151) (0.00853)
Gini 0.000984 0.0155 0.00523 0.00134
(0.00252) (0.00924) (0.00817) (0.00271)
Constant -0.129 -0.859* -0.543 -0.133
(0.126) (0.434) (0.355) (0.128)
Sigma 0.340***
(0.0409)
Observations 90 30 90 90
(pseudo) R2 0.426 0.481 0.547 0.427
Source: OECD Gender, Institution and Development Database, World Bank WDI, Alesina
et al. (2003), own calculations. Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in paren-
theses. * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01). If information is not available for 2009, data
is based on years before and closest to 2009. The GDP growth is the GDP's average annual
growth rate over the last 10 years.
own utility, they will trade off utility gains (more consumption) against utility costs (negative
health consequences) of the circumcision for the daughter. These consumption possibilities
depend on the probabilities of being matched to a richer man. Furthermore, the bargaining
power of the woman influences her consumption, since a couple makes consumption decisions
through cooperative bargaining. The cross-country differences in the status of women will
be translated into different bargaining power for women across countries (Fact 4). A more
detailed discussion of the model setup and assumptions follows in the next section.
2.3. Model
The model has two periods with a young (children) and old (parents) generation. In the
first period, the economy is populated by parents, father and mother, and their children.
Fertility is exogenous, with each couple having two children, a daughter and a son. There is
a unit measure of each gender and each generation. While parents make decisions on their
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and linearly in the utility of the woman, the consumption does not depend on it. Within
the decision problem of the household, which will be explained in Section 2.3.5, the choice
variables are the consumption cf and the FGC status of the daughter F
′, affecting uf ′ . The
own circumcision status F is a state variable. Similarly, the utility of a husband in the first
period is defined as:
um =
c1−σm
1− σ + αmFˆ + γ(uf ′ + um′), (2.6)
with individual consumption cm. He derives positive utility αm from being married to a
circumcised wife, Fˆ = 1. A man is altruistic towards his children in the same way as a
woman. The discounted (ex-ante) utility of a daughter in period one
uf ′ = βE(
c1−σf ′
1− σ − αf,iF
′) (2.7)
comprises the discounted expected utility of the second period. Expectations are multiplied
by the discount factor β and formed over the marriage market outcome, which will influence
the utility in the second period. The underlying probabilities are endogenous equilibrium
objects, which will be explained in further detail in Section 2.3.4. Since the model ends after
the second period and the second generation does not have offspring, only the consumption
(choice variable) and possible long-term effects of the circumcision (state variable) enter the
utility. For the son, the expected utility of the second period is given by:
um′ = βE(
c1−σm′
1− σ + αmFˆ
′), (2.8)
with Fˆ ′ = 1 if the son is married to a circumcised woman. The traits of the partner are always
indicated by a hat.
2.3.2. Household Budget Constraint
Each adult receives a fixed exogenous wage income for supplying labor inelastically. While
each woman earns wf , the wage income of a man depends on his type ω. The economy does
not provide any savings technology. A household pools its income to finance the individual
consumption of the spouses, leading to the following budget constraint:
cf + cm ≤ wf + wm(ω). (2.9)
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The budget constraint in the second period is the same.27
2.3.3. Heterogeneity
Women are heterogeneous in their long-term effect of FGC and men differ in their wage
income. While the mother and daughter within a household have the same long-term effects
of circumcision, the effects differ across households. The perceived long-term effect of FGC
for a household with a wife (mother) i is denoted by αf,i and is uniformly distributed over
the interval [αf , αf ]. The distribution function is denoted by Uαf,i . This variation across
households can be explained by different perceptions, information and social environment
across families. The assumption of the same perceived long-term effect within a household
can be justified by the empirical observation of a strong intergenerational transmission of the
tradition from the mother to daughter (Yount, 2002). Men can be either of type high or
low, ω ∈ {h, l}, with the high type earning more than the low type (wm(h) > wm(l)). For
simplicity, the types are randomly distributed, not only across households but also within a
household (across generation), meaning that the type of the father is not correlated with the
son's type. The fraction of high type men in the economy is given by fh and M denotes the
distribution of the type of men.
2.3.4. Marriage Market
I assume that there are no binding agreements before marriage and no search frictions in the
marriage market. As in Lundberg and Pollak (2008), the marriage market and consumption
allocation can be viewed as a two-stage game. In the first stage, couples are formed, taking
the consumption allocation that will emerge in the second stage as given. Utility transfers
within a couple due to the circumcision are assumed away: a man is not going to compensate
a circumcised woman in terms of consumption for deriving positive utility. Put differently,
the marriage surplus out of FGC is not divided. In this sense, FGC is not a technology that
allows the woman to extract more consumption out of a given marriage match. Furthermore,
I assume that staying single is strictly dominated by being married.28 In the marriage market,
first the high type men decide who they want to marry and subsequently the poor men. A
woman could in principal reject the proposal of a high type man. However, since a rich man
27The female wage stays the same wf ′ = wf and a high (low) type men in the second period earns the same
as a high (low) type in the first period, wm′(ω
′) = wm(ω) for ω′ = ω.
28For the main mechanism it is not important to model it explicitly, but it could easily be done by either
incorporating a high utility gain of marriage, a public good within marriage or a high utility loss of staying
single.
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is always preferred to a poor man, this will not happen in equilibrium. Furthermore, men
prefer circumcised women in this model, such that a high type man always wants to marry
a circumcised woman. If there are fewer circumcised women than rich men in the marriage
market, not every rich man can marry a circumcised woman. In such a case, the probability
of a high type man marrying a circumcised woman, pFˆ=1(h
′), is less than one and he will
marry an uncircumcised woman with a positive probability of (1−pFˆ=1(h′)). The probability
of a circumcised woman marrying a high type man is denoted by ph(F
′ = 1) and for an
uncircumcised woman by ph(F
′ = 0), which of course also depends on the fractions of high
type men and circumcised women in equilibrium.29 One could think of the underlying mating
process as follows: men propose to their most favored woman and if a woman has more than
one proposal, she only puts the dominant proposal on hold. Every man who was rejected
proposes to his preferred woman among those remaining to which he has not proposed before.
Women in turn reject the dominated proposals. This process continues until convergence,
which is assured by the fact that each woman receives at most one proposal from the same
man (Browning et al., 2014).30 This adjustment process corresponds to the Gale-Shapley
algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962), which provides a stable matching allocation such that
there are no two individuals who are not married to each other but would both strictly prefer
to be.
2.3.5. Decision of the Households
Household decisions concerning consumption are made through collective bargaining, where
the bargaining power of the wife is denoted by θf ∈ (0, 1).31 The bargaining power is exoge-
nous and the same for all women, mothers and daughters, in an economy. It is supposed to
capture the status of the women. The old couple's maximization problem in the first period
is:32
max
cm,cf ,F ′
U = θf
c1−σf
1− σ + (1− θf )
c1−σm
1− σ + γ(uf ′ + um′)
s.t. cf + cm = wf + wm(ω). (2.10)
29Mariani (2012) has a comparable framework in his marriage market, where men also differ in their income
but women in their virginity status. The marriage market in the baseline model of Laitner (1991) is also
similar.
30Bjerk (2009) also has a similar marriage market set up in his paper.
31This household decision process is modeled as a Pareto problem with different weights for the spouses,
following Chiappori (1992) and Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992).
32Since the circumcision status of the wife, F , is a state variable for the couple and does not influence the
consumption decision, it is ignored in the optimization problem.
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The household decides on the individual consumption cm and cf , on the circumcision of the
daughter F ′ subject to their budget constraint and taking into account the decision of their
children, in particular of their daughter. Even though the son's utility, um′ , enters the utility
of parents, it can be neglected in the optimization problem, since there is no relevant decision
on the son's side and the parents cannot influence his marriage market prospects.33 Therefore,
the optimization reduces to:
max
cm,F ′
U = θf
(wf + wm(ω)− cm)1−σ
1− σ + (1− θf )
c1−σm
1− σ
utility of
daughter

+γ
{
F ′β
(
ph(F
′ = 1)[
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1−σ − αf,i]+
(1− ph(F ′ = 1))[
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1−σ − αf,i]
)
+(1− F ′)β
(
ph(F
′ = 0)
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1−σ +
(1− ph(F ′ = 0))
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1−σ
)}
.
(2.11)
The discounted expected utility of the daughter depends on her FGC status, the marriage
market outcome and the bargaining power of women. The young couple's optimization prob-
lem in the second period is given by:34
max
cm′,ω′ ,cf ′,ω′
U = θf
c1−σf ′,ω′
1− σ + (1− θf )
c1−σm,ω′
1− σ
s.t. cf ′,ω′ + cm′,ω′ = wf ′ + wm′(ω
′). (2.12)
2.3.6. Equilibrium Definition
Let F ′∗(αf,i) be an indicator function that is equal to one if the family having a daughter
with the long-term effect αf,i decides to circumcise her:
F ′∗(αf,i) =

1 if household i does circumcise
0 otherwise.
Definition 2.1. The equilibrium consists of matching probabilities (ph(F
′ = 1), ph(F ′ = 0)),
pFˆ=1(h
′) and pFˆ=1(l
′)), the optimal consumption rules (c∗f , c
∗
m, c
∗
f ′,ωˆ′ and c
∗
m′,ω′) and the
33The son's utility primarily depends on his own type, which is known to the family, and secondly also on the
marriage match.
34As in the maximization problem (2.10) of the old couple, the FGC of the wife, F ′, is a state variable for the
couple and does not influence the consumption decision and can be ignored in the optimization problem
of a young couple.
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circumcision (F ′∗(αf,i)) choices for each household, such that:
• consumption choices (c∗f and c∗m) and the female circumcision decision (F ′∗(αf,i)) solve
the household's optimization problem of the couples in the first period (Equation 2.11),
given the marriage market probabilities, wages and individual long-term effect of FGC;
• consumption choices (c∗f ′,ωˆ′ and c∗m′,ω′) solve the household's optimization problem of
the couples in the second period (Equation 2.12); and
• the marriage market clears:
 the demand for circumcised women is equal to the supply
pFˆ=1(h
′)fh + pFˆ=1(l
′)(1− fh) =
α¯fˆ
αf
F ′∗(αf,i)dUαf,i(αf,i);
 the demand for high type men is equal to the supply
α¯fˆ
αf
F ′∗(αf,i)ph(F ′ = 1)dUαf,i(αf,i) +
α¯fˆ
αf
(
1− F ′∗(αf,i)
)
ph(F
′ = 0)dUαf,i(αf,i) = fh; and
• the matching is stable such that there are no two individuals who are not married to
each other but would both strictly prefer to be.
2.3.7. Equilibrium Characterization
The optimal consumption decision of the young couple in the second period is given by:
(c∗f ′,ω′ , c
∗
m′,ω′) = arg maxcf ′,ω′ ,cm′,ω′
θf
c1−σf ′,ω′
1− σ + (1− θf )
c1−σm′,ω′
1− σ
s.t. cf ′,ω′ + cm′,ω′ = wf ′ + wm′(ω
′),
c∗f ′,ω′ =
θ
1
σ
f
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
(wf ′ + wm′(ω
′)) and
c∗m′,ω′ =
(1− θf ) 1σ
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
(wf ′ + wm′(ω
′)). (2.13)
The optimal consumption rules of the old couple in the first period are analogous to (2.13).
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Parents will decide on the female genital cutting of their daughter, taking into account
the optimal consumption of the daughter in the second period (see Equation 2.13). If the
expected utility of being circumcised is higher than that of being uncircumcised, parents
decide to circumcise their daughter: F ′∗(αf,i) = 1 if
γβph(F
′ = 1)
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ − αf,i
)
+γβ(1− ph(F ′ = 1))
(
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ − αf,i
)
> γβph(F
′ = 0)
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
+γβ(1− ph(F ′ = 0))
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ .
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected utility when circumcised
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected utility when uncircumcised
(2.14)
Equation (2.14) can be rewritten in a way that the gain, comprising the probability increase
of marrying a high type man and the additional utility of the higher consumption, is weighted
against the utility costs of FGC:
(
ph(F
′ = 1)− ph(F ′ = 0)
)(c∗f ′,hˆ′1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
> αf,i. (2.15)
There exists a threshold for long-term effects, for which Equation (2.15) holds with equality:
α∗f =
(
ph(F
′ = 1)− ph(F ′ = 0)
) c∗f ′,hˆ′1−σ − c∗f ′,lˆ′1−σ
1− σ (2.16)
If the individual long-term effect is above this cutoff, the cost of circumcision dominates the
benefit, such that the family will refrain from FGC. All households in which the daughter has
FGC costs below this threshold will circumcise her. In equilibrium, this threshold defines the
fraction of circumcised women fF in the economy, which has to lay within the interval of [0, 1]
by definition.
The equilibrium probabilities depend on the fraction of circumcised young women in the
marriage market fF , which in turn is determined by this threshold α
∗
f :
fF =
α∗f − αf
αf − αf
=
(ph(F
′ = 1)− ph(F ′ = 0))
(αf − αf )(1− σ)
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ − c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
)
− αf
αf − αf
. (2.17)
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The stable matching in the marriage market is characterized by a positive assortative mating
with respect to FGC and wealth.35 This means that a high type man generally marries a
circumcised woman and a low type man a uncircumcised woman. If there are more high type
men in the economy than circumcised women, all circumcised women are matched with a high
type man and the remaining men will marry a uncircumcised woman. The opposite is true if
there are more circumcised women than high type men. The matching within these groups is
random.36 Depending on the fraction of high type men, fh, three different cases can occur in
equilibrium (which are also presented in Figure 2.A3 in Appendix 2.A.4):
Case(1) fh = fF : the fraction of circumcised women (fF ) in equilibrium is determined by
the fraction of high type men,
fF =
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ − c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
(αf − αf )(1− σ)
− αf
αf − αf
= fh (2.18)
with the following probabilities:37
ph(F
′ = 1) = 1 and ph(F ′ = 0) = 0.
Case(2) fh > fF : the fraction of high type men is larger than the fraction of circumcised
women in equilibrium. Therefore, the probabilities are:
ph(F
′ = 1) = 1 and ph(F ′ = 0) =
fh − fF
1− fF ,
such that the fraction of circumcised women is determined by:
fF = −
αf − 2αf
2(αf − αf )
±
((
αf − 2αf
)2
4(αf − αf )2
+
(1− fh)(c∗f ′,hˆ′1−σ − c∗f ′,lˆ′1−σ)
(1− σ)(αf − αf )
− αf
(αf − αf )
) 1
2
. (2.19)
Denoting the solution involving the positive sign before the root as Case (2.19a)
35This assortative mating is comparable in this special setup to Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010) and
Rai and Sengupta (2013) but also in general to the assortative mating in Becker (1965).
36Bjerk (2009) has a comparable matching process.
37If the fraction of high type men is actually zero, then the probabilities turn to ph(F
′ = 1) = 0 and
ph(F
′ = 0) = 1.
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and the other as Case (2.19b).
Case(3) fh < fF : the fraction of high type men is smaller than that of circumcised women
in equilibrium, which leads to the following probabilities:
ph(F
′ = 1) =
fh
fF
and ph(F
′ = 0) = 0.
The corresponding fraction of circumcised women is:
fF =
−αf
2(αf − αf )
±
(
α2f
4(αf − αf )2
+
fh(c
∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ − c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ)
(1− σ)(αf − αf )
) 1
2
. (2.20)
Again, the solution based on the positive sign before the root is denoted by (2.20a)
and the other by (2.20b).
Propositions 2.3 and 2.4 in Appendix 2.A.5 show that at least one equilibrium exists for a
relatively large parameter space, although there are some multiplicity problems. I solve for
all possible equilibria in the numerical example (see Section 2.5.2), however, there are no
multiplicity issues.
2.4. Inefficiency of the Equilibrium Outcome
In this section, I discuss inefficiencies of the marriage market equilibrium. As in Chesnokova
and Vaithianathan (2010), the degree of valuation of circumcision from the husband's per-
spective (αm) does not influence the level of the FGC rate, as long as αm is positive. For
the parents, it does not matter how much utility a potential husband of their daughter gains
from having a circumcised wife, parents do not maximize social welfare. It only matters that
he actually values the circumcision and that thus the circumcision increases the probability
of the daughter marrying a high type man. Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010) point out
that the FGC rate can be inefficiently high in such a set-up.
As briefly mentioned in the introduction, the discussion concerning inefficiencies is at the
heart of many papers in the literature on premarital investment. Depending on the assump-
tions, market outcomes can be efficient, e.g. if markets are large, no frictions exist and/or
utilities are transferable (Cole et al. (2001), Peters and Siow (2002), Iyigun and Walsh (2007)
and Chiappori et al. (2009)) but also inefficient, e.g. if markets are small and/or frictions are
prevalent (Burdett and Coles (2001), Peters and Siow (2002), Peters (2007) and Baker and
Jacobsen (2007)). The inefficiency can go in both directions, namely either underinvestment
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(e.g. Burdett and Coles, 2001) or over-investment (e.g Peters, 2007).38 For example, Mar-
iani (2012) shows that the virginity level in the private equilibrium is not socially optimal.
Depending on the parameter, the level is either inefficiently high or inefficiently low.
As Mariani (2012), I compute the social planner allocation to investigate whether the private
allocation is socially optimal. Preferences of men and women are taken as given. However, it is
not obvious which degree of freedom a social planner has, i.e. which allocations he can enforce.
This makes the welfare analysis not trivial. Therefore, I also analyze equivalent consumption
variations (EV) from a ex-post perspective in this section. For a woman, the EV represents
the amount of consumption she would be willing to give up to get rid of the negative FGC
long-term consequences. For the man, it is the compensation in terms of consumption that
he would call for not having a circumcised wife. Throughout this analysis of inefficiencies
one should keep in mind that FGC is a particularly harmful investment, in contrast to other
premarital investments such as education and that the preferences are taken as given.
2.4.1. Social Planner Solution
Assuming that the social planner can enforce the circumcision status, the consumption and
mating allocation, the weighted sum of utilities (social welfare) is maximized subject to the
aggregate feasibility constraint. Women are indexed by i and men by j, where Uαf,i is the
distribution of women and M the distribution of men. The weight on women's welfare is
denoted by 0 < µ < 1. The optimization problem reads as follows:
max
cf ′,i,cm′,j ,F
′
i ,Ii,j
µ
α¯fˆ
αf
(
c1−σf ′,i
1− σ − αf,iF
′
i )
)
dUαf,i(αf,i)
+(1− µ)
ˆ
j
(
c1−σm′,j
1− σ + Ii,j(αmF
′
i )
)
dM(j) (2.21)
s.t.
α¯fˆ
αf
cf ′,idUαf,i(αf,i) +
ˆ
j
cm′,jdM(j) = wf + fhwm(h
′) + (1− fh)wm(l′).
Ii,j =

1 if i and j are a couple
0 if i and j are no couple.
(2.22)
38The model of Burdett and Coles (2001) is a two-sided search market with non-transferable utility. The setup
leads to two externalities: An underinvestment externality, since the person does not take into account
that the partner is better off and a desertion externality, due to the fact that self-improved individuals are
more selective, which might lead to over-investment.
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The optimality conditions for the consumption allocations are:
µc−σf,i = λ ∀i
(1− µ)c−σm,j = λ ∀j, (2.23)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The optimal allocation is defined by cf,i = (
µ
1−µ)
1
σ cm,j
∀i, j. Taken the preferences as given, a woman i will be circumcised, Fi = 1, if:
αf,i <
µ
1− µαm ∀i. (2.24)
Those women with FGC utility costs below the weighted utility gain for men (αf,i <
µ
1−µαm)
are circumcised. The fraction of circumcised women is then fSPF =
αSP∗f −αf
α¯f−αf =
µ
1−µαm−αf
α¯f−αf , with
the threshold value being αSP∗f =
µ
1−µαm. In this setup, the couples are matched randomly,
Ii,j is randomly assigned, given that the matches do not matter for the maximization of
this social welfare function. The resulting level of the FGC rate would be the same if the
social planner could only influence the mating outcome and the FGC decision (see Appendix
2.A.6). By chance, it can happen that the weighted FGC valuation of the men is equal to the
decentralized competitive threshold, µ1−µαm = α
∗
f . However, if this is not the case, the FGC
rate of the private equilibrium is not socially optimal and thus inefficient. The main reason
for the inefficiency is that parents do not internalize the utility gain of the potential husband
in their decision. If the FGC valuation of men is very low, i.e. αm = ε → 0 and women's
welfare has a sufficiently high weight in the social welfare function (µ is not too small), the
decentralized FGC rate will be inefficiently high.39
2.4.2. Equivalent Consumption Variation
It can further happen that for a certain couple the woman would be willing to give up more
consumption to get rid of the negative FGC consequences than the husband would require as
compensation for not having a circumcised wife. For such a couple, a transfer allowing this
reallocation would be pareto improving.
Depending on the parameters of the model, the FGC status can be inefficient for some
couples from an ex-post perspective. The following exercise is only a thought experiment, given
that the circumcision cannot be reversed in the second period. The equivalent consumption
39Taking the individual preferences in this model as given, and particularly that men value female circumcision,
it could happen that the decentralized FGC rate is lower than the social planner solution. However, this
should not be interpreted as a normative statement in favor of a higher FGC rate.
30 CHAPTER 2. FGC AND WOMEN'S STATUS ACROSS COUNTRIES
variation (EV postf ′,i ) for a wife is defined as the amount of consumption she would give up to
get rid of the FGC utility costs.
(cf ′,ω′)
1−σ
1− σ − αf,i =
(cf ′,ω′ − EV postf ′,i )1−σ
1− σ
EV postf ′ = cf ′,ω′ −
(
(cf ′,ω′)
1−σ − (1− σ)αf,i
) 1
1−σ . (2.25)
For a husband of type ω′, married to a circumcised wife, the equivalent consumption variation
(EV postm′,ω′) is:
EV postm′,ω′ =
(
cm′,ω′
1−σ + (1− σ)αm
) 1
1−σ − cm′,ω′ . (2.26)
This is the amount of consumption that would equalize the utilities of being married with a
circumcised and uncircumcised woman. If EV postf ′,i > EV
post
m′,ω′ , the FGC of the wife is ex-post
inefficient for this couple. The woman could have been better off in terms of utility without
making the husband worse off. She could have compensated her husband with additional
consumption (EV postm′,ω′) to avoid the circumcision in the previous period and the associated
negative utility αf,i. The remaining difference EV
post
f ′,i − EV postm′,ω′ would have increased the
utility of the wife. Such an inefficiency most likely occurs for a couple with the wife having a
high FGC cost, equal or close to the threshold (αf,i = α
∗
f ).
2.5. Explaining Cross-Country Differences
In Section 2.2.2, I documented a negative correlation between women's rights and FGC rates.
The model sheds light on a possible link, pointing to a causality from the lack of women's
rights (represented by the female bargaining power as in Doepke and Tertilt (2009)) to FGC.
Accordingly, this is discussed in the following section.
2.5.1. Comparative Statics: Bargaining Power
The equilibrium fraction of circumcised women depends on the female bargaining power,
which determines their consumption within the marriage. The higher the bargaining power
of a woman, the higher her individual consumption. However, the expected utility gain
in consumption due to FGC is relevant for the parents' FGC decision. If the preferences
exhibit CRRA with σ > 1, the magnitude of the utility gain in consumption depends on
the initial level of consumption. In particular, the utility gain is decreasing in the level of
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consumption, i.e. the higher the initial consumption level, the lower the utility gain of a
certain consumption increase. The same consumption increase would yield a higher utility
gain if the initial consumption level were lower (see Figure 2.A4 in Appendix 2.A.4). Due to
this relation, an increase in the female bargaining power can lead to a decrease in the FGC
prevalence rates.40 Interpreting the female bargaining power as women's status, the model
is able to generate the negative cross-country correlation between women's status and FGC
prevalence rates, which I will now prove in two steps. First of all, I will analyze the effect of
an increase in the bargaining power on the FGC threshold α∗f , holding the marriage market
probabilities fixed.
Proposition 2.1. Bargaining Power (PE). Holding the marriage market probabilities
unchanged, the threshold α∗f decreases with an increase in the bargaining power if σ > 1.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.5.
Such a decrease in the threshold-value means that fewer families want to circumcise their
daughter if the female bargaining power increases, ceteris paribus. However, in a general
equilibrium framework, the decrease in the fraction of circumcised women in turn influences
the probabilities in the marriage market, which is not covered by Proposition 2.1. It is also
important to note that this proposition only holds for CRRA preferences with σ > 1. This
determines the degree of curvature in the utility function, which can be interpreted as relative
risk aversion.41 The relevance and importance of this range can be seen for example in the
marriage market literature, which also uses CRRA preferences with a relative risk aversion
above unity (see Greenwood et al. (2012) and Santos and Weiss (2013)). Furthermore, the
macroeconomic literature employs a relative risk aversion, which mostly ranges from one to
five (Yang, 2009).42 In a second step, I take the general equilibrium effects into account.
Proposition 2.2. Bargaining Power (GE). For αf = 0, the general equilibrium effect of
an increase in the bargaining power θf on the FGC rate f
∗
F is
40It is important to note that there is no disagreement between the spouses about the decision of circum-
cising the daughter. In this simple model, the wife does not have a preference against circumcising the
daughter and a higher bargaining power would subsequently turn the decision towards no circumcision.
The bargaining power only influences the female circumcision over the potential consumption level and the
corresponding consumption gain of the daughter.
41In this setup a woman can be in two different states related to consumption: a low consumption state
when married to a low type men or a high consumption state when married to a high type man. The
probabilities of each state are the marriage market probabilities, which depend on the circumcision status
of the woman.
42Yang (2009) uses a relative risk aversion of 1.5, which is close to the estimates of Attanasio et al. (1999)
and Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
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(a) negative if σ > 1 and Cases (2.18), (2.19b) or (2.20a) apply; and
(b) positive if σ > 1 and Case (2.19a) applies.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.5.
Given that Case (2.19a) for αf = 0 never occurs alone, as shown in Proposition 2.4 and Figure
2.A5, there is always a solution for which the FGC rate decreases due to an increase in the
bargaining power of the women.
2.5.2. Numerical Example
To assess the quantitative relevance of this channel, I provide a numerical example of the
impact of female bargaining power on the equilibrium FGC rates. I calibrate parameters
to a country, Burkina Faso in 2009/10, before subsequently varying the bargaining power
exogenously. The parameters are presented in Table 2.2. For a brief overview of the situation
in Burkina Faso, I refer to Appendix 2.A.3.
Table 2.2.: Parameters for Burkina Faso
Preset Parameter Value Source
Fraction of high type men fh 0.4
Average income of the lowest 60% (USD, p.a) wm(l) 296 ∗ 20 WDI, World Bank
Average income of the highest 40% (USD, p.a) wm(h) 940 ∗ 20 WDI, World Bank
Average income of the women wf 296/2 ∗ 20
Bargaining power = transformed SIGI-Index θf 0.4 OECD
Discount Factor β 0.9820 Standard
Utility gain of FGC αm 0.1
Note: The average income is calculated based on the GDP in 2010 and the population share within the income
deciles. The utility gain of FGC does not influence the equilibrium outcome, but clearly the welfare analysis.
Calibrated Parameters Value Target Source
Utility cost of circumcision αf,i [0, 0.26] FGC rate = 0.76 DHS 2010
CRRA parameter σ 1.1 FGC rate = 0.76 DHS 2010
The length of one period is set to 20 years. In 2010, 76% of the women aged 15 to 49
years in Burkina Faso had undergone FGC.43 The value of the female bargaining power is
43The FGC prevalence rate for just the younger cohorts is lower, alternatively this lower rate could be targeted.
Since this model is not a dynamic OLG model, a distinction between different FGC rates across cohorts
does not make sense. The FGC rate within the old cohort would be closely related to the one within the
young cohort, since the environment is the same and there are no different forces leading to a distinct
equilibrium outcome.
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than the fraction of high type men (see Equation (2.20), Case (2.20a)).45
The numerical results show that the FGC rate decreases with the woman's increased bar-
gaining power.46 Qualitatively, the model is able to explain the cross-country correlation be-
tween women's status and female circumcision rates (Figures 2.4a (model) and 2.4b (data)).
The Social Institution and Gender Index is transformed to line up with the definition of female
bargaining power in the model, such that an increase in this transformed index corresponds
to an increase in the women's status. Therefore, the relationship between the transformed
index and FGC rates now decreases.47
The ex-ante welfare, namely the aggregated discounted expected utilities of daughters and
sons together, is shown in Figure 2.4c for every equilibrium.48 While the ex-ante expected
utility increases in the bargaining power for the daughters, it decreases for sons. The overall
averaged welfare of the daughters and sons is also illustrated and increases in the bargaining
power up to θf = 0.5. The difference between the welfare of the daughters and sons for
θf = 0.5 is purely driven by the utility costs of circumcised women and utility gains of the
men with a circumcised wife.
2.6. Policy Implications
I now apply the inefficiency measures from Section 2.4 to the numerical example. For the
decentralized set-up, the men's valuation of FGC (αm) does not influence the FGC rate
in equilibrium, whereas it is an important parameter for the discussion of inefficiency. A
45For all those equilibria it holds that fh < 0.5 and 1fh ≥
1
αf
(
c∗
f′,hˆ′
1−σ
1−σ −
c∗
f′,lˆ′
1−σ
1−σ ) > fh. Therefore, no other
cases than Case (3) apply (see Table 2.A7 in Appendix 2.A.5).
46The results are shown for the relevant value range of the bargaining power, θf (0, 0.5]. A value of 0 means
that a woman has no bargaining power at all, while a value of 0.5 represents equal rights for a wife and
her husband. Values above 0.5 would mean that the husband is disadvantaged, which does not seem to be
relevant for the analyzed countries. Nevertheless, the described pattern also holds in this value range.
47The range of empirical FGC rates is higher than the one of the model implied prevalence rates, but the
numerical example is only calibrated to Burkina Faso. Only the female bargaining power differs across
the equilibria, all other parameters are the same. Such a one-dimensional comparison is most likely not
able to replicate the right FGC levels for all countries, which differ in many dimensions.
48Wex−ante = 0.5Wd + 0.5Ws with
Wd =
α∗fˆ
αf
β
ph(F ′ = 1)
 c∗f′,hˆ′1−σ
1− σ − αf,i
 + (1− ph(F ′ = 1))
 c∗f′,lˆ′1−σ
1− σ − αf,i
 dUαf,i (αf,i)
+
α¯fˆ
α∗
f
β
ph(F ′ = 0) c∗f′,hˆ′1−σ
1− σ + (1− ph(F
′
= 0))
c∗
f′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ − αf,i
 dUαf,i (αf,i)
Ws = fhβ
p
Fˆ ′=1(h)
 c∗m′,h′1−σ
1− σ + αm
 + (1− pF (h)) c∗m′,h′1−σ
1− σ
 +
+(1− fh)β
pF (l)
 c∗m′,l′1−σ
1− σ + αm
 + (1− pF (l)) c∗m′,l′1−σ
1− σ
 .
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36 CHAPTER 2. FGC AND WOMEN'S STATUS ACROSS COUNTRIES
gaining power of women leads to a decrease in FGC rates.51 Every policy that increases the
bargaining power directly could reduce FGC prevalence rates according to the model. For
example, the Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services (CEOSS) is active in Egypt
and focuses in particular on the improvement of women's status (UNICEF, 2005a), while
the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating
Change also relies on these elements.52 Such policies are in line with the theory that the
expansion of women's rights should lead to a reduction in FGC prevalence rates (see Yount
(2002), Bellemare et al. (2014), Finke (2006) and Dawla (1999)).
Second, explaining the potential health costs and the harmfulness of this tradition could
increase the perceived costs, which in turn would reduce the number of circumcised daughters.
Existing programs are starting at these points, such as the Tostan Community Empowerment
Programme to promote human rights, which was initiated in Senegal. This non-formal edu-
cation program has been able to rise the awareness of women and men of FGC consequences
to some extent, leading to some community-based declarations to abandon this practice. The
program has also been implemented in some villages in Burkina Faso (UNICEF, 2005a). How-
ever, rising awareness can only be effective in reducing FGC rates if parents do not have full
information about the utility cost of their daughter (αf,i). If parents know the utility costs
and are not subject to incomplete information, as in the model, such a policy cannot affect
the FGC rate.
The third and fourth policies are now discussed in more detail. The third policy involves
the introduction of penalty fees, which is supposed to represent a ban of the tradition. The
fourth policy consists of direct consumption subsidies to women, financed through propor-
tional income taxes for men. The analysis is based on the numerical example of Section
2.5.2.
2.6.1. Penalty Fees
Twenty-six African and Middle East countries have outlawed FGC, through legislation ranging
from a ban of female circumcision in medical centers to arrests. Burkina Faso already enacted
a law against FGC in 1996, including fines against practitioners and people being silent about
the execution of the procedure. Furthermore, harmful reproductive practices were banned
by law in 2005 (UNICEF, 2013).53 Diop et al. (2008) argue that, in contrast to the other
51This is true for certain types of equilibria (see Proposition 2.2).
52http://www.unicef.org/protection/57929_58002.html, accessed August, 2013.
53Detailed information can be found on pages 8 and 88 in UNICEF (2013).
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African countries, Burkina Faso systematically enforces the law. Burkina Faso even has an
SOS Excision hotline for anonymous reports on the performance.54 To analyze such a policy
within the model, I assume that parents have to pay a penalty fee p if they decide to circumcise
their daughter. The revenue of these fees is not redistributed in the economy.
max
cm,cf ,F ′
U = θf
(
cf
1−σ
1− σ − αf,iF
)
+ (1− θf )
(
c1−σm
1− σ + αmF
)
+ γ(u∗f ′ + u
∗
m′)
s.t. cf + cm + pF
′ = wf + wm(ω) (2.27)
This policy creates a link between the consumption of the parents and the circumcision of
the daughter by reducing their budget. Therefore, the optimal consumption decision of the
parents changes to:
c∗f (ω, F
′) =
θ
1
σ
f
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
(wf + wm(ω)− pF ′)
c∗m(ω, F
′) =
(1− θf ) 1σ
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
(wf + wm(ω)− pF ′). (2.28)
The threshold value for the utility costs, below which the parents decide to circumcise their
daughter, is then defined as
α∗f,ω =
(
ph(F
′ = 1)− ph(F ′ = 0)
) c∗f ′,hˆ′1−σ − c∗f ′,lˆ′1−σ
1− σ + Cω, (2.29)
where Cω ≡ θf c
∗
f (ω,F
′=1)1−σ−c∗f (ω,F ′=0)1−σ
1−σ +(1−θf ) c
∗
m(ω,F
′=1)1−σ−c∗m(ω,F ′=0)1−σ
1−σ . There are now
two threshold values α∗f,h and α
∗
f,l, for a rich and a poor family, respectively. The difference
between the threshold values is given by α∗f,h − α∗f,l = Ch − Cl.
54The low rate of women, who state having at least one circumcised daughter (around 16%), supports this
view but the issue of potential under-reporting, as briefly discussed in Section 2.A.3, should not be under-
estimated and the number should be treated with caution.
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the negative effect on the disposable income, which leads to an increase of their threshold
α∗f,h. In turn, this leads to more rich families circumcising their daughters. For poor families,
the opposite is true, with the threshold (α∗f,l) falling relatively sharply. Thus, in a sense, the
penalty fee redistributes from poor to rich families, given that more rich than poor daughters
now have the chance to marry a rich man. The welfare of sons decreases slightly, while the
welfare of daughters increases. Aggregate welfare increases, even though the changes are
small.56
2.6.2. Taxes and Consumption Subsidy
Since the potential consumption gain is one of the driving forces, a reduction of this gain
should reduce the equilibrium FGC rates. This reasoning leads to an indirect policy, namely
a consumption subsidy to the women (s′), financed through proportional taxes (τ ′) on the
wages of the men in the second period.57 In this policy set-up, I force the couple to give a
certain level of consumption to the wife. It is meant to mimic a policy capable of providing
women with a direct consumption subsidy that cannot be consumed by her husband. The
optimization problem of the old couples remains the same, but changes for the young couples
in the second period:
max
cm′,ω′ ,cf ′,ω′
U = θf
(
(cf ′,ω′ + s
′)1−σ
1− σ − αf,iF
′
)
+ (1− θf )
(
c1−σm′,ω′
1− σ + αmF
′
)
s.t. cf ′,ω′ + cm′,ω′ = wf + (1− τ ′)wm(ω′). (2.30)
In the second period, the government budget needs to be balanced:
s′ = τ ′
(
wm′(h
′)fh + wm′(l′)(1− fh)
)
.
The optimal consumptions are then given by:
c∗f ′,ωˆ′(s) =
θ
1
σ
f
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
(wf + (1− τ ′)wm(ωˆ′))− (1− θf )
1
σ
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
s
c∗m′,ω′(s) = wf + (1− τ ′)wm − c∗f,ω′ and (2.31)
56The welfare of parents is not considered here. For those who circumcise their daughter consumption de-
creases, which influences their utility.
57Admittedly, this policy is very abstract and it could be argued to some extent that it is out of the model
setup. Since there is only one bundle of consumption goods/one consumption good and the consumption
decision is based on a cooperative model of the household, the income is pooled and there is no direct way
of giving resources in the woman's hand only. Such a consumption discrimination against a husband in
this framework would not reflect an optimization result.
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ph(F
′ = 1)− ph(F ′ = 0)
) c∗f ′,hˆ′(s)1−σ − c∗f ′,lˆ′(s)1−σ
1− σ .
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shows s′ = τ ′ (wm(h′)fh + wm(l′)(1− fh)). The consumption subsidy in the poor household
to the wife relaxes the family's budget constraint, which not only allows higher consumption
of the wife, but also of the husband. Only for higher tax rates, the reduction of the poor
household's budget is too high to finance an increase in the man's consumption. This pattern
is demonstrated in Figure 2.8c, which shows the consumption of a woman in the second period
either living in a rich or poor household. Figure 2.8d focuses on the consumption of a man.
For a woman married to a rich man, the consumption initially decreases, since the budget of
the family falls. The increase in consumption for high tax rates is due to the high subsidy.
In this region, the bargaining process is removed. The woman receives a predefined subsidy,
which is higher than the optimal consumption level resulting from the household optimiza-
tion problem. The FGC rate drops since the redistribution reduces the expected gain from
circumcision. This lowers the threshold for the FGC utility costs and thus the number of
circumcised women. The changes in welfare are documented in Figure 2.8b, where the kinks
are related to those in the consumption. Such a policy has an overall positive effect for women
in the second period (daughters), for each value of bargaining power it increases their welfare
in equilibrium. The picture is different for men in the second period (sons), with an overall
decrease in aggregated welfare.
Essentially, this policy comprises two components: a redistribution across households and
a redistribution between genders within households. To better understand the effect of this
policy, I analyze the first part separately. The redistribution across households only includes
the component of a proportional tax to men's wage, which is then redistributed to all house-
holds as a lump-sum transfer. This only affects the budget constraints of the households:
cf ′,ω′ + cm′,ω′ = wf + (1 − τ ′)wm(ω′) + T with T = τ ′ (wm(h′)fh + wm(l′)(1− fh)). The
resulting equilibrium FGC rates for different tax rates are presented in Figure 2.9, showing
that this policy alone (across) has a less stronger effect for tax rates above 0.4 than the
combined policy (both). For lower tax rates, the effect is the same. Even though this is
not a "true" composition of this combined policy, given that general equilibrium outcomes
are compared, Figure 2.9 indicates that the redistribution across households for tax rates
below 0.4 is driving the results. This is due to the above-mentioned effect that for low tax
rates the forced within-household redistribution of consumption from the husband to the wife
is still lower than the optimal consumption level, which leads to no adjustment along this
margin. For higher tax rates, the within-household distribution is kicking in, meaning that
the combination of those policies rapidly drives down the FGC rates.
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power influences the consumption allocation within a household and consequently the util-
ity gain from consumption, which can be achieved by marrying a rich versus a poor man.
Depending on the model parameters, this utility gain is decreasing in the female bargaining
power. Such a reduction of the FGC benefits, while costs remain unchanged, leads to lower
FGC prevalence rate.
Another important insight of the model is that the equilibrium FGC rate can be ineffi-
cient, which rationalizes policy interventions from a further perspective besides human rights
violation and negative health effects. The model allows for structured policy analysis, show-
ing that general equilibrium effects in the marriage market can have a dampening effect on
the reduction of FGC. This should be taken into account for policy considerations, e.g. for
penalty fees, the probability of marrying a high type man increases for circumcised daughters,
since the FGC rate falls. For many poor households, the penalty fee places a high burden
on their budget constraint, such that they refrain from circumcising the daughter. However,
the picture is different for rich households. For some, the increased probability outweighs
the additional cost of FGC, which induces them to circumcise their daughter. Therefore, a
penalty indirectly redistributes from poor to rich families, besides the overall reduction of
the FGC rate. The second policy of a direct consumption subsidy to all women, financed
through a proportional tax rate on men's income, is also able to reduce FGC rates. However,
in contrast to the first policy, the redistribution goes in the opposite direction, namely from
rich to poor households, but also from men to women.
Returning to the empirical observation, one obvious open question is why the status of
women differs across countries and whether the tradition of FGC in turn affects the women's
status in an economy. There might be a form of "vicious circle" at work, whereby patriarchal
systems perpetuate the FGC practice (see e.g. Monagan, 2010), which in turn reinforces the
gender role and with that the women's status. A better understanding of the interaction
between FGC and women's status, including a potentially reversed causality, represents an
important step towards well-informed policy advices and is left to future research.
Furthermore, there is not only a large variation across countries with respect to the FGC
practice, but also within countries. Despite some studies having worked on the within-country
variation, it has not been conclusively explored to date. For example, the role of education
for FGC remains unexplained.
Finally, even though the model already allows for many insights, it is relatively simple and
leaves room for improvement. First, it has only two periods, thus rendering the analysis of
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dynamics over generations difficult. Second, parents can only invest in the FGC of the daugh-
ter and have no other dimension, such as education. Third, the marriage market is modeled
without search frictions, which might not reflect reality. These caveats will be addressed in
the following Chapter 3.
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2.A. Appendix
2.A.1. FGC Prevalence Rates in non-OECD Countries
Even though FGC is predominantly observed in African countries and the Middle East, there
are low FGC prevalence rates outside this region. The OECD provides a collection of FGC
prevalence rates in non-OECD countries, which are shown in Figure 2.A1. Small but pos-
itive rates are recorded in countries such as Peru, Indonesia and Pakistan. This map does
not include the fraction of circumcised women in OECD countries, since numbers are barely
available, although the practice is continued by immigrants in Europe, North America, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand (Dorkenoo et al., 2007). For England and Wales, it is estimated that
more than 20,000 girls are at risk of being circumcised (Dorkenoo et al., 2007).
Source: OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database 2009, Notes: These are prevalence rates
across women aged 15-49 years.
Figure 2.A1.: FGC Prevalence Rates Worldwide
2.A.2. Data and Robustness Checks
In this section, I provide a brief overview of the data sources used in the empirical analysis in
Section 2.2.2. The Social Institution and Gender Index (SIGI) 2009 is provided by the OECD
Gender, Institution and Development Database. This index consists of 14 variables, which
are grouped into 5 categories: Discriminatory Family Code, Restricted Physical Integrity,
Son Bias, Restricted Resources and Entitlements and Restricted Civil Liberties. The index
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formula is SIGI = 15Family
2 + 15Physical
2 + 15Son
2 + 15Resources
2 + 15Civil
2.58 Since FGC
rates are part of the subindex "Restricted Physical Integrity", I adjust the SIGI by excluding
this subindex. The formula for the adjusted index, which is used throughout the analysis, is
SIGIadjust =
1
4Family
2 + 14Son
2 + 14Ownership
2 + 14Civil
2. The FGC rates provided by the
OECD are based on national Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Multiple Indicator
Cluster Surveys (MICS), conducted before and closest to 2009.
Most of the further controls in the regressions, such as GDP p.c., GDP growth, Gini coef-
ficient of income, primary education completion rate are taken from the World Development
Indicators of the World Bank. The GDP growth is the average annual GDP growth over the
last 10 years, while the primary completion rate is the percentage of students completing the
last year of primary school. The estimated earned incomes for males and females (in PPP
US$) are taken from the OECD Gender, Institution and Development Database and are only
available for 2006. The fraction of Muslims in all countries is provided by Alesina et al. (2003).
If information on these variables is not available for 2009, data based on the years before and
closest to 2009 is used.
Table 2.A1 shows the estimated coefficients for the same regression model as in Table 2.1,
with the only difference being that information on Sudan is excluded. As Figure 2.2b shows,
Sudan is an outlier with respect to the value of the SIGI index; therefore, I exclude the
country to check its influence on the estimation results. Even though the magnitudes of
the effects change slightly, the sign of the coefficients remain the same and the significant
positive interaction between the FGC rate and the SIGI stays. Afghanistan is another outlier
in this respect, although is excluded from the regressions regardless since there is missing
information concerning some controls. The second robustness check is presented in Table
2.A2, where additional controls are added to the regressions. As for the first robustness check,
the relevant significant positive interaction between the FGC rate and the SIGI remains true.
58For more information, see http://genderindex.org/content/team, accessed 10.09.2013.
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Table 2.A1.: Regression Results: FGC Prevalence Rates (Excluding Sudan)
OLS OLS (FGC>0) Tobit OLS
SIGI 1.097*** 1.404** 2.087***
(0.247) (0.589) (0.495)
SIGI>0.1 1.015***
(0.276)
SIGI≤0.1 0.303
(0.764)
Fract. of Muslim 0.00140* 0.00356** 0.00399*** 0.00146*
(0.000812) (0.00129) (0.00150) (0.000828)
GDP p.c. -0.000000158 0.00000979 -0.000130** -0.000000526
(0.00000170) (0.0000647) (0.0000573) (0.00000187)
GDP growth 0.00248 0.0334** -0.00785 0.00354
(0.00827) (0.0158) (0.0152) (0.00840)
Gini 0.00107 0.0155 0.00515 0.00158
(0.00252) (0.00918) (0.00835) (0.00271)
Constant -0.120 -0.892** -0.552 -0.125
(0.126) (0.425) (0.352) (0.127)
Sigma 0.347***
(0.0419)
Observations 89 29 89 89
R2 0.366 0.430 0.524 0.370
Source: OECD Gender, Institution and Development Database, World Bank WDI, Alesina
et al. (2003)), own calculations. Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in paren-
theses. * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01). If information is not available for 2009, data
based on years before and closest to 2009 is used. Sudan is excluded. The GDP growth is
the GDP's average annual growth rate over the last 10 years.
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Table 2.A2.: Robustness: FGC Prevalence Rates and SIGI
OLS OLS (FGC>0) Tobit OLS
SIGI 1.189*** 1.765** 2.411***
(0.338) (0.680) (0.517)
SIGI>0.1 1.134***
(0.340)
SIGI≤0.1 0.500
(0.746)
Fract. if Muslim 0.00160* 0.00197 0.00405*** 0.00157*
(0.000819) (0.00209) (0.00131) (0.000800)
GDP p.c. 0.0000163 -0.000170 0.0000139 0.0000231*
(0.0000136) (0.000305) (0.0000607) (0.0000119)
GDP growth -0.00739 -0.00621 -0.0369* -0.00584
(0.00936) (0.0297) (0.0221) (0.00912)
Gini -0.000586 0.0103 -0.00164 -0.000221
(0.00274) (0.0124) (0.00793) (0.00282)
Prim. educ. comp. rate (f) 0.00501 0.0124 0.00814 0.00504
(0.00412) (0.00874) (0.00654) (0.00414)
Prim educ. comp. rate (m) -0.00676 -0.0130 -0.00920 -0.00676
(0.00480) (0.0112) (0.00747) (0.00482)
Income (f) 0.0000109 -0.00000474 0.0000705
(0.0000203) (0.000211) (0.000110)
Income (m) -0.0000194 0.0000820 -0.0000917 -0.0000171*
(0.0000130) (0.000104) (0.0000621) (0.00000977)
Constant 0.188 -0.364 -0.0306 0.181
(0.253) (0.885) (0.565) (0.257)
Sigma 0.317***
(0.0431)
Observations 79 27 79 79
(pseudo)R2 0.489 0.510 0.595 0.490
Source: OECD Gender, Institution and Development Database, World Bank WDI,Alesina et al. (2003)),
own calculations. Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. * (p<0.10), **
(p<0.05),*** (p<0.01). If information is not available for 2009, data based on years before and closest
to 2009 is used. The GDP growth is GDP's average annual growth rate over the last 10 years. The
estimated income is given in PPP US$. Prim. educ. comp. rate stands for primary completion rate
and is the percentage of students completing the last year of primary school.
2.A.3. Empirical Evidence: Burkina Faso (DHS 2010)
The analysis for Burkina Faso is based on data from the Demographic and Health survey in
2010, based upon interviews with 17,087 women (aged 15-49) and 7,307 men (aged 15-59)
(Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie and ICF-International, 2012). The
DHS program was established by the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) in 1984 as a follow-up to the World Fertility Survey and the Contraceptive Preva-
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Table 2.A3.: Summary Statistics - Burkina Faso (1)
FGC rates of Women with cir-
women (15-49 years) cumcised daughters
Mean Total Mean Total
Total 0.7610 17031 0.1632 10716
Wealth
poorest quintile 0.7746 2825 0.2072 2003
poorer quintile 0.7841 3074 0.1905 2130
middle quintile 0.7814 3264 0.1660 2208
richer quintile 0.8000 3583 0.1569 2343
richest quintile 0.6873 4285 0.0893 2032
Education (wife)
no education 0.8068 12425 0.1813 8915
primary 0.6977 2397 0.0972 1166
secondary 0.5608 2087 0.0221 597
higher 0.5194 115 0.0000 36
Education (husband)
no education 0.8255 10863 0.1826 8583
primary 0.7625 1715 0.1165 1198
secondary 0.6984 1133 0.0297 694
higher 0.6230 145 0.0106 76
Marital status
never married 0.5548 3096 0.0314 109
ever married 0.8044 13935 0.1643 10607
Source: DHS 2010 Burkina Faso, own calculations. Observations are weighted
by individual sampling weights. The FGC rates for different marital status and
educational attainment of women are tested on equality based on a two-sample
t-test with sampling weights. FGC rates between ever and never married women
are significantly different at the 1% level. This is also the case for all differences in
FGC rates between education groups. Only the difference in FGC rates between
secondary and higher educated women is not significant.
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Table 2.A4.: Summary Statistics - Burkina Faso (2)
FGC rates of Women with cir-
women (15-49 years) cumcised daughters
Mean Total Mean Total
Religion
no religion 0.6210 128 0.2006 78
muslim 0.8169 10207 0.1892 6515
catholic 0.6632 4164 0.0995 2425
protestant 0.6036 1070 0.0856 615
traditionnal/animist 0.7590 1415 0.1857 1044
Ethnicity
bobo 0.6874 644 0.1633 395
dioula 0.7282 155 0.1589 102
fulfuldé/peul 0.8438 1346 0.2842 909
gourmatché 0.6445 1045 0.1054 701
gourounsi 0.6052 790 0.1175 476
lobi 0.8322 617 0.1833 411
mossi 0.7881 8912 0.1437 5537
sénoufo 0.8715 906 0.2340 595
touareg / bella 0.2224 254 0.0464 154
dagara 0.6942 560 0.1893 342
bissa 0.8338 672 0.1898 401
others 0.7557 1097 0.1994 671
Region
boucle de mouhoun 0.7065 1344 0.1775 940
cascades 0.8213 1106 0.1121 712
centre 0.6662 1690 0.0522 801
centre-est 0.8963 1262 0.1954 796
centre-nord 0.8683 1156 0.1381 779
centre-ouest 0.5529 1517 0.1146 949
centre-sud 0.6828 1150 0.1009 753
est 0.7015 1353 0.1091 926
hauts basins 0.8289 1538 0.2388 922
nord 0.8776 1299 0.2302 825
plateau central 0.8769 1253 0.1367 777
sahel 0.7823 1151 0.2901 755
sud-ouest 0.7933 1212 0.1926 781
urban 0.6902 5354 0.0838 2689
rural 0.7872 11677 0.1835 8027
Source: DHS 2010 Burkina Faso, own calculations. Observations are weighted
by individual sampling weights.
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Table 2.A5.: Summary Statistics - Burkina Faso (3)
Circumcised Uncircumcised
(15-49 years) (15-49 years)
Mean Total Mean Total
Current age 30.07 12897 24.80 4134
Ever married 0.87 12897 0.68 4134
Age at first cohabitation 17.47 11247 17.56 2688
Circumcised daughters 0.20 8863 0.01 1853
Age of circumcision 3.49 12842
Education
no education 0.78 0.60
primary 0.12 0.17
secondary 0.08 0.21
higher 0.01 0.02
12892 4132
Wealth
poorest quintile 0.18 0.17
poorer quintile 0.19 0.17
middle quintile 0.20 0.17
richer quintile 0.21 0.17
richest quintile 0.22 0.33
12897 4134
Form of circumcision
cut, no flesh removed 0.17
cut, flesh removed 0.77
sewn closed 0.01
don't know/missing 0.05
12897
Circumcision performed by
health professional 0.00
traditional circumciser 0.97
don't know 0.03
12897
Source: DHS 2010 Burkina Faso, own calculations. Observations are weighted
by individual sampling weights. The differences between circumcised and
uncircumcised women are signficant at the 1% level, with two exceptions.
The difference for the lowest wealth quintile (poorest) is only significant at the
10% level and the difference in the ages at first cohabitation is not significant.
The means are tested on equality based on a two-sample t-test with sampling
weights.
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2.A.4. Figures of the Model
Figure 2.A3 illustrates the three different cases that can occur in the marriage market equi-
librium. The resulting equilibrium probabilities vary for the different cases. In Case (1), the
fraction of circumcised women is the same as for high type men. The fraction of high type
men is higher than that of circumcised women for the Case (2), while the opposite is true for
Case (3).
men 
women 
Case 3: 𝑓ℎ − 𝑓𝐹 < 0 
1 − 𝑓ℎ 𝑓ℎ 
1 − 𝑓𝐹 𝑓𝐹 
𝑓𝐹 − 𝑓ℎ 
men 
women 
Case 2: 𝑓ℎ − 𝑓𝐹 > 0 
1 − 𝑓ℎ 𝑓ℎ 
1 − 𝑓𝐹 𝑓𝐹 
𝑓ℎ − 𝑓𝐹 
men 
women 
Case 1: 𝑓ℎ − 𝑓𝐹 = 0 
1 − 𝑓ℎ 𝑓ℎ 
1 − 𝑓𝐹 𝑓𝐹 
Figure 2.A3.: Structure of the Marriage Market
Figure 2.A4 provides an example of the functional form of CRRA preferences. It shows
that, depending on the level of consumption, an 50% increase in the consumption translates
differently into an increase in the utility. The higher the consumption level, the lower the
induced increase in the utility.
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Figure 2.A4.: Utility Gain - CRRA Preferences
2.A.5. Propositions and Proofs
The existence of an equilibrium depends on the model parameter, which is formalized in
Proposition 2.3.
Proposition 2.3. Existence. For αf = 0, there exists at least one solution if:
1
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gu≡utility gain
≤ 1
fh
and
1
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
≤ 1
4(1− fh) .
Proof. See below.
The conditions for existence link the fraction of high type men, fh, to the utility gain in
consumption of being married to a high type men, Gu, which is weighted by the highest
possible cost of FGC in the economy, αf . Figure 2.A5 illustrates the parameter ranges for
which a solution exists, given αf = 0. If the parameters fall within the colored regions, at
least one solution exists and the relevant cases are displayed. No solution exists for the region
where 1αfGu ≥ 1fh and 1αfGu ≥ 14(1−fh) .62 Furthermore, there are parameter spaces for which
multiple solutions exist, as Proposition 2.4 establishes.
62Gu =
c∗
f′,hˆ′
1−σ
1−σ −
c∗
f′,lˆ′
1−σ
1−σ .
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Note: For this figure αf is equal to zero.
Figure 2.A5.: Existence and Multiplicity of Equilibria
Proposition 2.4. Multiplicity. For αf = 0 there exist two solutions, Cases (2a) and (2b),
if:
1
fh
< 1αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1−σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1−σ
)
≤ 1
4(1− fh)
and three solutions, Cases (2a), (2b) and (3a), if:
fh <
1
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
≤ 1
4(1− fh) and
fh <
1
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
≤ 1
fh
.
Proof. See below.
Within Case (2), two equilibria are possible due to the quadratic equation. However, it can
also happen that different cases, namely Cases (2) and (3), apply at the same time. These
equilibria can potentially be pareto ranked, for which Section 2.4 establishes a basis. Note
that in Section 2.3.7, the notation is slightly different: Case (1) is referred to as Case (2.18),
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Cases (2a) and (2b) as Cases (2.19a) and (2.19b), respectively. Finally, Cases (3a) and (3b)
are referred to as Cases (2.20a) and (2.20b), respectively.
A further, more technical multiplicity exists due to the random matching within the group,
making a stable equilibrium not unique. If for example, the fraction of high type men equals
the fraction of circumcised women in equilibrium, all circumcised women will be matched to a
high type man. Within this group, all matches between people of the opposite sex can happen
and are stable.
Proof. Proposition 2.3 (Existence) and Proposition 2.4 (Multiplicity).
For αf = 0, the equilibrium fractions reduces to the following equations in the different cases.
Case(1) For this case to hold, the fraction of high type men has to equal the fraction of
circumcised women, fh = fF . Therefore, the FGC prevalence rate is equal to the utility
gain in consumption of being married to a high type men, weighted by the highest cost of
circumcision:
fF =
1
αf︸︷︷︸
highest cost of FGC
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility gain
= fh. (2.32)
Case(3) If the FGC prevalence rate is higher than the fraction of high type men fh < fF ,
the FGC fraction is given by:
fF =
√√√√ fh
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
. (2.33)
This case allows for only one solution, namely Case (3a), since the fraction fF has to be
positive, fF [0, 1]. This solution exists if fh <
√√√√ fh
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=fF
≤ 1, meaning:
1
fh
≥ 1
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
> fh. (2.34)
Case(2) The fraction of high type men has to be larger than the FGC prevalence rate,
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fh > fF . The prevalence rate reduces to:
fF =
1
2
±
√√√√1
4
− (1− fh)
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
. (2.35)
For this case to deliver a real solution,
1
4
≥ (1− fh)
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
1
4(1− fh) ≥
1
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
(2.36)
has to hold. Furthermore the inequalities
0 ≤ 1
2
±
√√√√1
4
− (1− fh)
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=fF
< fh (2.37)
have to hold. The lower bound of the inequality, fF ≥ 0, holds for both solutions (+/−),
since as long as the root is real it is also smaller than 12 . To investigate the second inequality,
I have to analyze both solutions, starting with the one based on the positive sign, followed by
the negative sign:
Case(2a)
1
2
+
√√√√1
4
− (1− fh)
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
< fh. (2.38)
If fh >
1
2 , then the following inequality has to hold to satisfy Inequality (2.38):√√√√1
4
− (1− fh)
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< fh − 1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
1
4
− (1− fh)
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
<
(
fh − 1
2
)2
1
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
> fh. (2.39)
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If fh ≤ 12 , Inequality (2.38) does not hold.
Case(2b)
1
2
−
√√√√1
4
− (1− fh)
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
< fh. (2.40)
If fh ≥ 12 , Inequality (2.40) holds because the following inequality is true:
−
√√√√1
4
− (1− fh)
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< fh − 1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
≥0
If fh ≤ 12 , the following inequality needs to be satisfied such that Inequality (2.40) holds:
−
√√√√1
4
− (1− fh)
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< fh − 1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
1
4
− (1− fh)
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
>
(
fh − 1
2
)2
1
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
< fh. (2.41)
Summing up, as long as 1αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1−σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1−σ
)
≤ 14(1−fh) , at least one solution exists if the
conditions in Table 2.A6 are satisfied. If fh >
1
2 , two solutions exist based on Case (2).
Table 2.A6.: Conditions for Equilibrium Case (2)
fh >
1
2 fh <
1
2 fh =
1
2
(+) 1αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1−σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1−σ
)
> fh 7 7
(-) always 1αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1−σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1−σ
)
< fh always
Note: 7 means that no solution exists.
Furthermore, if 1αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1−σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1−σ
)
< fh and therefore Cases (1) and (3) do not hold,
Case (2) has one solution, namely:
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fF =
1
2
−
√√√√1
4
− (1− fh)
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
as long as 1αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1−σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1−σ
)
≤ 14(1−fh) , which holds in this case since fh ≤
1
4(1−fh) ,
with fh[0, 1). An overview of the existence conditions for all cases is given in Table 2.A7.
Table 2.A7.: Conditions for all Equilibrium Cases
Case Conditions for the Existence of an Equilibrium
fh ∈ [0,1]
1 1αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1−σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1−σ
)
= fh
3a (+) 1fh ≥ 1αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1−σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1−σ
)
> fh
fh >
1
2 fh <
1
2 fh =
1
2
2a (+) 1αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1−σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1−σ
)
> fh 7 7
2b (-) 3 1αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1−σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1−σ
)
< fh 3
Notes: 3 holds without condition, 7 does not hold
Proposition. Bargaining Power (PE). Holding the marriage market probabilities un-
changed, the threshold α∗f decreases with an increase in the bargaining power if σ > 1.
Proof. Proposition 2.1 (Bargaining Power (PE)).
The equilibrium threshold-value for the FGC cost is given by:
α∗f =
(
ph(F
′ = 1)− ph(F ′ = 0)
) c∗f ′,hˆ′1−σ − c∗f ′,lˆ′1−σ
1− σ
=
(
ph(F
′ = 1)− ph(F ′ = 0)
) ∗ θ 1σf
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ

1−σ
(wf ′ + wm′(hˆ
′))1−σ − (wf ′ + wm′(lˆ′))1−σ
1− σ .
60 CHAPTER 2. FGC AND WOMEN'S STATUS ACROSS COUNTRIES
Since wm′(hˆ
′) > wm′(lˆ′), the partial derivative of the threshold with respect to the bargaining
power is negative:
∂α∗f
∂θf
=
(
ph(F
′ = 1)− ph(F ′ = 0)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
1
σθ
1
σ
−2
f (1− θf )
1
σ
−1(
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
)2−σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∗((wf ′ + wm′(hˆ′))1−σ − (wf ′ + wm′(lˆ′))1−σ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
∂α∗f
∂θf
< 0.
Proposition. Bargaining Power (GE). For αf = 0, the general equilibrium effect of an
increase in the bargaining power θf on the FGC rate f
∗
F is:
(a) negative if σ > 1 and Cases (2.18), (2.19b) or (2.20a) apply; and
(b) positive if σ < 1 and Case (2.19a) applies.
As already noted, the notation in Section 2.3.7 is slightly different, and thus the cases have
different numbers in this proposition. In the following, Case (1) represents Case (2.18), Cases
(2a) and (2b) represent Cases (2.19a) and (2.19b), respectively. Finally, Cases (3a) and (3b)
stands for Cases (2.20a) and (2.20b), respectively.
Proof. Proposition 2.2 (Bargaining Power (GE))
Case (1) fF = fh: The equilibrium fraction of FGC for αf = 0 is given by:
fF =
1
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
=
1
αf
 θ 1σf
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ

1−σ
((wf ′ + wm′(hˆ
′))1−σ − ((wf ′ + wm′(lˆ′))1−σ
1− σ .
The derivative of this fraction with respect to the bargaining power of the woman is as follows:
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∂fF
∂θf
=
((wf ′ + wm′(hˆ
′))1−σ − ((wf ′ + wm′(lˆ′))1−σ
αf︸ ︷︷ ︸
if σ>1⇒<0
1
σθ
1
σ
−2
f (1− θf )
1
σ
−1(
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
)2−σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(σ>1)
< 0.
If σ > 1, the equilibrium FGC fraction declines if θf increases, but in this case for an un-
changed value of αh Case (1) would no longer apply, since then ff < fh. Even though there
would be a switch to Case (2), this still means that the FGC prevalence rate would be lower
after an increase in θf .
Case (3a) fh < fF : The FGC prevalence rate for αf = 0 is given by:
fF =
√√√√ fh
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
=
√√√√√√ fh
αf
 θ 1σf
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
1−σ (wf ′ + wm′(hˆ′))1−σ − (wf ′ + wm′(lˆ′))1−σ
1− σ (2.42)
=
√
fh
αf
(wf ′ + wm′(hˆ′))1−σ − (wf ′ + wm′(lˆ′))1−σ
1− σ
 θ 1σf
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ

1−σ
2
(2.43)
and with that the derivative is:
∂fF
∂θf
=
√
fh
αf
(wf ′ + wm′(hˆ′))1−σ − (wf ′ + wm′(lˆ′))1−σ
1− σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∗ (1− σ)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
if σ>1⇒<0
1
σθ
1
2σ
− 3
2
f (1− θf )
1
σ
−1(
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
) 3−σ
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(σ>1)
< 0.
Therefore, the fraction of circumcised women decreases. Case (3) only holds if fh < fF . For
an unchanged fh, it could be the case that the induced change by an increase in θf is too
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high, such that fh > fF and cases are switched. This would mean that either Case (1) or
Case (2) are relevant, meaning that fF ≤ fh and thus the equilibrium FGC fraction is lower.
Case (2a+b) fh > fF : The FGC prevalence rate for αf = 0 is given:
fF =
1
2
±
√√√√1
4
− (1− fh)
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
)
=
1
2
±
√√√√√√1
4
− (1− fh)
αf
 θ 1σf
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
1−σ (wf ′ + wm′(hˆ′))1−σ − (wf ′ + wm′(lˆ′))1−σ
1− σ
(2a) :
∂fF
∂θf
(+)
=
1
2
(
1
4
− (1− fh)
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
))− 1
2
∗
−(1− fh)
αf
(wf ′ + wm′(hˆ
′))1−σ − (wf ′ + wm′(lˆ′))1−σ
1− σ (1− σ) ∗
1
σθ
1
σ
−2
f (1− θf )
1
σ
−1(
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
)2−σ
= −1
2
(
1
4
− (1− fh)
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
))− 1
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 otherwise no solution
∗
(1− fh)
(
(wf ′ + wm′(hˆ
′))1−σ − (wf ′ + wm′(lˆ′))1−σ
)
αf︸ ︷︷ ︸
if σ>1⇒<0
∗
1
σθ
1
σ
−2
f (1− θf )
1
σ
−1(
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
)2−σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(σ>1)
> 0
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(2b) :
∂fF
∂θf
(−)
=
1
2
(
1
4
− (1− fh)
αf
(
c∗
f ′,hˆ′
1−σ
1− σ −
c∗
f ′,lˆ′
1−σ
1− σ
))− 1
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 otherwise no solution
∗
(1− fh)
(
(wf ′ + wm′(hˆ
′))1−σ − (wf ′ + wm′(lˆ′))1−σ
)
αf︸ ︷︷ ︸
if σ>1⇒<0
∗
1
σθ
1
σ
−2
f (1− θf )
1
σ
−1(
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
)2−σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(σ>1)
< 0.
For Case (2b), the equilibrium FGC rate decreases, while for Case (2a) the FGC rate increases.
2.A.6. Inefficiency  Further Analysis
As mentioned in Section 2.4.1, it is not obvious what allocations a social planner can enforce.
Here, I assume that the social planner can only enforce the FGC rate and the mating outcome
on the marriage market. The social planner has no influence on the intra-household bargaining
structure over the consumption and cannot distribute resources across men. This means the
optimal consumption decision within a couple is taken as given, the budget constraint for
each couple has to hold and income is not redistributed across couples. Accordingly, the
optimization problem of the social planner is:
max
F
′
i ,Ii,j
µ
α¯fˆ
αf
(
c1−σf ′,i
1− σ − αf,iF
′
i
)
dUαf,i(αf,i) + (1− µ)
ˆ
j
(
c1−σm′,j
1− σ + αmF
′
i
)
dM(j)
s.t.
(cf ′,ω,i, cm′,ω,j) = arg max
cf ′,ω,i,cm′,ω,j
Ii,j
{
θf (
c1−σ
f ′,ω,i
1−σ − αf,iF
′
i ) + (1− θf )(
c1−σ
m′,j
1−σ + αmF
′
i )
}
cf ′,ω,i + cm′,ω,j = s.t. wf + wm(ω
′), ∀Ii,j = 1
Ii,j =

1 if i and j are a couple
0 if i and j are no couple.
(2.44)
64 CHAPTER 2. FGC AND WOMEN'S STATUS ACROSS COUNTRIES
The consumption allocations for the couple are the same as in the decentralized framework:
cf ′,ω′ =
θ
1
σ
f
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
(wf ′ + wm′(ω
′)) and cm′,ω′
(1− θf ) 1σ
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
(wf ′ + wm′(ω
′)),
and are taken as given by the social planner, who can only decide on the circumcision status
F
′
i and the matches Ii,j . However, the optimality condition for the FGC is the same as in
the social planner problem in Section 2.4.1 (see Equation (2.24)). A woman woman i will be
circumcised, Fi = 1, if αf,i <
µ
1−µαm, which leads to the same fraction of circumcised women
as in the other social planner allocation: f cSPF =
αcSP∗f −αf
α¯f−αf =
µ
1−µαm−αf
α¯f−αf . The assignment of
the couples, Iij does not influence this FGC rate.
In Section 2.4.2, I have discussed the equivalent consumption variation and the gender
differences in this measure from an ex-post perspective. Now, I turn to an ex-ante perspective,
where the thought experiment is the abolishment of FGC. For this evaluation, I aggregate
the equivalent consumption variation of all women (
∑
iEV
ante
f ′,i ) of not being circumcised and
compare this to the aggregated equivalent consumption variations of all men (fhEV
ante
m′,h′+(1−
fh)EV
ante
m′,l′ ) for not having the possibility to marry a circumcised woman. For daughters with
αf ′,i ≤ α∗f , the equivalent consumption variation is determined by the following equation:
ph(F
′ = 1)(
c1−σf ′,h′
1− σ − αf,i)
+(1− ph(F ′ = 1))(
c1−σf ′,l′
1− σ − αf,i) = fh(
(cf ′,h′ − EV antef ′,i )1−σ
1− σ )
+(1− fh)(
(cf ′,l′ − EV antef ′,i )1−σ
1− σ ). (2.45)
The right-hand side of (2.45) is the expected utility of a daughter if FGC was not possible
and women are matched randomly to a man. The probability of marrying a high type man
is subsequently equal to the fraction of high type men in the economy, fh. The marriage
prospects of daughters with αf ′,i > α
∗
f are also affected by the change in marriage probabilities,
even though they would not have been circumcised. The equivalent consumption variation for
them is thus defined as in Equation (2.45), albeit with no FGC costs and a different marriage
probability, namely ph(F
′ = 0), on the left hand side.63
63The equivalent consumption variation is defined by ph(F
′ = 0)
c1−σ
f′,h′
1−σ + (1 − ph(F ′ = 0))
c1−σ
f′,l′
1−σ =
fh
(cf′,h′−EV antef′,i )
1−σ
1−σ + (1− fh)
(cf′,l′−EV antef′,i )
1−σ
1−σ .
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For a man of type ω′, the equivalent consumption variation is defined as:
EV antem′,ω′ = (1− σ)[pF=1(ω′)(
c1−σm′,ω′
1− σ + αm) + (1− pF=1(ω
′))
c1−σm′,ω′
1− σ }
1
1−σ − cm′,ω′ .(2.46)
The aggregated equivalent consumption variation for men is EV antem′ = fhEV
ante
m′,h′ + (1 −
fh)EV
ante
m′,l′ and for the women EV
ante
f ′ =
´ α¯f
αf
EV antef ′,αf,idUf,i . If EV
ante
f ′ > EV
ante
m′ the equi-
librium outcome is inefficient according to this measure. Alternatively put the focus on the
marginal couple, where the wife has long-term effects equal to the threshold αf,i = α
∗
f . The
consumption equivalent variation EV antef ′,i∗ of this wife is defined as in Equation (2.45), albeit
with αf,i = α
∗
f . The husband's ex-ante EV is not obvious, since in some equilibria it could
happen that either a high or low type is married to this marginal women. The equivalent
consumption variation from an ex-ante point of view is then determined by Equation (2.46)
for ω′ = h′ and ω′ = l′, respectively.
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Chapter 3
Female Genital Cutting vs. Education
 Two Competing Investments?
3.1. Introduction
"Two things that will ensure the sustainability of FGM/C abandonment are women's
education and economic empowerment. One reason why women are subjected to FGM/C is
their economic dependence on men. If they are empowered, they can say no to FGM/C and
they can protect their children, too. Their negotiation skills increase.When women are
economically capable, they can send their girls to school and the girls, in turn, will also stand
up for their rights." (Asmelash Woldemariam)1
This quote establishes a link between women's education and the harmful tradition of female
genital cutting (FGC), namely that women's education and economic empowerment will help
to eliminate female circumcision.2 The aim of this chapter is to get to the bottom of this
statement and analyze the role of women's education and their economic dependence on men
through marriage for FGC.3 The underlying research questions are: how do FGC, education
and the marriage market interact? Could female education subsidies reduce FGC rates? The
first question is empirically analyzed and the second question is answered within a structural
search model capable of replicating relevant empirical patterns.
1Executive director of Rohi Weddu Pastoral Women Development Organization in Ethiopia (UNFPA and
UNICEF, 2011).
2FGC is also referred to as female genital mutilation (FGM). As in Chapter 2, I will use FGC and female
circumcision as synonyms for this tradition.
3For background information on female circumcision, I refer to the Introduction (Section 2.1) and the Em-
pirical Background Section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2.
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To investigate the first question, I use information from the Demographic and Health Survey
(DHS) 2010 in Burkina Faso and estimate logit and ordered logit models. First, I find for
Burkina Faso that uncircumcised as well as single women are better educated than circumcised
or married women. Second, circumcised or non-educated women are more likely to be married
than their counterparts. Third, better educated parents (mother and father) are less likely to
have a circumcised daughter.
Based on these empirical findings, I hypothesize that education and FGC are two competing
investments for the daughter, with education fostering economic independence and possibly
also marriage market prospects and FGC only improving marriage market prospects. While
better educated parents will focus on the education investment, low educated parents will
decide in favor of FGC, since they cannot afford the education of their daughter. This is one
of the first papers to analyze and document these interactions. Ouedraogo and Koissy-Kpein
(2014) also analyze the link between FGC, marriage market and education, finding a negative
correlation between the education and FGC of daughters. However, they use the Burkina
Faso DHS 2003, which has a smaller sample size and is older than the DHS 2010. Yount
(2002) and Wagner (2013) find that only the education of the mother is negatively correlated
with the daughter's FGC status, but they do not investigate the relationship between the
daughter's education and her FGC status.
To answer the question of whether female education subsidies are able to reduce FGC, I
provide a dynamic model with equilibrium search in the marriage market in which parents
decide upon the circumcision of their daughter and the education of their children. Some
of the ingredients, particularly the premarital investment nature of FGC, are the same as
in Chapter 2. However, this model has more than two periods and the marriage market
is modeled differently, involving search frictions. In each period, singles meet randomly in
the marriage market and mutually decide whether to marry. If one person does not agree to
marry, there is a high probability that both stay single for this period but reenter the marriage
market in the next period. This equilibrium search model is closely related to Greenwood
et al. (2012), as well as the literature on marriage search models (e.g. Mortensen (1988),
Aiyagari et al. (2000), Fernández and Rogerson (2001) and Santos and Weiss (2013)).4 For
the education and FGC decision, parents trade-off the costs against the benefits of each of
the investments. Children are heterogeneous in their ability, which influences the education
cost and girls have different costs of FGC.
4See Section 2.1 for a selection of papers. For an extensive overview of the marriage market literature, I refer
the reader to Browning et al. (2014).
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I calibrate the model to match some moments for Burkina Faso and it is able to qualitatively
reproduce the empirical patterns. More precisely, the model generates that uncircumcised
women and single women are better educated than their counterparts, i.e. circumcised and
married women. Circumcised women as well as low educated women are more likely to
be married than uncircumcised and low educated women. Furthermore, better educated
parents are less likely to circumcise their daughter. The competition between the two forms
of investment for daughters, namely education and FGC, is mainly driving the results. Parents
with low education, involving lower disposable income, tend to invest less in the education of
the daughter. They may decide to circumcise her if they cannot afford the costs of a better
education and the utility cost of FGC is low enough.5 Low education reduces the future income
of the daughter, which makes a marriage relatively more attractive than staying single. Put
differently, a better educated woman has a higher income, which increases her outside options
to marriage (independence margin). However, this is not the only margin of the education
investment; moreover, higher income also increases women's attractiveness to men and with
that her marriage market prospects (marriage margin). In contrast, Ouedraogo and Koissy-
Kpein (2014) only focus on the independence margin in their two period model, in which
parents can decide to circumcise their daughter and thus invest in the marriage market, or
to educate her. Education only generates returns on the labor market, with the authors
concluding that FGC seems to be more profitable than education in poor countries. However,
Ouedraogo and Koissy-Kpein (2014) do not model the marriage market and thus cannot
account for general equilibrium effects, which are particularly important for policy analysis.
Other FGC papers, such as Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010), Coyne and Coyne (2014),
Rai and Sengupta (2013) and Bellemare et al. (2014) (see the embedded literature review in
Section 2.1 of Chapter 2), also do not consider general equilibrium effects and also do not look
at education. The goal of this chapter is to fill this gap in the literature. The investment nature
of FGC and education further relates the paper to the literature on premarital investments,
e.g. Peters and Siow (2002), Fernández et al. (2005), Baker and Jacobsen (2007), Iyigun
and Walsh (2007), Nosaka (2007), Peters (2007), Bjerk (2009), Chiappori et al. (2009) and
Bhaskar and Hopkins (2011). While most of the papers focus on education as premarital
investment, some analyze the investment in beauty (e.g. Burdett and Coles (2001) and Lee
and Ryu (2012)) or even premarital chastity (e.g. Mariani, 2012), although none of the papers
investigate FGC as premarital investment. In particular, the interaction between education
5This is an indirect comparison, since education costs are monetary, but FGC costs are formulated in terms
of utility.
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and FGC is not analyzed. I refer to Section 2.1 of Chapter 2 for a discussion of this literature.
Based on the calibrated version of the model, I analyze the effect of a subsidy to female
education, finding that this can reduce FGC rates but not eradicate the tradition. For ex-
ample, a reduction of the education costs for women by 50% leads to a 54 percentage point
decrease in the FGC rate (or a decrease of 75%). At the same time, the marriage rate of
uncircumcised women increases. This suggests that in equilibrium, the marriage margin of
the education investment dominates the independence margin: namely, for lower costs of
female education, daughters receive better education, which makes them more attractive in
the marriage market. However, education subsidies are only effective to a certain extent, since
the FGC prevalence no longer decreases for sufficiently high subsidy rates, leveling off at a
rate around 20%. Owing to an almost costless female education, most of the women are highly
educated and do not differ from each other with respect to this characteristic. Accordingly,
the only heterogeneity lies in the FGC status. Since men prefer circumcised to uncircumcised
women in this model, the daughters with low FGC costs will be circumcised to increase their
marriage market prospects. The welfare analysis shows that women are the winners of this
policy, partly at the expense of men, who are confronted with a welfare decrease for subsidies
up to 50% of the female education cost. However, men's welfare slightly increases again for
higher subsidy rates, while remaining below the starting point's welfare. This policy analysis
of female education subsidies yields interesting and novel insights for the literature.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides empirical
analysis concerning the interaction between female circumcision, education and marriage. The
model is presented in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, I discuss the numerical example. Section
3.5 covers the policy analysis, before Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2. Evidence from Burkina Faso
In this section, I provide evidence on the interaction between FGC, the marriage market and
education in Burkina Faso. The first part focuses on the description of the data and the
summary statistics, before the empirical analysis is presented in the second part.
3.2.1. Data and Summary Statistics
The analysis for Burkina Faso is based on data from the Demographic and Health survey
in 2010, involving interviews with 17,087 women (aged 15-49) and 7,307 men (aged 15-59)
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(Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie and ICF-International, 2012).6 The
important feature of the survey is the module of questions on FGC. Women are asked whether
they and their daughters are circumcised. The module includes questions on the form of female
circumcision, the age at the time the procedure was performed and the circumcisor. This
information can be related to socio-economic characteristics of the women, such as marital
status, education, as well as characteristics of both the household and the husband. The DHS
provides individual sampling weights, which are used to calculate means and fractions.
In total, 17,031 women provide information on their own FGC status. The summary statis-
tics and averages are presented for women of the age group 15-39, for the following reason.
All circumcised women older than 34 have been married (see Table 3.A1 in Appendix 3.A.1).
Only 1% of the uncircumcised women have never been married at age 35, which switches to
0% at the age of 40.7 In any case, women above 39 have all been married, and thus there
is no heterogeneity in this dimension.8 This means that only women up to age 39 are still
single and potentially searching for a man on the marriage market and thus relevant for the
analysis.9 However, summary statistics for all women aged 15 to 49 are also provided in
Appendix 2.A.3 of Chapter 2.10
Some numbers are presented here before proceeding with the analysis of the interaction
between FGC, the marriage market and education. 73% of all women aged 15-39 are cir-
cumcised.11 While more than 78% of the non-educated women are circumcised, only 54%
of the women with secondary education have undergone the procedure. This pattern also
holds for ever vs. never married women (with FGC rates of 78% vs. 55 %). For younger
age groups, 15-29, there are significantly more circumcised than uncircumcised women mar-
ried. See Tables 3.A2 and 3.A3 for further FGC rates of different socio-economic groups.
Differences between circumcised and uncircumcised women are displayed in Table 3.A4 (see
6The DHS program was established by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in
1984 as a follow-up to the World Fertility Survey and the Contraceptive Prevalence Survey projects.
7Concerning the marital status, I distinguish between "ever married" and "never married". The "ever
married" group not only includes people who are currently in a union or living with the partner, but also
those who have been formerly in a union. All other people, namely those who have not yet been married,
belong to the "never married" group. For the sake of convenience, I will also refer to "ever married" as "
married" and "never married" as "single". Note that under this definition, an "ever married" person could
be divorced, separated or widowed at the time of the interview. However, this only applies to a fraction of
around 3% of the sample population.
8Men marry later in life than women, with all men having been married at the age of 45.
9This is not quite correct, since some of the women aged 40 or older might be divorced, separated or widowed
and therefore also searching for a partner. However, as discussed, this is only relevant for a negligible small
fraction.
10In the regression analysis (next Section), I consider all women but control for their age.
11The overall FGC rate (76%) is higher when women of the age 40-49 are also considered. The numerical
example in Section 2.5.2 (Chapter 2) is based on this larger sample of women (aged 15-49).
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Appendix 3.A.1), e.g. 84% of the circumcised women have been married, compared to only
65% of uncircumcised women.
3.2.2. Female Genital Cutting, Marriage and Education
In this section, I focus on the interaction analysis between FGC, marriage and education.
First, I analyze the education levels of women and contrast them for different groups, such
as circumcised vs. uncircumcised and single vs. married women. Second, I investigate the
influence of the FGC status and educational attainment on the marriage probability of a
woman. In a final step, the parents' decision to circumcise at least one daughter is studied.
Starting with the education levels, Table 3.1 shows the education distribution of ever mar-
ried women and singles, aged 15 to 39, who are further divided into two subgroups, namely
those who are circumcised (FGC) and those who are uncircumcised (no FGC).12 While 80%
Table 3.1.: Education Distribution of Women
Ever Married Singles no
Education FGC no FGC both FGC no FGC both FGC FGC
no education 0.81 0.73 0.80 0.46 0.29 0.39 0.76 0.58
primary 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.18
secondary 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.29 0.44 0.35 0.10 0.22
higher 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
Total 8598 2361 10959 1642 1444 3086 10240 3805
Source: DHS 2010 Burkina Faso, own calculations. Observations are weighted by individual
sampling weights. Only women of ages 15 to 39 years. The differences within the aggregated
groups of circumcised (FGC) vs. uncircumcised (no FGC) as well as ever married vs. single
women are significant at the 1% level. Only the difference in higher education between ever
married and single women is significant at the 5% level. The fractions are tested on equality
based on a two-sample t-test with sampling weights.
of all ever married women have no education, only 39% of single women are non-educated. A
large fraction of singles, 35%, have secondary education, whereas this fraction is much lower
for the married women, i.e. 7%. Comparing the education of circumcised with uncircumcised
women yields a similar picture (last two columns of Table 3.1). The highest share, 76%, of
circumcised women are non-educated, which is only true for 58% of the uncircumcised women.
Furthermore, only 10% of the circumcised women received secondary education, compared to
22% of the uncircumcised women.13
12Table 3.A5 in Appendix 3.A.1 provides the distributions for all women, women aged 15 to 30 and women
aged 15 to 25. The patterns are the same and independent of the considered age group. Note, that
all fractions are calculated at a higher precision than two decimal places and are subsequently rounded;
therefore, they might not exactly add up to one. This also holds for all following calculations.
13For information on the education distribution of ever married and never married men, I refer to Table 3.A7
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The joint distribution of education and FGC within the group of married and single women
aged 15 to 39 years is reported in Table 3.2.14 For example, only 26% of the singles are non-
Table 3.2.: Joint Distribution of Education and FGC of Women
Ever Married Singles
Education FGC no FGC FGC no FGC
no education 0.64 0.16 0.26 0.13
primary 0.09 0.03 0.13 0.11
secondary 0.05 0.02 0.16 0.19
higher 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Total 10959 3086
8598 2361 1642 1444
Source: DHS 2010 Burkina Faso, own calculations. Ob-
servations are weighted by individual sampling weights.
Only women of ages 15 to 39 years. The differences be-
tween ever married and single women are signficant at the
1% level. For the group of higher educated uncircumcised
women the difference is only significant at the 5% level.
For higher educated circumcised women there is no sig-
nificant difference. The fractions are tested on equality
based on a two-sample t-test with sampling weights.
educated and circumcised, while 19% have secondary education and are uncircumcised. This
is different for ever-married women, 64% of whom are non-educated and circumcised, while
16% are non-educated and uncircumcised. These facts suggest that both the FGC status and
marriage are negatively correlated with a women's educational attainment.15
In addition, I find evidence that those women who were circumcised before the age of
school enrollment are less educated than women who have never been circumcised.16 Table
3.3 presents the estimation results of two ordered logit models. A woman's own educational
attainment is regressed on her FGC status and further controls. Educational attainment has
four categories, i.e. no education, primary, secondary and higher education.17 The estimation
is based on a setup in which Educ∗i = x
′
iα+ εi is a latent variable with unknown thresholds,
i.e. the real level of education, and the stated educational attainment is defined by Educi = j
in Appendix 3.A.1.
14Table 3.A6 in Appendix 3.A.1 includes the joint distributions for all women, women aged 15 to 30 years
and 15 to 25, which display the same patterns.
15This negative correlation is also observed, when comparing the FGC rates and average years of schooling
for different cohorts. Figure 3.A1 in Appendix 3.A.1 shows that the FGC rates have been decreasing for
younger cohorts. In contrast, the average years of schooling have been increasing.
16The official age of school enrollment in Burkina Faso is 6 years, according to the Education Act on the
Rights of the Child (UN 2002, p. 10).
17Primary education consists of incomplete and complete primary education. This structure also holds for
the category of secondary education.
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if βj−1 < Educ∗i < βj .
18 The probability of each education category is:
Pr[Educi = j] = Pr[βj−1 < Educ∗i < βj ]
= Pr[βj−1 < x
′
iα+ εi < βj ]
= F (βj − x′iα)− F (βj−1 − x
′
iα), (3.1)
with the error term ε following a logistic distribution and xi including FGC status and further
controls.19 The regression in the first column of Table 3.3 is based on non-married daughters
above the age of 14 years who still live at their parental home. The FGC dummy is equal
to one if the daughter was circumcised before the age of 7 and zero if she has not yet been
circumcised. Daughters who are circumcised at an age between 7 and 14 are excluded, since
the interaction between education and circumcision might be different.20 The second column
considers all women, rather than only daughters, excluding those who have been circumcised
between the ages of 7 and 14. Given that this sample includes the characteristics of daughters
still living at home, as well as married women living with their husband, controls such as
wealth, region and urban area refer to some women's parental home and that of their family
in-law for others. Therefore, I exclude these controls for the regression based on the whole
sample.
For both samples, I find a significant negative effect of FGC on educational attainment.21
Women who are circumcised before the age of 7 are less educated than uncircumcised women.22
This strongly supports the previous finding of a negative correlation between FGC and ed-
ucational attainment. Even though the female circumcision took place before the education
started, a causal statement that FGC influences education is problematic. The decision
whether to circumcise the daughter could have been affected by the plans for her education,
which in turn does not contradict the hypothesis that education and FGC are competing
investments.
18See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for more details, p. 519-520.
19The logistic distribution is given by F (z) = ez/(1 + ez) and the controls are the number of older siblings,
age, religion, ethnicity, urban, wealth and region.
20It still might happen that a young adult will undergo FGC in the future, although the likelihood is low since
the average age of FGC in Burkina Faso is below 4 years.
21Table 3.A8 in Appendix 3.A.1 shows the estimated coefficients of all controls.
22This finding is robust to changes in the classification of educational attainment. Table 3.A9 in Appendix
3.A.1 shows the results of an ordered logit model where incomplete education belongs to the lower category,
such that incomplete primary education belongs to no education, for example. Table 3.A10 shows the
regression results including all women, even those who have been circumcised between the ages of 7 and
14. The results also remain robust for this classification.
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Table 3.3.: Education of Women
Daughters All
Circumcised before age 7 -0.668*** (0.110) -0.586*** (0.0488)
Current age, religion, ethnicity 3 3
Number of older siblings 3 3
Wealth, region, urban 3 7
Observations 2008 13376
Pseudo R2 0.201 0.116
Source: DHS, own calculations. Notes: Ordered logit model with estimated coeffi-
cients. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the household level. *
(p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01). The education categories are no education,
primary education, secondary education and higher education. The dummy "circum-
cised before age 7" is equal to one if the woman was circumcised before age 7 and
zero if she never has been circumcised. Column 1 only considers unmarried daughters,
older than 14 years, who are still living at their parental home. Column 2 considers
all women. 3 controlling for, 7 not controlling for. The dummy urban is equal to one
if the person lives in an urban area, otherwise it is zero.
To analyze the influence of the FGC status and educational attainment on the marriage
probability of a woman, I estimate a logistic regression model of the marriage status (married
vs. single) on the FGC status, education and further controls. The underlying equation for
this estimation is:
Pr[Evermarriedi = 1|xi] = exp(α0 + x
′
iα1)
1 + exp(α0 + x
′
iα1)
, (3.2)
with xi representing the FGC status, education and further controls.
23 Table 3.4 shows the
results. First of all, the FGC status increases the likelihood of being married, as does the
age. Secondly, a woman with primary education is less likely to be married than a woman
with no education, which also holds for women with secondary and higher education.24 These
findings are in line with the literature (see Wagner, 2013).
23See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for a detailed expression on p.464. The controls are current age, number
of all and older siblings, urban area, region, ethnicity and religion.
24The estimation results for the remaining controls are presented in Table 3.A11 in Appendix 3.A.1.
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Table 3.4.: Probability of Marriage
Marriage
FGC 0.159** (0.072)
Primary education -0.704*** (0.080)
Secondary education -2.022*** (0.103)
Higher education -2.616*** (0.427)
Age 0.498*** (0.016)
Observations 16688
Pseudo R2 0.599
Source: DHS, own calculations. Notes: Logis-
tic regression model with estimated coefficients.
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered
at household level. * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), ***
(p<0.01). Controlling for the number of siblings
and older siblings, urban area, region, religion
and ethnicity. The reference group for educa-
tion is "no education".
Finally, I focus on the driving forces of parents' decision to circumcise their daughter. Each
woman is asked whether she has at least one circumcised daughter.25 I estimate a logistic
regression model of the probability of having at least one circumcised daughter on covariates
that refer to either the mother, the father or the whole family.26 The education of the mother
and her partner are included in the regression as dummies.27
The main results are presented in Table 3.5. The estimated coefficients of the remaining
controls are displayed in Table 3.A12 (see Appendix 3.A.1).28 A woman with secondary
education is significantly less likely to have at least one circumcised daughter than a woman
with no education.29 The same holds true for the education of the father. Furthermore, the
probability that at least one daughter is circumcised increases with the number of children
and particularly with the number of daughters in a household. Finally, the FGC status of
the mother has a high significant and positive influence, indicating a strong intergenerational
2516% (15%) of women aged 15-49 (15-39) report that they have at least one circumcised daughter. Compared
to the overall FGC rate, this is a low fraction. As discussed in Appendix 2.A.3 in Chapter 2, there are some
caveats to this measure. For instance, it does not distinguish between the number of circumcised daughters
and the daughters who might still be at risk of undergoing the procedure at a later stage. Furthermore,
there might be an under-reporting problem due to the law against FGC in Burkina Faso.
26Individual information on daughters is not included. The underlying equation of the regression corresponds
to Equation (3.2) but with the daughters' FGC status as dependent variable.
27Again, the education categories are no education, primary, secondary and higher education. No education
is taken as the reference group. The education information about the partner is given by the woman. It
could be the case that the current partner is not the father of the daughters. However, since divorce is
relatively rare, I assume the partner to be the father of the children.
28The age gap between parents (father's age minus mother's age) is added as a control in the second column
of Table 3.A12, but has only a low influence on the FGC probability.
29The dummy for higher education is omitted. However, this does not affect the results, since there are only
36 observations.
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transmission of the tradition.30 The relevance of the mother's education for the FGC decision
is supported by Yount (2002), who focuses on Minia (Egypt), as well as Wagner (2013), who
analyzes 13 African countries. Both find that the mother's education is negatively correlated
with the circumcision status of the daughter; however, in contrast to the presented results,
they do not find a significant effect of the father's education.
Table 3.5.: Probability of Circumcising Daughters
FGC Daughter
Mother:
Primary education -0.186 (0.121)
Secondary education -0.786*** (0.299)
FGC 2.694*** (0.235)
Father:
Primary educ. (partner) -0.142 (0.112
Secondary educ. (partner) -0.952*** (0.271)
Higher educ.(partner) -0.926 (1.001)
Family:
Children ever born 0.0556*** (0.0211)
Daughters living 0.240*** (0.0265)
Observations 10491
Pseudo R2 0.147
Source: DHS, own calculations. Notes: Logistic regres-
sion model with estimated coefficients. Standard errors
are in parentheses and clustered at household level. *
(p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01). Controlling for re-
ligion and ethnicity, mother's current age and her age
at first cohabition, number of household members, sex
of household head, wealth, region and urban area. The
reference group is "no education". For the mother's ed-
ucation "highest educ" is omitted.
To summarize, the main empirical findings of this section are:
1. Uncircumcised as well as never married women are better educated than circumcised
and married women, respectively.
2. Circumcised or non-educated women are more likely to be married than their counter-
parts.
3. Parents with secondary education are less likely to circumcise their daughters than
parents with no education.
These findings lead to the following hypothesis:
30The separate estimation results for the two subgroups, circumcised and non-circumcised mothers, are pre-
sented in Table 3.A13 in Appendix 3.A.1. Accordingly, it becomes evident that the characteristics of the
circumcised mothers are driving the results.
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Education and FGC are two competing investments for the daughter. While education fosters
economic independence and possibly also improves marriage market prospects, FGC only im-
proves marriage market prospects. Better educated parents focus on the education investment
and low educated parents on FGC, since they cannot afford education for the daughter.
3.3. The Model
Based on these empirical facts, I provide a structural model to test the hypothesis of competing
investments. Parents can decide upon two forms of investment, namely the circumcision of
the daughter and the education of both children, daughter and son. The model is a dynamic
equilibrium search model of the marriage market. The marriage market takes place every
period and people have the option to stay single.31 The main mechanism is as follows: if
the costs of education are high, parents with low education, associated with low disposable
income, may prefer circumcising their daughter to investing in her education. In turn, this
lowers the future income of the daughter, which makes a marriage relatively more attractive
than staying single.
3.3.1. General Framework
The following framework is closely related to the model of Greenwood et al. (2012). This
economy has the same number of females, f , and males, m. Every person starts her life
with childhood, which lasts for Tc periods. During adulthood, people are confronted with a
constant dying probability of δ, meaning there is a positive likelihood that they do not survive
into the next period.32 Adults make a living from working in the labor market. Furthermore,
starting with adulthood, a person is active in the marriage market, randomly meets a person
of the opposite sex and can decide at the beginning of the period whether to marry or stay
single. The decision to marry cannot be revoked, meaning divorce is not possible, but a single
will re-enter the marriage market in the next period. A married couple has two children, a son
and a daughter, while a single remains childless. After the marriage market has taken place
31Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010) also present an alternative approach of modeling the marriage market,
comparable to Burdett and Coles (2001). People meet randomly and decide whether to marry. If they
marry, they leave the market and are replaced by a male and a female, where the female still has to decide
on the circumcision. Besides the differences in the marriage market setup and replacement, they neither
have an alternative investment in education nor is the FGC decision made by the parents.
32I assume that children survive childhood and enter adulthood with certainty. Furthermore, the dying
probability is the same for everyone and not higher for circumcised women. This seems to be a very strong
assumption in the context of FGC, but information on the number of women/children who die due to the
tradition rarely exists. In the model, a higher dying probability could also be interpreted as an additional
cost of FGC.
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and couples are formed, people decide upon consumption and investments in their children
(if they have some). In this economy, couples die together. Figure 3.1 displays the basic time
line of the model.
Figure 3.1.: Time Structure of the Model
As in Chapter 2, women can differ in their utility costs of FGC, αf , but they will pass
the same utility cost on to their daughter, such that the utility cost of FGC does not vary
between mother and daughter. Thus, utility costs of FGC are potentially different for each
family of woman i, but for simplicity I refrain from indexing them, αf ≡ αf,i. The distribution
function of this utility cost over all women is log-normally distributed ln(αf ) ∼ N(µαf , σ2αf )
and labeled by Dα.
The labor supply on the labor market is exogenous, although the wage function depends on
the individual's education. An adult can earn money in the labor market, according to the
wage function w(e, g) = ψgwe with we = wmin + ηe. The wage depends on the education of
the individual, e, with ∂we∂e > 0, as well as the gender, g. The private return to education is
governed by η and everyone receives a minimum income of wmin. A female is confronted with
a gender wage gap of ψf ∈ (0, 1), with ψm = 1.33
33This is a critical assumption, since many women and men are working in agriculture. Furthermore, women
might not even be employed. Accordingly, the question is whether there are returns to education in
agriculture. For example, Ram and Singh (1988) find private returns to education (years in schooling) of
around 10% for rural households in Burkina Faso. Kazianga (2004) estimates returns to schooling between
9% and 16% for a year of schooling, depending on the type of education (primary, secondary or tertiary)
for Burkina Faso. For further evidence on positive schooling returns (also for agriculture) in sub-Saharan
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The education decision for the children is made by their parents, who also bear its costs
in terms of consumption goods. The cost of education is given by κ(a, e) =
κg
a e, where κg
is a constant and potentially different for genders and a is the ability of a person, in this
case the child. People differ in their ability, which is independently and randomly distributed
ln(a) ∼ N(0, σ2ag) across people, as in Greenwood et al. (2012). The distribution can be
different for genders and is denoted by Ag. In order to be precise, the ability would have to
be indexed by i (for women) and j (for men) to highlight that people are heterogeneous, but
for readability the index is dropped. Parents can observe the ability of their son and daughter
before the education decision is made, albeit only after the children are born. The education
decisions are discrete, with the categories e ∈ {0, .., k} and k being an integer.
The gains from marriage are manifold. First, a married person derives additional utility
from having children in the first period of marriage. Parents are altruistic towards their
children, such that the children's utility enters their utility. Since a single person does not
have children in this set-up, this additional utility cannot be derived. Second, a couple enjoys
economies to scale in form of a cost reduction of the consumption good, which is governed
by φ. Third, a married person randomly derives utility from being in love with the partner,
denoted by lg ∼ N(µl, σ2l ) with the distribution function L. This love parameter is different
for the spouses, in contrast to the altruism and economies to scale, which are the same for
the wife and her husband.
Starting from a unit measure of female and male singles in the very first period of the
economy, the population is either increasing, decreasing or stays constant, depending on the
fraction of singles who marry and the survival probability. This is due to the assumptions
that people die with a probability of δ after their first year of adulthood and that fertility
for a couple is exogenous at a replacement rate of one. If more people marry than die, the
population grows. I further assume that couples die together. In the steady state of the
economy, which will be explained in further detail in Section 3.3.6, the number of people in
the single pool and their characteristics are constant.
Furthermore, there is no savings technology in this economy.
African countries, I refer to Psacharopoulos (1994), Glewwe (1996), Siphambe (2000), Oyelere (2010),
Alene and Manyong (2007) and Foltz and Gajigo (2012). The estimated private returns to education go
up to 18%.
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3.3.2. Preferences
The preferences of a woman are represented by the following period utility function:
uf =
c1−σf
1− σ − αfF + lf,1 + γ1E(uf ′ + um′), (3.3)
F =

1
0
if circumcised
otherwise,
{γ1, lf,1} =

{βTcγ, lf}
{0, 0}
first period of marriage
otherwise.
The relative risk aversion of the CRRA preferences is determined by σ for the private good
cf . The indicator F is equal to one when the woman is circumcised and zero if not. FGC
(F = 1) leads to a utility cost of αf each period. In the first period of the marriage, a woman
derives utility from being in love, lf .
34 She has dynastic preferences in the fashion of Barro
and Becker (1988, 1989), whereby the degree of altruism towards her children is represented
by γ, with uf ′ and um′ being the lifetime utilities of the daughter and son, respectively. The
children's future utility is discounted by βTc , since they will first derive utility after their
childhood (lasting Tc periods), when they are grown-ups.
35
The period utility of a man is defined as:
um =
c1−σm
1− σ + αmFˆ + lm,1 + γ1E(uf ′ + um′) (3.4)
Fˆ =

1
0
if wife circumcised
otherwise,
{γ1, lm,1} =

{βTcγ, lm}
{0, 0}
first period of marriage
otherwise.
If he is married to a circumcised wife, Fˆ = 1, he derives a positive utility of αm each period.
This utility gain αm is the same for every man. The altruism enters the utility in exactly the
same way as it enters the wife's utility.
34Here, this random love shock is only relevant in the first period of marriage. Nevertheless, it could be easily
transformed into a constant period love shock or interpreted as the discounted aggregated love shock over
the whole marriage.
35Here, parents only derive utility from having children in the first period of the marriage. This is also the
time when they decide upon the investment into their children, which cannot be revoked later on.
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3.3.3. Budget Constraint
The period budget constraint for a single of gender g = {m, f} is as follows:
cg ≤ w(eg, g). (3.5)
For a young couple, i.e. a couple that just got married in this period, the budget constraint is
given by:
φ(cf + cm) + κ(af ′ , ef ′) + κ(am′ , em′) ≤ w(ef , f) + w(em,m) (3.6)
with φ < 1 being the additional gain from marriage, representing economies to scale in the
household. The costs of education for the daughter and son are given by κ(af ′ , ef ′) =
κf
af ′
ef ′
and κ(am′ , em′) =
κm
am′
em′ , respectively.
36 The variables of the children are marked by a
prime, where ef ′ and af ′ (em′ and am′) are the education and ability of the daughter (son),
respectively.
For an old couple, i.e. a couple that has been married for longer than one period, the budget
constraint is:
φ(cf + cm) ≤ w(ef , f) + w(em,m). (3.7)
3.3.4. Marriage Market
The marriage market takes place at the beginning of each period, where only singles meet.
There is no divorce or remarriage. Furthermore, polygamy is not allowed in this model.37 If
two people mutually agree upon marrying, they will exit the marriage market forever. Within
the market, everyone randomly meets a person of the opposite sex, independent of their age.
Consequently, marriages can take place across generations and are not restricted to cohorts.
In particular, this means that children enter the marriage market after their childhood and
36The costs are denominated in terms of the consumption good, which parents only have to pay in the first
period of their marriage. This is not a crucial assumption, since the costs could just be interpreted as
discounted aggregated costs of education during the childhood.
37In Burkina Faso, the polygyny rate is relatively high, with 42% of the married women having at least one
co-wife according to the DHS 2010 (see also Table 4.1 in Chapter 4, Section 4.2). Therefore, one could think
about an extension of the model in which polygyny is possible. In an earlier version of their paper from
2007, Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010) find that circumcised women in a polygynous relationship are
more likely to have a higher rank within the marriage. This could be another margin along which FGC
might improve marriage market prospects. In this version of the model, I abstract from this additional
dimension and leave it to future research.
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can potentially marry every single of the opposite sex, regardless how old this person is.38
With a probability of δim, a single has to marry the partner met in the marriage market,
without having the option of rejecting.39 With probability (1 − δim), a single person has
the option of refusing to marry. This feature ensures that everyone who survives eventually
marries, which corresponds to the empirical findings (see Table 3.A1 in Appendix 3.A.1).
This marriage market is characterized by search frictions, as in Greenwood et al. (2012), since
people only randomly meet a person of the opposite sex.40
3.3.5. Optimization Problem
The value function of a single with gender g is denoted by V sg . While the value function of
a just married person in the first period of marriage (young couple) is denoted by V m,yg , the
abbreviation for the value function of a married person from the second period of marriage
onwards (old couple) is V m,og . The traits of the spouse are marked by a hat, e.g. the education
attainment of the spouse is denoted by eˆg.
3.3.5.1. Singles
For a single female, the value function is given by
V sf (ef , αf , F ) = max
csf
{
csf
1−σ
1− σ − αfF + (1− δ)βE(V
market
f (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′))
}
s.t. csf ≤ ψf (wmin + ηef )︸ ︷︷ ︸
w(ef ,f)
(3.8)
38Of course, this is a simplifying assumption, yet is not unreasonable for girls, since the age gap between
men and women at marriage is relatively high in Burkina Faso. On average, women are around 11 years
younger than their husband (this average gap is 6 years when only considering women and men aged 15
to 39), although there are also some couples for which the woman is older (see Figure 3.A2 in Appendix
3.A.1). The empirical distribution of the age gap is not symmetric around zero, which cannot be accounted
for in the model. However, this feature is not crucial for the analysis, since this paper does not focus on
the age gap in marriage. Furthermore, the age gap between parents is not economically relevant for the
decision on FGC, which can be seen from the logit regression results in Table 3.A12 (Appendix 3.A.1).
The estimated coefficient of the age gap on the probability of FGC is hardly significant at the 10% level
and very small.
39The subscript (im) stands for involuntary marriage.
40Alternatively, one could think about a setup with lower search frictions. The marriage market could be
separated, i.e. into one market in which only circumcised women search for a husband and every man
who prefers circumcised women could search there. The other marriage market would be one in which
uncircumcised women are present. Furthermore, one concern of the marriage market in this paper could
be that children do not decide on their marriage in reality, but rather their parents. However, the model
can easily be reinterpreted in the way that parents decide on the marriage market of their children, under
the same search frictions.
84 CHAPTER 3. FGC VS. EDUCATION  TWO COMPETING INVESTMENTS?
The current utility is given by
csf
1−σ
1−σ − αfF and E(V marketf (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′)) is the
expected continuation value from the next period onwards, which depends on the marriage
market outcome. The state variables for a single woman are her education status (ef ), her
utility cost of FGC (αf ) and her FGC status (F ), which do not change over time.
41 Primes
are used to indicate the characteristics of the children. The expected continuation value is
defined as:
E(V marketf (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′)) =
ˆ
L
ˆ
Af
ˆ
Am
ˆ
Sˆm,new′{
Ief ,F,eˆm,lV
m,y
f (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′)
+(1− Ief ,F,eˆm,l)
[
(1− δim)V sf (ef , αf , F )
+ δimV
m,y
f (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′)
]}
dSˆm,new
′
(em)dAm(am′)dAf (af ′)dL(l)
Ief ,eˆm,F,l =

1 if mutual agreement to marry
0 otherwise.
(3.9)
The expectation is formed over the normalized distributions of single males in the next pe-
riod, Sˆm,new
′
(eˆm), over the distribution of the love shock, L(l), and the ability shocks for
the daughter and the son, Af (af ′) and Am(am′). If a couple mutually agrees upon mar-
rying (Ief ,F,eˆm,l = 1), the continuation value for the woman is V
m,y
f (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′),
i.e. the value function of a young married woman, which is explained in further detail in the
next section. If they do not mutually agree, there is still a small chance of marriage, with
probability δim. This yields the same continuation value of V
m,y
f (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′). How-
ever, they will not marry with probability (1− δim), which leads to the continuation value of
V sf (ef , αf , F ), i.e. the value function of a single woman. The marriage decision and the single
distributions are discussed in further detail in Sections 3.3.5.3 and 3.3.6, respectively.
41Hence the notation will stay the same, without primes, in the next period. Furthermore, her ability af
is not a state variable, since it has only been relevant for her education level, ef , chosen by her parents.
Thus, all crucial information about af for the woman's decisions is captured in the education, such that
the ability does not need to be included in the value function. This also holds for single men, as well as
people living as young couples and old couples.
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For a single male, the value function is defined analogously:
V sm(em) = maxcsm
{
csm
1−σ
1− σ + (1− δ)βE(V
market
m (eˆf , em, αˆf , Fˆ , af ′ , am′))
}
s.t. csm ≤ wmin + ηem︸ ︷︷ ︸
w(em,m)
(3.10)
with
E(V marketm (em, eˆf , αˆf , Fˆ , af ′ , am′)) =
ˆ
L
ˆ
Af
ˆ
Am
ˆ
Sˆf,new′{
Ieˆf ,em,Fˆ,lV
m,y
m (eˆf , em, αˆf , Fˆ , af ′ , am′)
+(1− Ieˆf ,em,Fˆ,l) [(1− δim)V
s
m(em)
+ δimV
m,y
m (eˆf , em, αˆf , Fˆ , af ′ , am′)
]}
dSˆf,new
′
(ef , αf , F )dAm(am′)dAf (af ′)dL(l)
Ieˆf ,em,Fˆ ,l =

1 if mutual agreement to marry
0 otherwise.
(3.11)
The single man only has his education level as a state variable. Furthermore, he faces the
same distributions of the love and ability shocks (L(l), Af (af ′) and Am(am′)) as a single
woman, although the normalized distribution of single females in the next period is relevant
for him, i.e. Sˆf,new
′
(eˆf , αˆf , Fˆ ).
3.3.5.2. Couples
There are two different types of couples, i.e. young and old couples, as briefly mentioned in
Section 3.3.3. A couple that just got married in this period is called a young couple, while all
others are old couples. For a woman who just got married, the value function is:
V m,yf (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′) =
(cm,y∗f )
1−σ
1− σ − αfF + lf + (1− δ)βV
m,o
f (ef , eˆm, αf , F )
+γ1E
(
V market
′
f (e
∗
f ′ , eˆm′ , αf ′ , F
′∗, af ′′ , am′′)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
altruism (daughter)
+ γ1E
(
V market
′
m (eˆf ′ , e
∗
m′ , αˆf ′ , Fˆ
′, af ′′ , am′′)
)
,︸ ︷︷ ︸
altruism (son)
(3.12)
where E(V market′f (e∗f ′ , eˆm′ , αf ′ , F
′∗, af ′′ , am′′)) is the expected lifetime valuation of the daugh-
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ter and E(V market′m (eˆf ′ , e∗m′ , αˆf ′ , Fˆ ′, af ′′ , am′′)) of the son.
42 In addition, her current utility,
(cm,y∗f )
1−σ
1−σ − αfF , the love from marriage, lf , and her discounted continuation value of the
ongoing marriage, V m,of (ef , eˆm, αf , F ), are incorporated into the value function of a young
married woman. State variables are her education, ef , her utility cost of circumcision, αf ,
her circumcision status, F , the education status of her husband, eˆm, and the ability of her
children, af ′ and am′ .
43 It is important to note that the cost of circumcision is the same for
the mother and her daughter, αf = αf ′ .
The value function of a man who just got married reads:
V m,ym (eˆf , em, αˆf , Fˆ , af ′ , am′) =
(cm,y∗m )1−σ
1− σ + αmFˆ + lm + (1− δ)βV
m,o
m (eˆf , em, Fˆ )
+γ1E
(
V market
′
f (e
∗
f ′ , eˆm′ , αf ′ , F
′∗, af ′′ , am′′)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
altruism (daughter)
+ γ1E
(
V market
′
m (eˆf ′ , e
∗
m′ , αˆf ′ , Fˆ
′, af ′′ , am′′)
)
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
altruism (son)
(3.13)
His state variables correspond to those of his wife.44 The wife's cost of circumcision (αˆf ) is
only relevant for the husband to the extend that this utility cost is transmitted to the daughter
(αˆf = αf ′) and thus influences the FGC decision.
45 Since the decisions within a household
are based upon a cooperative bargaining with fixed weights (θf is the bargaining power of the
wife), the choice variables are the solutions to the following optimization problem of a young
42The star (∗) indicates that the choice variable is an outcome of the cooperative bargaining process of a
couple. The expected lifetime valuations of the children is equivalent to the expected continuation value
of a single, as discussed in Section 3.3.5.1.
43The love parameter lf is not a state variable in the sense that it does not influence anything other than the
decision whether to marry. Therefore, there is no need to keep track of it.
44Note, the utility gain αm of being married to a circumcised women is the same for all man. Therefore, it is
sufficient to only carry the FGC status of the wife as a state variable.
45αˆf denotes the FGC cost of the wife, αf ′ of the daughter and αˆf ′ denotes the cost of circumcision of the
son's potential wife.
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couple:46
(cm,y∗f , c
m,y∗
m , e
∗
f ′ , e
∗
m′ , F
′∗) = arg max
cf ,cm,ef ′ ,em′ ,F ′
{
θf
(cm,yf )
1−σ
1− σ + (1− θf )
(cm,ym )1−σ
1− σ
+γE
(
V market
′
f (ef ′ , eˆm′ , αf ′ , F
′, af ′′ , am′′)
)
+γE
(
V market
′
m (eˆf ′ , em′ , αˆf ′ , Fˆ
′, af ′′ , am′′)
)}
s.t φ(cf + cm) + κ(af ′ , ef ′) + κ(am′ , em′) ≤ w(ef , f) + w(em,m)
eg ∈ {0, .., k} with g = {m, f} and
F = Fˆ. (3.14)
The budget constraint includes the cost of education for the children and a gain from mar-
riage, namely that consumption goods are less costly, φ(cf + cm) with φ < 1. The life-
time valuation of the children depends on the marriage market in the next period. The
distribution of singles and the traits of the children, which influences their probabilities of
marrying or not, are relevant to form this expectation. The expected lifetime valuations
E(V market′f (e∗f ′ , eˆm′ , αf ′ , F
′∗, af ′′ , am′′)) and E(V market
′
m (eˆf ′ , e
∗
m′ , αˆf ′ , Fˆ
′, af ′′ , am′′)) correspond
to Equations 3.9 and 3.11. The education decision for the daughter and the son can be formu-
lated as policy functions, e∗f ′ = ef ′(ef , em, αf , F, af ′ , am′) and e
∗
m′ =em′(ef , em, αf , F, af ′ , am′),
as can the FGC decision, F ′∗ = F ′(ef , em, αf , F, af ′ , am′) and the consumption decision.47
After the first period of marriage in which children were born, an old couple only lives
together without deriving utility from their children. Therefore, the value function of a
woman from the second period of marriage onwards is:
V m,of (ef , eˆm, αf , F ) =
(cm,o
∗
f )
1−σ
1− σ − αfF + (1− δ)βV
m,o
f (ef , eˆm, αf , F ) (3.15)
and for a man:
V m,om (eˆf , em, Fˆ ) =
(cm,o
∗
m )1−σ
1− σ + αmFˆ + (1− δ)βV
m,o
m (eˆf , em, Fˆ ), (3.16)
46Note that neither the love shocks, lf and lm, nor the utility loss and gain, (−αfF ) and αmFˆ , of the young
couple are included in the maximization problem, since they do not influence the decisions of the married
couple.
47The policy functions for the consumption are cm,y∗f = c
m,y
f (ef , em, αf , F, af ′ , am′) and c
m,y∗
m =
cm,ym (ef , em, αf , F, af ′ , am′).
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with the consumption decision being determined by a bargaining process with fixed weights:48
(cm,o∗f , c
m,o∗
m ) = arg maxcf ,cm
{
θf
(cm,of )
1−σ
1− σ + (1− θf )
(cm,om )1−σ
1− σ
}
s.t φ(cf + cm) ≤ w(ef , f) + w(em,m) and
F = Fˆ . (3.17)
3.3.5.3. Marriage Decision
A single is willing to marry a person of the opposite gender if the continuation value of
marriage, including the love shock, is higher than the continuation value of staying single:
V m,yg > V sg . People will marry, Ief ,em,F,l = 1, if and only if:
V m,yf (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′) ≥ V sf (ef , αf , F ) and
V m,ym (eˆf , em, αˆf , Fˆ , af ′ , am′) ≥ V sm(em), (3.18)
otherwise Ief ,em,F,l = 0. The minimum love shocks to marry a randomly met person are
defined by l∗f (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′)=V
s
f − V m,yf and l∗m(eˆf , em, αˆf , Fˆ , af ′ , am′)= V sm − V m,ym ,
where the underlying distribution function of these random shocks is normal, lg ∼ N(µl, σ2l ),
and the same for both genders and denoted by L.49 Alternatively stated, Ief ,em,F,l = 1, if and
only if:
lf ≥ l∗f (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′) and
lm ≥ l∗m(eˆf , em, αˆf , Fˆ , af ′ , am′), (3.19)
otherwise Ief ,em,F,l = 0. With probability δim, people have to marry the randomly met person
of the opposite sex, even if Condition (3.18) is not fulfilled.50 As mentioned in Section 3.3.4,
this allows the model, depending on the value of δim, to match the empirical observation that
almost everyone in Burkina Faso has been married after a certain age (around 40 years).
48As for the decision problem (3.14), the utility loss and gain, (−αfF ) and αmFˆ , of the old couple do not
influence the maximization problem and are thus excluded.
49Here, the index function Ief ,em,F,l does not include any ^ notation of the subscripts, since the Condition
(3.18) is not formulated from the perspective of a particular gender, but rather from a general perspective.
In Equations (3.9) and (3.11), the index functions represent the perspective of a woman (Ief ,eˆm,F,l) and
man (Ieˆf ,em,Fˆ ,l ). The subscript l combines both love shocks (lf and lm).
50An alternative interpretation would be that with probability δim the love shocks are huge, such that the
couple wants to marry.
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3.3.6. Steady-State Equilibrium
The marriage decision is made by comparing the continuation values of staying single with
that of being married. Therefore, each individual needs to solve both dynamic programming
problems, which requires the knowledge of the distributions of the potential mates in the next
period. The initial distribution of singles in the next period consists of those people who did
not marry in the last period and are still alive, Sg,old, as well as those children who are now
grown-ups and enter the marriage market as new singles, Sf
′
and Sm
′
(grown-up daughters
and sons). The parents of these grown-up children have been married Tc periods ago. The
distribution of singles before the marriage market of the previous period is denoted by Sg,new
and Sg,new,Tc represents the distribution of singles before the marriage market Tc periods ago.
The distribution of female singles Sf,new
′
just before the marriage market starts is given by:
Sf,new
′
(ef , αf , F ) = S
f,old(ef , αf , F ) + S
f ′(ef , αf , F ) with (3.20)
Sf,old(ef , αf , F ) = (1− δ)
ˆ
L
ˆ
Af
ˆ
Am
ˆ
Sˆm,new
ˆ
Sf,new
(1− Ief ,eˆm,F,l)(1− δim)
dSf,new(ef , αf , F )dSˆ
m,new(em)dAm(am′)dAf (af ′)dL(l) (3.21)
Sf
′
(ef , αf , F ) =
ˆ
L
ˆ
Af
ˆ
Am
ˆ
Sˆm,new,Tc
ˆ
Sf,new,Tc
[Ief ,eˆm,F,l + (1− Ief ,eˆm,F,l)δim]
Gf{ef ′(ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′), F ′(ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′), αf}
dSf,new,Tc(ef , αf , F )dSˆ
m,new,Tc(em)dL(l)dAf (af ′)dAm(am′). (3.22)
The distribution of old female singles is characterized by those women who did not marry in
the previous period (1−Ief ,eˆm,F,l)(1−δim) and are still alive in this period (1−δ). Sˆm,new(em)
was the normalized distribution of male singles before the marriage market in the last period.51
The distribution of grown-up daughters in the marriage market of this period depends on
the mating outcome Tc periods ago, the people who married (Ief ,eˆm,F,l + (1 − Ief ,eˆm,F,l)δim)
and the respective education and FGC decisions of those couples.52 The policy rule of the
daughter's education is given by ef ′(ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′) and the policy rule for FGC by
F ′(ef , eˆm, αf , Faf ′ , am′). The characteristics of a grown-up daughter entering the marriage
51Equations 3.28 and 3.29 display the normalization of the stationary distributions. The same applies to
Sˆm,new(em) and Sˆ
f,new(em).
52Sˆm,new,Tc is the normalized distribution of male singles before the marriage market Tc periods ago.
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market are described by Gf{ef ′(ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′), F ′(ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′), αf}.
The distribution of male singles entering the marriage market Sm,new
′
evolves as follows:53
Sm,new
′
(em) = S
m,old(em) + S
m′(em) with (3.23)
Sm,old(em) = (1− δ)
ˆ
L
ˆ
Af
ˆ
Am
ˆ
Sf
ˆ
Sm
(1− Ieˆf ,em,Fˆ ,l)
dL(l)dAf (af ′)dAm(am′)dSˆ
f,new(ef , αf , F )dS
m,new(em) (3.24)
Sm
′
(em) =
ˆ
L
ˆ
Af
ˆ
Am
ˆ
Sf
ˆ
Sm
[Ieˆf ,em,Fˆ ,l + (1− Ieˆf ,em,Fˆ ,l)δim]
Gm{em′(eˆf , αˆf , Fˆ , em, af ′ , am′)}
dL(l)dAf (af ′)dAm(am′)dSˆ
f,new,Tc(ef , αf , F )dS
m,new,Tc(em). (3.25)
In this model, men are characterized by only one trait, their education, which simplifies the ex-
pression of the distribution, although the basic structure remains the same. The characteristic
of a grown-up son entering the marriage market is specified byGm{em′(ef , αˆf , Fˆ , eˆm, af ′ , am′)},
with em′(ef , αˆf , Fˆ , eˆm, af ′ , am′) being the policy function of the sons' education. Again, the
parents have been married Tc periods ago. The normalized distribution of female singles
before the marriage market in the previous period is given by Sˆf,new.54
The steady-state distributions for female singles, Sf (ef , αf , F ), and male singles, S
m(em),
satisfy:
Sf (ef , αf , F ) ≡ Sf,new′(ef , αf , F ) = Sf,new(ef , αf , F ) = Sf,new,Tc(ef , αf , F ), (3.26)
Sm(em) ≡ Sm,new′(em) = Sm,new(em) = Sm,new,Tc(em), (3.27)
such that the inflow and outflow of the single pool does not change its size and composition.
The normalized stationary distributions are defined as:
Sˆf (ef , αf , F ) =
Sf (ef , αf , F )´
dSf (ef , αf , F )
and (3.28)
Sˆm(em) =
Sm(em)´
dSm(em)
. (3.29)
53Denoting the distribution of male singles before the marriage market of the previous period by Sm,new.
54Sˆf,new,Tc was the normalized distribution of female singles before the marriage market Tc periods ago.
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Definition 3.1. A Stationary Matching Equilibrium consists of the value functions for
singles, V sf (ef , αf , F ) and V
s
m(em), for just married people, V
m,y
f (ef ,eˆm,αf ,F,af ′ ,am′) and
V m,ym (eˆf ,em,αˆf ,Fˆ ,af ′ ,am′), those longer married, V
m,o
f (ef ,eˆm,αf ,F ) and V
m,o
m (eˆf , em, Fˆ ), pol-
icy rules on the education of children, the circumcision of the daughter (e∗f ′ , e
∗
m′ and F
′∗) and
consumption (cs∗f , c
s∗
m , c
m,y∗
f , c
m,y∗
m , c
m,o∗
f , c
m,o∗
m ), a matching rule for singles, Ief ,em,F,l, and
stationary distributions of singles, Sf (ef , αf , F ) and S
m(em), such that:
1. The value functions V sf (ef , αf , F ) and V
s
m(em) solve the single's recursions, defined in
Equations (3.8) and (3.10), taking as given the value functions of young married people,
V m,yf (ef ,eˆm,αf ,F,af ′ ,am′) and V
m,y
m (eˆf ,em,αˆf ,Fˆ ,af ′ ,am′), the normalized distributions
for singles of the opposite sex, Sˆf (ef , αf , F ) and Sˆ
m(em), defined by Equations (3.28)
and (3.29), as well as the matching rule Ief ,em,F,l.
2. The value functions of young married people V m,yf (ef ,eˆm,αf ,F,af ′ ,am′) and V
m,y
m (eˆf ,em,
αˆf ,Fˆ ,af ′ ,am′) solve the recursions (3.12) and (3.13), taken as given the policy functions
cm,y∗f , c
m,y∗
m , e∗f ′ , e
∗
m′ and F
′∗, which solve the cooperative bargaining problem (3.14),
the own value functions as a old married person V m,of (ef ,eˆm,αf ,F ) and V
m,o
m (eˆf , em, Fˆ ),
the value functions of the children being single, V sf (e
∗
f ′ ,αf ′ ,F
′∗) and V sm(e∗m′), and newly
married, V m,yf (e
∗
f ′ ,eˆm′ ,αf ′ ,F
′∗,af ′′ ,am′′) and V
m,y
m (eˆf ′ ,e
∗
m′ ,αˆf ′ ,Fˆ
′,af ′′ ,am′′), as well as the
normalized distributions for singles, Sˆf (ef , αf , F ) and Sˆ
m(em), and the matching rule,
Ief ,em,F,l.
3. The value functions of old married people V m,of (ef ,eˆm,αf ,F ) and V
m,o
m (eˆf , em, Fˆ ) solve
the recursions (3.15) and (3.16), taking as given the policy functions cm,o∗f and c
m,o∗
m ,
which solve the cooperative bargaining problem (3.17).
4. The matching rule Ief ,em,F,l is in accordance with Equation (3.18), taking as given all
value functions.
5. The stationary distributions Sf (ef , αf , F ) and S
m(em) solve (3.26) and (3.27), taking
all policy rules and the matching rule as given and δim = δ.
55
3.4. Numerical Example: Burkina Faso
In this Section, I discuss the model results for a numerical example that is calibrated to fit
the data of Burkina Faso in 2010. While the parameter values are explained in Section 3.4.1,
55To ensure a stationary distribution of singles over education and FGC status (Sf (ef , αf , F ) and S
m(em)),
the probability of involuntary marriage (δim) has to equal the dying probability (δ). Otherwise, the fraction
of singles (δ) passing away would not be replaced by young adults, because they do not marry and have
no children, and thus the single pool would eventually die out.
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the results are presented in Section 3.4.2. The model is solved numerically, since an analytical
solution does not exist. Broadly speaking, the value functions are solved using value function
iteration and the stationary matching equilibrium is found through iteration on the single
distributions. The exact numerical solution algorithm is described in Appendix 3.A.2.
3.4.1. Parameters
There are 18 parameters in the model that have to be determined. They can be roughly
categorized into five groups: cost and benefit of FGC, marriage, cost of education, income
process and further parameters.
I start with a discussion of those parameters that are set either directly from the data or
the literature (see Table 3.6). The period length of the model is one year and adulthood
starts at the age of 15, since I only have information on women and men older than 14 years.
All circumcised women in Burkina Faso have ever been married at the age of 35 and all
non-circumcised women at the age of 40 (see Table 3.A1 in the Appendix). This indicates
that the relevant period for women's search in the marriage market lies between the ages of
15 and 39.56 Therefore, the model covers the period length of 25 years, which leads to a
dying probability of δ = 125 . Note that the probability of involuntary marriage δim has to be
the same as the dying probability to ensure a stationary matching equilibrium. While this
seems to be a critical assumption upon first glance, it ensures that everyone who survives
eventually marries, which in turn corresponds to the data. The discount factor β is chosen
to be 0.98, which is a common value in the macroeconomic literature, while the number of
education categories is set according to the data: no education, primary, secondary and higher
education. In line with Chapter 2, I set the bargaining power of women in Burkina Faso to
θf = 0.4.
57 The altruism parameter is determined to be γ = 0.5.58
56This period is a little longer for men, namely until the age of 45, albeit with a negligible low fraction of men
never being married between the ages of 40 and 45. Within the model, this period does not differ between
men and women and since the emphasis of the paper is placed on the education and FGC of women, I
focus on the information on women.
57The value is chosen according to the Social Institution and Gender Index 2009 (OECD) for Burkina Faso,
see Section 2.5.2 in Chapter 2.
58For comparison, the calibrated altruism parameters in Nishiyama (2000)'s dynamic heterogeneous agent
OLG model are 0.5 for a CRRA of 2 and 0.7 for relative a risk aversion level of 1.
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Table 3.6.: Predefined Parameters
Description Parameter Value Reference/Source
Dying probability δ = δim
1
25 Data (relevant age group: 15-39)
Discount factor β 0.98 Standard value in the literature
Education categories eg {0, 1, 2, 3} Data
Bargaining power θf 0.4 Data (see Chapter 2)
Altruism γ 0.5 Set freely (see also Nishiyama, 2000)
The remaining 13 parameters are calibrated such that the model moments fit the data of
Burkina Faso. Since the moments are indirect, nonlinear functions of the parameters and
based on numerical results, the explicit functional form is unknown. A one-to-one mapping
of these moments to the parameters does not exist. Nevertheless, depending on the targeted
moment, certain parameters will be more important than others. Such a rough assignment
of moments to parameters is shown in Table 3.7. The utility cost of FGC for women and the
utility gain for men are the main driving forces of the FGC rates. Imagine that men did not
value female circumcision at all, then FGC would not be prevalent in equilibrium. Thus, the
levels of αm, µαf and σαf are crucial in determining the FGC rates.
59 Turning to the marriage
rates, which are strongly affected by the love shock; namely, the higher the average love shock
µl, the higher the likelihood that a person will consent to marriage. The variance of the love
shock σ2l introduces additional heterogeneity into the marriage decision. Furthermore, since a
married person enjoys economies to scale φ in the form of lower consumption good costs, the
size of this parameter is also relevant for the marriage decision and hence the marriage rates.60
The education distributions (of singles and married people) are influenced by the education
costs, based on κf and κm, as well as the ability (ln(a) = N(0, σ
2
a)). The ability distributions
for men and women are assumed to be the same.61 Indirectly, these parameters also determine
the annual income of women and men through human capital. A more direct relation exists
between the levels of the minimum income, wmin, the returns to education, η, and annual
income. The difference between women's and men's income is strongly driven by the gender
wage gap ψ. As previously mentioned, all those linkages between parameters and moments are
not exclusive. Most of the parameters influence further moments, if only through interactions
59The distribution of the FGC costs is discretized for the numerical solution method.
60Of course, the predefined probability of involuntary marriage δim also influences the marriage rates.
61As the distribution of the FGC costs, the ability distribution is discretized within the numerical solution
method.
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with other parameters. Moreover, this is also true for the CRRA parameter σ.62 Table 3.7
also shows the resulting parameter values to fit the data and Appendix 3.A.2 presents the
details concerning the calculation of the model moments.
Table 3.7.: Targeted Moments and Calibrated Parameters
Group Description Parameter Values Targeted Moments
Cost/benefit of FGC Gain of FGC αm 2 FGC rates of married
Cost of FGC µαf , σαf -0.9, 1.5 and single women
Marriage Love shock µl, σl 20, 30 Marriage rates of un-/
Marriage gain φ 0.58 circumcised women
Cost of education Educ. costs κf , κm 399.5, 336 Education
Ability shock σa 0.35 distributions
Income process Min. income wmin 250 Annual
Educ. returns η 126 income
Wage gap ψf 0.63 data
Further CRRA para. σ 1.05 All moments
Note: The targets and data moments are assigned to the respective group of parameters and not to
one single parameter. Furthermore, it is possible and quite likely that some parameters also influence
other moments.
3.4.2. Model vs. Data
The model is able to qualitatively reproduce the empirical facts depicted in Section 3.2. First,
uncircumcised and single women are better educated than circumcised and married women.
Second, the marriage rate is higher for circumcised than uncircumcised women and a larger
fraction of lower than better educated women is married. Finally, better educated parents
are less likely to circumcise their daughter. Note that the model moments are calculated in
the model steady state after the marriage market has taken place (see Appendix 3.A.2 for
details).
In particular, the model fits the FGC and the marriage rates remarkably well (see Table
3.8). The overall FGC rate is 72% in the model vs. 73% in the data. Disaggregation shows
that 77% (54%) of the married (single) women are circumcised in the model, compared to 78%
(55%) in the data. The marriage rate among all women is perfectly matched with 79%, which
is also true for the marriage rates of circumcised (84%) and uncircumcised (65%) women. As
62The CRRA parameter influences all moments, e.g. changing the preferences to log-preferences, while keeping
the other parameters unchanged, leads to higher FGC rates, higher marriage rates and lower education.
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Table 3.8.: Model Fit  Targeted Moments
Description Model Moment Data Moment
FGC rate:
Married women 0.77 0.78
Single women 0.54 0.55
Marriage rate:
Circumcised women 0.84 0.84
Uncircumcised women 0.65 0.65
Education distribution (no, primary, secondary, higher):
Married women 0.64, 0.25, 0.08, 0.03 0.80, 0.12, 0.07, 0.01
Single women 0.50, 0.34, 0.12, 0.04 0.39, 0.25, 0.35, 0.01
Men 0.54, 0.37, 0.08, 0.01 0.54, 0.22, 0.20, 0.03
Annual income:
Women 831 861
Men 1326 1306
Source: Income data are taken from the OECD Gender, Institutions and De-
velopment Database 2009 and expressed in PPP USD. All other data moments
are based on the Burkina Faso DHS 2010. The education distribution shows
the fractions of people with no, primary, secondary and higher education.
broadly defined education groups is similar. While the model generates a FGC rate of 78%
(31%) for the group of non- or primary (secondary or higher) educated, the corresponding
rate in the data is 77% (54%). From a different perspective, 95% (70%) of the circumcised
(uncircumcised) women are non- or primary educated in the model compared to 90% (76%)
in the data.64 Furthermore, the model delivers an imperfect assortative mating with respect
to the education level, which is in line with the data. Figure 3.3 contrasts the mating outcome
in the model with that in the data. In both cases, the wedlocks between women and men
with no education comprise the largest part of all marriages. However, this fraction is much
smaller in the model, leaving room for quite a few marriages between either a non-educated
wife and primary educated husband or the opposite constellation. Last but not least, there
is one caveat with respect to the education distribution of the men. Even though the overall
education distribution is relatively well matched, the differential education patterns between
single and married men do not fit (see Figure 3.A3 in Appendix 3.A.3). In contrast to the
data, married men are slightly better educated than singles in the model. This stems from the
64Thus, 5% (30%) of the circumcised (uncircumcised) women are secondary or higher educated in the model,
compared to 10% (24%) in the data.
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3.5. Policy Experiment: Female Education Subsidy
The question of whether the introduction of female education subsidies could reduce FGC rates
in an economy arises almost naturally from the empirical and theoretical results. Of course,
this is not the only possible policy intervention to reduce FGC rates, as is already evident from
the policy discussion in Chapter 2. However, quantifying the effect of an education subsidy
for girls on the FGC rate will provide valuable insights for policy makers.
The policy experiment is based on a steady state comparison and is translated into the
model as a reduction of the education cost parameter κf .
66 This affects the budget constraint
of a young married couple, altering Equation (3.6) to:
φ(cf + cm) +
(1− sef )κf
af ′
ef ′ +
κm
am′
em′ ≤ w(ef , f) + w(em,m), (3.30)
where sef ∈ (0, 1) represents the subsidy as a fraction of the education costs. The financing
of the policy intervention is not incorporated into the analysis.67
Figure 3.4 shows the steady state FGC and marriage rates for different education subsidies,
i.e. sef ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.8, 0.9}.68 The starting point is the calibrated version of the
model with no subsidy, sef = 0. Then the education costs for women are gradually reduced.
The most important thing to note is that for low subsidy rates the FGC rate decreases with
the level of subsidy. However, there seems to be a lower bound of the FGC rate, around
20%, which it does not fall below. Second, while the marriage rate for circumcised women
only slightly decreases, for uncircumcised women it first increases and subsequently evens out
at higher subsidy rates. The overall marriage rate only registers a very small downtrend.
An unsurprising response is observed for the educational attainment (see Figure 3.5). As the
education cost for females decreases through higher subsidies, women become better educated.
Indeed, the fraction of higher educated women increases at the expense of the fraction of non-
educated women, which decreases, while the fraction of primary educated women is also
reduced. For lower subsidy rates, the fraction of women with secondary education increases,
but since almost everyone can afford higher education for the daughter at high enough subsidy
66The transition path between the steady states is not considered here and is left for future research.
67One possibility would be to introduce a lump-sum tax to finance the education subsidy, although I presume
that this would not significantly alter the results.
68Note that the figures are not based on a continuous measure of education subsidies and that only 10 policies
with different levels of subsidies are carried out here. The lines only connect the results and do not allow
for any statements concerning differentiability or continuity. Numerical inaccuracy could also lead to larger
jumps.
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uncircumcised women separately shows that the subsidy has a strong positive effect on the
welfare of uncircumcised women (see Figure 3.6b). In contrast, the effect on the average
welfare of circumcised women is relatively small.71 For such a comparison, it is important to
remember that the fraction of uncircumcised women increases with the subsidy rate and thus
the average welfare of uncircumcised women represents a larger fraction of women. Such a
size effect is also at work for other groups, i.e. the number of people within a certain group
might change with the subsidy level, since the composition of the whole population changes.
Figures 3.6c and 3.6d present the welfare at an even more disaggregated level, i.e. circumcised
vs. uncircumcised single women and circumcised vs. uncircumcised married women. In the
group of single women, the welfare increase is steeper for uncircumcised than circumcised
women. The opposite is true in the group of married women, among whom the welfare
increase is lower for uncircumcised than circumcised women.
Overall, women are the winners of this policy intervention, partly at the expense of men,
while the welfare gain is stronger for uncircumcised than circumcised women. For subsidy
rates below 50%, the welfare of men strongly falls, since the FGC rate decreases and the
fraction of non-educated men goes up (see Figure 3.A4 in the Appendix 3.A.3). For higher
subsidy rates, the FGC level does not further decrease, while the fraction of men with primary
and secondary education increases, as does the eduction level of all women (particularly the
wives). This trend leads to a slight recovery of men's welfare, even though the levels remain
below the welfare of the starting point.
To analyze the policy effects in greater detail, I focus on one level of the education subsidy,
e.g. sef = 0.5. A 50% reduction of the education costs for women results in a lower FGC rate
of 18%, which is a decrease of 54 percentage points (or a decrease of 75%).72 However, I wish
to stress the pattern and direction of the changes rather than the exact numbers. Table 3.9
shows the results of a decomposition exercise for this subsidy rate. In a first step, I introduce
the subsidy and let people re-optimize, but under the constraint that the FGC decision rule
remains unchanged, i.e. the FGC policy function is fixed. In a second step, people can also
adjust their FGC decision, although the marriage probabilities are the same, i.e. the minimum
love shock for a certain couple is fixed. Again, I only consider the steady state of the economy
for both steps.
A small decrease in FGC rates can already be observed for the setup in which the FGC policy
71While the axis scale makes it hard see, the welfare of circumcised women is higher than in the initial situation
for almost all subsidy rates, except for 0.4, 0.5 and 0.6.
72Further decomposition for the subsidy rates 0.3 and 0.4 are shown in Table 3.A14 in Appendix 3.A.3.
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shock and thus the marriage probability are kept at their initial levels. Here, parents can not
only re-optimize with respect to the education of their children, but also with respect to the
FGC of their daughter. As in the first step, women are better educated, but parents also
circumcise their daughters less since FGC is now relatively more expensive in terms of utility
costs compared to the costs of education.
The strongest effect on the FGC rate is observed under the full policy, when parents can
re-optimize freely and marriages can adjust. Thus, general equilibrium (GE) effects in the
marriage market are the driving forces, highlighting the importance of accounting for them
when conducting policy analysis. Furthermore, these results support the story of competing
investments. Parents invest more in the education of the daughter and less in FGC. Higher
education also makes uncircumcised women more attractive for men, which is reflected in the
higher marriage rate of uncircumcised women.
Table 3.9.: Decomposition of the Effects of the Female Education Subsidy Policy
Subsidy (sef = 0.5)
No Fix FGC Fix marriage Full
Policy decision rule probability Policy
FGC rate:
All 0.72 0.68 0.57 0.18
Married 0.77 0.72 0.62 0.19
Single 0.54 0.52 0.42 0.14
Marriage rate of women:
All 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.78
Circumcised 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83
Uncircumcised 0.65 0.68 0.69 0.77
Education of married women:
No 0.64 0.13 0.11 0.05
Primary 0.25 0.11 0.11 0.10
Secondary 0.08 0.24 0.23 0.24
Higher 0.03 0.52 0.55 0.61
Education of single women:
No 0.50 0.08 0.07 0.04
Primary 0.34 0.10 0.10 0.10
Secondary 0.12 0.22 0.22 0.25
Higher 0.04 0.60 0.61 0.61
In summary, it can be stated that subsidies to female education in the numerical example
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of Burkina Faso can reduce FGC rates, but only down to a certain rate. The winners of this
policy are women. Additional policy interventions would be needed to completely eradicate
FGC. Furthermore, the marriage margin of education investments, i.e. higher education
makes women more attractive to men, seems to dominate in equilibrium. However, what
remains open is the trade-off between the cost and benefit of this policy, since I abstracted
from making any financing considerations.
3.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have provided within country-evidence concerning the interaction of edu-
cation, FGC and marriage for Burkina Faso. First of all, I find that uncircumcised women
as well as single women are better educated than circumcised and married women. Second,
circumcised and non-educated women are more likely to be married than their counterparts.
Furthermore, better educated parents are less likely to circumcise their daughters.
To replicate these empirical patterns and answer the question of whether an education
subsidy to women could reduce FGC rates, I present a dynamic model with an equilibrium
search on the marriage market. Parents decide upon the circumcision of their daughter and
the level of education of their children. While FGC improves the marriage market prospects
of the daughter, education increases the children's income later in life. For women, higher
income through better education provides them with the opportunity to live on their own
(better outside option to the marriage, investment margin), as well as making them more
attractive for marriage (marriage margin).
The calibrated version of the model is able to qualitatively replicate the observed empirical
patterns between women's education, marriage and FGC. It quantitatively matches the FGC
and marriage rates of Burkina Faso in 2010.
The policy experiment shows novel results, namely that a decrease in the education cost
of girls leads to higher educational attainment, as well as a decrease in the overall FGC rate.
However, the FGC does not fall below a certain lower bound (here 20%). At high enough
subsidy rates, everyone can afford high education of the daughter. Thus, almost all women
are highly educated and FGC status reflects the only dimension in which women may differ.
Since men prefer circumcised to uncircumcised women, FGC increases the marriage market
prospects and parents will still circumcise their daughter if the cost of FGC is low enough.
Furthermore, the policy experiment sheds light on the two dimensions of the education in-
vestment, suggesting that the marriage margin seems to play a more important role in
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equilibrium than the investment margin. The welfare analysis of different subsidy levels
shows that women benefit from this policy. For subsidy rates below 50%, the welfare of men
decreases with the level of female education subsidy rates. However, it slightly increases again
for higher subsidy rates, while remaining below the welfare level of the starting point.
The limited number of economic papers on female genital cutting highlights that there are
many different directions to explore in future research. This paper aims to provide a tractable
framework to analyze policy interventions and discuss the tradition and its interplay with
other economic variables/outcomes. Nonetheless, given the vast number of open questions,
I only focus on possible research avenues resulting directly from this paper. First of all, the
financing part of the education subsidy should be incorporated into the analysis. It could be
financed through (lump-sum) taxes on the population, which might affect the welfare analysis.
Second, including the transition paths between two steady states in the analysis would be very
interesting and important. During the transition, the welfare impact could be very different
from the current findings. Third, since an education subsidy is unable to completely eradicate
FGC, additional policies, e.g. penalty fees, should be considered and analyzed, which can be
achieved within this model. One can even analyze the effects and the interactions of policy
packages, i.e. a combination of different policies at the same time. The proposed framework
can also be employed to analyze the effect of differing FGC valuation by education. For
example, Sakeah et al. (2006) find evidence from Ghana suggesting that illiterate men and
those with only primary schooling have stronger preferences for circumcised women. In such
an environment, an interesting question would be whether education subsidies to men could
also reduce FGC rates.
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3.A. Appendix
3.A.1. Further Evidence from Burkina Faso
This section presents further evidence from Burkina Faso, including summary statistics, the
estimates for the controls of the regressions in Section 3.2.2 and robustness checks.
Table 3.A1.: Fraction of Ever Married People
Women Men
Age FGC no FGC
group Fract. Total Fract. Total Fract.Total
15-19 0.37 1866 0.26 1459 0.02 1499
20-24 0.87 2260 0.74 971 0.31 1018
25-29 0.97 2288 0.93 647 0.73 918
30-34 0.98 2135 0.99 444 0.92 939
35-39 1.00 1696 0.99 286 0.96 804
40-44 1.00 1466 1.00 191 0.99 712
45-49 1.00 1186 1.00 136 1.00 610
50-54 . 0 . 0 1.00 463
55-59 . 0 . 0 1.00 344
All ages 0.87 12897 0.68 4134 0.66 7307
Source: DHS 2010 Burkina Faso, own calculations. Ob-
servations are weighted by individual sampling weights.
The fractions of ever married women are significantly
different at the 1% significance level for circumcised and
uncircumcised women in the age groups 15-19, 20-24 and
25-29. The fractions are tested on equality based on a
two-sample t-test with sampling weights.
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Table 3.A2.: Summary Statistics - FGC Rates (1)
FGC rates of Women with cir-
women (15-39 years) cumcised daughters
Mean Total Mean Total
Total 0.7344 14052 0.1632 10716
Wealth
poorest quintile 0.7436 2181 0.2072 2003
poorer quintile 0.7603 2495 0.1905 2130
middle quintile 0.7597 2697 0.1660 2208
richer quintile 0.7763 2941 0.1569 2343
richest quintile 0.6598 3738 0.0893 2032
Education (wife)
no education 0.7841 9784 0.1813 8915
primary 0.6808 2175 0.0972 1166
secondary 0.5435 1986 0.0221 597
higher 0.4886 100 0.0000 36
Education (husband)
no education 0.8055 8321 0.1826 8583
primary 0.7399 1456 0.1165 1198
secondary 0.6831 1001 0.0297 694
higher 0.5880 117 0.0106 76
Marital status
never married 0.5535 3090 0.0314 109
ever married 0.7824 10962 0.1643 10607
Source: DHS 2010 Burkina Faso, own calculations. Observations are weighted
by individual sampling weights. The FGC rates for different marital status and
educational attainment of women are tested on equality based on a two-sample
t-test with sampling weights. FGC rates between ever and never married women
are significantly different at the 1% level. This is also the case for all differences in
FGC rates between education groups. Only the difference in FGC rates between
secondary and higher educated women is not significant.
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Table 3.A3.: Summary Statistics - FGC Rates (2)
FGC rates of Women with cir-
women (15-39 years) cumcised daughters
Mean Total Mean Total
Religion
no religion 0.5974 110 0.2006 78
muslim 0.7967 8509 0.1892 6515
catholic 0.6265 3434 0.0995 2425
protestant 0.5774 914 0.0856 615
traditionnal/animist 0.7126 1056 0.1857 1044
Ethnicity
bobo 0.6488 534 0.1633 395
dioula 0.6659 122 0.1589 102
fulfuldé/peul 0.8299 1112 0.2842 909
gourmatché 0.6178 909 0.1054 701
gourounsi 0.5791 666 0.1175 476
lobi 0.7970 484 0.1833 411
mossi 0.7636 7359 0.1437 5537
sénoufo 0.8540 750 0.2340 595
touareg / bella 0.2090 211 0.0464 154
dagara 0.6213 429 0.1893 342
bissa 0.8072 567 0.1898 401
others 0.7226 885 0.1994 671
Region
boucle de mouhoun 0.6677 1073 0.1775 940
cascades 0.7971 909 0.1121 712
centre 0.6337 1436 0.0522 801
centre-est 0.8827 1064 0.1954 796
centre-nord 0.8468 951 0.1381 779
centre-ouest 0.5219 1232 0.1146 949
centre-sud 0.6335 943 0.1009 753
est 0.6726 1156 0.1091 926
hauts basins 0.8099 1287 0.2388 922
nord 0.8653 1081 0.2302 825
plateau central 0.8537 1019 0.1367 777
sahel 0.7756 944 0.2901 755
sud-ouest 0.7425 957 0.1926 781
urban 0.6603 4593 0.0838 2689
rural 0.7635 9459 0.1835 8027
Source: DHS 2010 Burkina Faso, own calculations. Observations are weighted
by individual sampling weights.
109
Table 3.A4.: Summary Statistics - Circumcised vs. Uncircumcised Women
Circumcised Uncircumcised
(15-39 years) (15-39 years)
Mean Total Mean Total
Current age 26.59 10245 23.17 3807
Ever married 0.84 10245 0.65 3807
Age at first cohabitation 17.32 8601 17.51 2361
Circumcised daughters 0.18 6392 0.01 1555
Age of circumcision 3.49 12842
Education
no education 0.76 0.58
primary 0.14 0.18
secondary 0.10 0.22
higher 0.01 0.02
10240 3805
Wealth
poorest quintile 0.17 0.16
poorer quintile 0.19 0.17
middle quintile 0.20 0.17
richer quintile 0.21 0.17
richest quintile 0.23 0.33
10245 3807
Form of circumcision
cut, no flesh removed 0.16
cut, flesh removed 0.77
sewn closed 0.01
don't know/missing 0.06
10245
Circumcision performed by
health professional 0.00
traditional circumciser 0.97
don't know 0.03
10245
Source: DHS 2010 Burkina Faso, own calculations. Observations are weighted
by individual sampling weights. The differences between circumcised and
uncircumcised women are signficant at the 1% level. Only the difference in
the ages at first cohabitation is significant at the 5% level. The means are
tested on equality based on a two-sample t-test with sampling weights.
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Table 3.A5.: Education Distributions of Women - Different Age Groups
Ever Married Singles no
Education FGC no FGC both FGC no FGC both FGC FGC
no education 0.83 0.74 0.81 0.46 0.29 0.38 0.78 0.60
primary 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.12 0.17
secondary 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.29 0.44 0.35 0.08 0.21
higher 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Total 11244 2688 13932 1648 1444 3092 12892 4132
Source: DHS 2010 Burkina Faso, own calculations. Observations are weighted by individual
sampling weights. All women aged 15-49 years are considered.
(a) All Women
Ever Married Singles no
Education FGC no FGC both FGC no FGC both FGC FGC
no education 0.80 0.73 0.78 0.47 0.29 0.39 0.72 0.55
primary 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.16 0.19
secondary 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.28 0.43 0.35 0.11 0.24
higher 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
Total 5444 1799 7243 1606 1439 3045 7050 3238
Source: DHS 2010 Burkina Faso, own calculations. Observations are weighted by individual
sampling weights. Only women of ages 15 to 30 years.
(b) Women aged 15-30 years
Ever Married Singles no
Education FGC no FGC both FGC no FGC both FGC FGC
no education 0.80 0.71 0.77 0.48 0.30 0.40 0.70 0.50
primary 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.20
secondary 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.27 0.44 0.35 0.13 0.28
higher 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
Total 3129 1226 4355 1548 1397 2945 4677 2623
Source: DHS 2010 Burkina Faso, own calculations. Observations are weighted by individual
sampling weights. Only women of ages 15 to 25 years.
(c) Women aged 15-25 years
Note: The differences within the aggregated groups of circumcised (FGC) vs. uncircumcised (no FGC) as well
as ever married vs. single women are significant at the 1% level. Only the differences in higher education
between ever married and single women are significant at the 5% (in Table (a)), 10% (in Table (b)) level
or even insignificant (in Table (c)). The fractions are tested on equality based on a two-sample t-test with
sampling weights.
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Table 3.A6.: Joint Distribution of Education and FGC of Women - Different Age Groups
Ever Married Singles
Education FGC no FGC FGC no FGC
no education 0.67 0.15 0.25 0.13
primary 0.09 0.03 0.13 0.11
secondary 0.04 0.02 0.16 0.19
higher 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Total 13932 3092
11244 2688 1648 1444
Source: DHS 2010 Burkina Faso, own calculations. Ob-
servations are weighted by individual sampling weights.
(a) All Women
Ever Married Singles
Education FGC no FGC FGC no FGC
no education 0.60 0.18 0.26 0.13
primary 0.10 0.04 0.13 0.11
secondary 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.20
higher 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Total 7243 3045
5444 1799 1606 1439
Source: DHS 2010 Burkina Faso, own calculations. Ob-
servations are weighted by individual sampling weights.
Only women of ages 15 to 30 years.
(b) Women aged 15-30 years
Ever Married Singles
Education FGC no FGC FGC no FGC
no education 0.57 0.20 0.26 0.13
primary 0.10 0.04 0.13 0.11
secondary 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.20
higher 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Total 4355 2945
3129 1226 1548 1397
Source: DHS 2010 Burkina Faso, own calculations. Ob-
servations are weighted by individual sampling weights.
Only women of ages 15 to 25 years.
(c) Women aged 15-25 years
Note: The differences between ever married and single women are signficant at the 1% level. For the groups of
higher educated uncircumcised women (and non-educated uncircumcised women in Table (a)) the differences
are only significant at the 5% level. For higher educated circumcised women there are no significant differences.
The fractions are tested on equality based on a two-sample t-test with sampling weights.
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Table 3.A8.: Education of Women (All Controls)
Daughters All
Circumcised before age 7 -0.668*** (0.110) -0.586*** (0.0488)
Number of older siblings 0.00266 (0.0222) -0.00430 (0.00778)
Age 0.0486** (0.0193) -0.0660***(0.00256)
Bobo 0.0113 (0.291) -0.142 (0.119)
Dioula -1.744*** (0.593) 0.0791 (0.217)
Fulani -1.021*** (0.388) -1.548*** (0.130)
Gurmanche -0.973** (0.429) -1.290*** (0.150)
Gurunsi -0.406 (0.350) -0.397*** (0.114)
Lobi -0.280 (0.490) -0.144 (0.155)
Mossi -0.546** (0.243) -0.693*** (0.0799)
Senufo 0.104 (0.322) 0.0129 (0.119)
Touareg -1.398*** (0.535) -2.440*** (0.261)
Dagara -0.400 (0.422) -0.816*** (0.146)
Bissa -0.525 (0.328) -0.240* (0.134)
Muslim 0.486 (0.566) 1.327*** (0.296)
Catholic 1.100* (0.565) 2.184*** (0.295)
Protestant 1.315** (0.575) 2.152*** (0.302)
Animist 0.245 (0.601) -0.0265 (0.317)
Poorer 0.151 (0.193)
Middle 0.405** (0.186)
Richer 1.042*** (0.184)
Richest 1.935*** (0.219)
Urban 0.952*** (0.146)
Cascades -0.0802 (0.327)
Centre 0.825*** (0.273)
Centre-Est 0.749*** (0.290)
Centre-Nord 0.328 (0.304)
Centre-Ouest 0.216 (0.271)
Centre-Sud 1.077*** (0.313)
Est 0.426 (0.401)
Hauts-Bassins 0.0250 (0.242)
Nord 0.505* (0.276)
Plateau-Central 0.387 (0.292)
Sahel 0.670* (0.397)
Sud-Ouest 0.0660 (0.359)
Constant (cut 1) 1.800** (0.701) -0.349 (0.310)
Constant (cut 2) 3.239*** (0.701) 0.717** (0.310)
Constant (cut 3) 8.005*** (0.716) 3.974*** (0.324)
Observations 2008 13376
Pseudo R2 0.201 0.116
Source: DHS, own calculations. Notes: Ordered logit model with estimated coefficients. Standard
errors are in parentheses and clustered at the household level. * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01).
The education categories are no education, primary education, secondary education and higher ed-
ucation. The dummy "circumcised before age 7)" is equal to one if the woman was circumcised
before age 7 and zero if she never has been circumcised. Column 1 only considers unmarried daugh-
ters, above 14 years, who are still living at their parental home. Column 2 considers all women.
The reference groups for ethnicity, religion, wealth and region are "others", "no religion", "poorest"
and "boucle de mouhoun". The urban dummy is equal to one if the person lives in an urban area,
otherwise it is zero.
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Table 3.A9.: Education of Women (Different Classification)
Daughters All
Circumcised before age 7 -0.645*** (0.122) -0.678*** (0.0562)
Number of older siblings 0.00875 (0.0247) 0.00291 (0.00906)
Age 0.0946***(0.0222) -0.0620***(0.00315)
Ethnicity:
Bobo 0.252 (0.311) -0.130 (0.139)
Dioula -1.613** (0.700) 0.159 (0.254)
Fulani -0.908** (0.434) -1.484*** (0.170)
Gurmanche -1.036** (0.462) -1.184*** (0.171)
Gurunsi -0.362 (0.404) -0.312** (0.140)
Lobi -0.150 (0.570) -0.111 (0.194)
Mossi -0.239 (0.268) -0.573*** (0.0950)
Senufo -0.0310 (0.343) 0.0516 (0.139)
Touareg -1.615*** (0.622) -3.054*** (0.462)
Dagara -0.0943 (0.433) -0.839*** (0.178)
Bissa -0.420 (0.375) -0.263 (0.165)
Religion:
Muslim 1.676 (1.391) 1.698*** (0.514)
Catholic 2.081 (1.390) 2.450*** (0.512)
Protestant 2.334* (1.392) 2.515*** (0.516)
Animist 1.228 (1.432) -0.206 (0.553)
Wealth 3 7
Urban 3 7
Region 3 7
Constant (cut 1) 4.775*** (1.495) 0.848 (0.524)
Constant (cut 2) 9.244*** (1.504) 3.882*** (0.527)
Constant (cut 3) 10.02*** (1.515) 4.433*** (0.531)
Observations 2008 13376
Pseudo R2 0.236 0.129
Source: DHS, own calculations. Notes: Ordered logit model with estimated
coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the household
level. * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01). The education categories: no
education, primary education, secondary education and higher education are
defined in a more pessimistic way. Incomplete primary education is defined as
no education and incomplete secondary education is defined as primary edu-
cation. The dummy "circumcised (age<7)" is equal to one if the woman was
circumcised before age 7 and zero if she never has been circumcised. Column
1 only considers unmarried daughters, above 14 years, who are still living at
their parental home. Column 2 considers all women. 3 controlling for, 7 not
controlling for. The reference groups for ethnicity and religion are "others" and
"no religion".
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Table 3.A10.: Education of Women (All Women)
Daughters All
FGC -0.669***(0.101) -0.622*** (0.0464)
Number of older siblings 0.0172 (0.0206) -0.00217 (0.00741)
Age 0.0344** (0.0173) -0.0660***(0.00231)
Ethnicity:
Bobo -0.0869 (0.293) -0.191* (0.115)
Dioula -1.743***(0.575) 0.106 (0.203)
Fulani -1.140***(0.369) -1.573*** (0.125)
Gurmanche -1.108***(0.403) -1.391*** (0.137)
Gurunsi -0.659* (0.336) -0.453*** (0.108)
Lobi -0.361 (0.473) -0.290** (0.147)
Mossi -0.747***(0.238) -0.716*** (0.0747)
Senufo 0.0316 (0.314) -0.112 (0.111)
Touareg -1.535***(0.525) -2.496*** (0.260)
Dagara -0.388 (0.427) -0.824*** (0.140)
Bissa -0.823** (0.323) -0.472*** (0.122)
Religion:
Muslim 0.548 (0.554) 1.326*** (0.287)
Catholic 1.166** (0.553) 2.152*** (0.286)
Protestant 1.383** (0.562) 2.127*** (0.292)
Animist 0.152 (0.584) -0.0875 (0.308)
Wealth 3 7
Urban 3 7
Region 3 7
Constant (cut 1) 1.527** (0.673) -0.406 (0.299)
Constant (cut 2) 2.920*** (0.673) 0.663** (0.299)
Constant (cut 3) 7.644*** (0.685) 3.890*** (0.312)
Observations 2288 16688
Pseudo R2 0.201 0.113
Source: DHS, own calculations. Notes: Ordered logit model with estimated
coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the household
level. * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01). The dummy "circumcised" is
equal to one if the woman is circumcised and zero if not. Column 1 only con-
siders unmarried daughters, above 14 years, who are still living at their parental
home. Column 2 considers all women. 3 controlling for, 7 not controlling for.
The reference groups for ethnicity and religion are "others" and "no religion".
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Table 3.A11.: Probability of Marriage (All Controls)
Marriage
FGC 0.159** (0.0721)
Age 0.498*** (0.0110)
Primary education -0.704*** (0.0838)
Secondary education -2.022*** (0.0953)
Higher eduation. -2.616*** (0.311)
Number of siblings -0.0366** (0.0167)
Number of older siblings -0.00330 (0.0124)
Urban -0.924*** (0.0796)
Region:
Cascades -0.0664 (0.204)
Centre -0.454*** (0.168)
Centre-Est -0.196 (0.193)
Centre-Nord -0.0692 (0.189)
Centre-Ouest -0.463*** (0.176)
Centre-Sud -0.153 (0.188)
Est 0.142 (0.231)
Hauts-Bassins -0.537*** (0.164)
Nord -0.598*** (0.181)
Plateau-Central -0.681*** (0.182)
Sahel 0.0894 (0.216)
Sud-Ouest 0.373 (0.231)
Ethnicity:
Bobo 0.401* (0.209)
Dioula -0.628* (0.365)
Fulani 0.651*** (0.202)
Gurmanche 0.943*** (0.253)
Gurunsi 0.450** (0.208)
Lobi -0.183 (0.268)
Mossi 0.330** (0.147)
Senufo 0.207 (0.212)
Touareg 0.843** (0.352)
Dagara 0.513** (0.261)
Bissa 0.0114 (0.224)
Religion:
Muslim 0.377** (0.156)
Catholic -0.391** (0.159)
Protestant -0.732*** (0.188)
Constant -8.561*** (0.304)
Observations 16688
Pseudo R2 0.599
Source: DHS, own calculations. Notes: Logistic re-
gression model with estimated coefficients. Standard
errors are in parentheses and clustered at household
level. * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01). The
reference groups for education, region, religion and
ethnicity are "no education", "boucle de mouhan",
"traditionlist/animist and others", and "others".
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Table 3.A12.: Probability of Circumcising Daughters (All Controls)
FGC Daughter (1) FGC Daughter (2)
Mother:
Primary education -0.186 (0.121) -0.174 (0.123)
Secondary education -0.786*** (0.299) -0.789*** (0.303)
FGC 2.694*** (0.235) 2.705*** (0.241)
Age 0.00679 (0.00583) 0.00889 (0.00601)
Age at first cohabition -0.00432 (0.0117) -0.0111 (0.0122)
Father:
Primary education -0.142 (0.112) -0.170 (0.114)
Secondary education -0.952*** (0.271) -1.029*** (0.285)
Higher education -0.926 (1.001) -0.891 (0.998)
Family:
Children ever born 0.0556*** (0.0211) 0.0526** (0.0218)
Daughters living 0.240*** (0.0265) 0.237*** (0.0272)
Household members 0.0210*** (0.00769) 0.0240*** (0.00806)
Sex of household head 0.0544 (0.119) -0.0748 (0.138)
Urban area -0.349*** (0.105) -0.335*** (0.108)
Age difference (couple) -0.00608* (0.00368)
Wealth of family:
Poorer -0.121 (0.0904) -0.126 (0.0923)
Middle -0.205** (0.0949) -0.215** (0.0973)
Richer -0.225** (0.0992) -0.211** (0.101)
Richest -0.279* (0.143) -0.308** (0.148)
Observations 10491 10018
Pseudo R2 0.147 0.147
Source: DHS, own calculations. Notes: Logistic regression model with estimated
coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at household level.
* (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01). Controlling for region, religion and
ethnicity in all columns. The reference groups for wealth and edcuation are
"poorest" and "no education". For the mother's education "highest educ" is
omitted. Column (2) has an additional control, i.e age difference between the
couple, which is father's age minus mother's age.
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3.A.2. Numerical Solution Algorithm and Moments of the Model
The model is solved numerically using the software MATLAB R2013b. The solution algorithm
works in the following iteration steps:
1. Start with an initial guess of the distribution of single females and males, (Sf (ef , αf , F )i=0
and Sm(em)i=0), the value functions of singles, (V
s
f (ef , αf , F )i=0 and V
s
m(em)i=0), the
expected continuation values of the marriage market for women and men,
(E(V marketf (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′))i=0 and E(V
market
m (eˆf , em, αˆf , Fˆ , af ′ , am′))i=0), and
the value functions of young married women and men, (V m,yf (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′)i=0
and V m,ym (eˆf , em, αˆf , Fˆ , af ′ , am′)i=0).
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2. Solve for the value function of old married women and men (V m,of (ef , eˆm, αf , F ) and
V m,om (eˆf , em, Fˆ ), which are defined in Equations (3.15) and (3.16)) based on the decision
problem of an old married couple (see Equation (3.17)).74 The decision problem of such
a couple is independent of the single distribution, since old married people no longer
have any connection to the marriage market.75 The old married couple only makes
intratemporal choices, which enables a closed form solution of the consumption policy
rule, yielding:
c∗f (ef,em) =
θ
1
σ
f
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
w(ef , f) + w(em,m)
φ
c∗m(ef,em) =
(1− θf ) 1σ
θ
1
σ
f + (1− θf )
1
σ
w(ef , f) + w(em,m)
φ
.
3. Based on the single distributions, calculate the normalized single distributions
(Sˆf (ef , αf , F )i and Sˆ
m(em)i) according to Equations (3.28) and (3.29).
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4. Taking these normalized single distributions (Sˆf (ef , αf , F )i and Sˆ
m(em)i) into account,
solve the optimization problem of a young married couple (see Equation (3.14)) and
73The subscript indicates the iteration step. The initial step is only undertaken once at the beginning of the
algorithm. Therefore, I denote it by i = 0. Since the following steps (starting with step 3) will be repeated
until convergence occurs, the index is given in a general form: i + 1. For the first iteration, it is equal to
1, for the second iteration it is equal to 2, and so on. Consequently, i refers to the values of the previous
iteration.
74I refrain from indexing the value functions, since these are already the final solutions and do not change
throughout the iteration process.
75People who are married stay together until they die. Furthermore, from the second period of their marriage
(old married couple) onwards, they no longer derive any utility from having children. Therefore, the
marriage market is irrelevant for them and their decisions.
76These are the normalized single distributions based on the previous single distributions (or based on the
initial distributions for the very first iteration). Therefore, the index is i.
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with that the value functions of a young married women and men,
(V m,yf (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′)i+1 and V
m,y
m (eˆf , em, αˆf , Fˆ , af ′ , am′)i+1), which are given by
Equations (3.12) and (3.13). Save the policy functions for the education of the children
and the female circumcision of the daughter. The underlying solution procedure is based
on value function iteration. To improve the speed of the algorithm, the value function
iteration is conducted in parallel with the updating of the single distributions (see Step
(9)).77
5. For every possible mating outcome, calculate the probability that this couple will meet
and marry (meet-and-marry probabilities).78 This depends on the normalized single
distributions, (Sˆf (ef , αf , F )i and Sˆ
m(em)i), the drawn love shock, the value functions
of singles, (V sf (ef , αf , F )i and V
s
m(em)i), and the value functions of young married peo-
ple, (V m,yf (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′)i and V
m,y
m (eˆf , em, αˆf , Fˆ , af ′ , am′)i). The underlying
decision is explained in Section 3.3.5.3.
6. Based on these meet-and-marry probabilities, the expected continuation values of the
marriage market for women and men can be updated according to the Equations (3.9)
and (3.11), which are then denoted by E(V marketf (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′))i+1 and
E(V marketm (eˆf , em, αˆf , Fˆ , af ′ , am′))i+1, respectively.
7. Using these updated continuation values of the marriage market, the value functions of
the singles can be recalculated based on Equations (3.8) and (3.10). The consumption
decision of a single person is straight-forward, since consumption equals income. The
updated single value functions are V sf (ef , αf , F )i+1 and V
s
m(em)i+1.
8. The meet-and-marry probabilities from Step 6 and the investment decisions of the
parents concerning their children, who enter the marriage market from Step 4, are used
to calculate the new single distributions.79 The new single distributions are denoted by
Sf (ef , αf , F )i+1 and S
m(em)i+1 and calculated as explained in Section 3.3.6.
9. Compare the old single value functions, V sf (ef , αf , F )i and V
s
m(em)i, with the new calcu-
lated ones, V sf (ef , αf , F )i+1 and V
s
m(em)i+1. If the difference is lower than the acceptable
error, keep the old ones; otherwise, update the value functions for singles and replace
V sf (ef , αf , F )i+1 and V
s
m(em)i+1 by them.
80 This is indirectly also an updating of the
77The choices for the children depend on the expected continuation values of the marriage market for them.
The iteration is undertaken on these objects, which is indirectly an iteration on the value functions of
young married people.
78Since each man can potentially meet every woman, the meet-and-marry probability has to be calculated
for every single possibility.
79The investment decisions are the policy rules for education of the children and the female circumcision
decision for the daughter.
80The updating is conservative, e.g. V sm(em)
update
i+1 = λV
s
m(em)i + (1 − λ)V sm(em)i+1 and changes with the
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continuation values of the marriage market and the value functions of young married
people. Furthermore, compare the old single distributions, Sf (ef , αf , F )i and S
m(em)i,
with the new calculated ones, Sf (ef , αf , F )i+1 and S
m(em)i+1, and apply the same up-
dating procedure as for the single value functions. In addition, update
E(V marketf (ef , eˆm, αf , F, af ′ , am′))i andE(V
market
m (eˆf , em, αˆf , Fˆ , af ′ , am′))i with the new
values from Step 6.
10. If one of the differences in Step 9 is larger than the predefined errors, continue with Step
3; otherwise, stop the iteration and the stationary matching equilibrium is found.
Given that I am interested in the outcomes of the marriage market, the model moments are
calculated after the marriage market has taken place. Note that the moments are only derived
for the steady state of the model. Therefore, the following notation always refers to the steady
state. After the marriage market, the population of adults consists of those people who are
still singles (Sf,old and Sm,old), those who have just been married (Mf,y andMm,y) and those
who have been married for more than one period and are still living (Mf,old and Mm,old).
The "old married" population not only includes the surviving couples who got married the
last period, but also those who married two periods ago and so forth. Therefore, Mf,old and
Mm,old are defined as follows: Mf,old =
∑∞
i=1(1−δ)iMf,y andMm,old =
∑∞
i=1(1−δ)iMm,y. I
do not consider children here (adulthood starts at 15 in the calibrated model), since the data
is restricted to people aged 15 and older. Thus, the relevant female, P f , and male populations,
Pm, are:
P f = Sf,old +Mf,y +
∞∑
i=1
(1− δ)iMf,y
= Sf,old +
1
δ
Mf,y and
Pm = Sm,old +
1
δ
Mm,y. (3.31)
All moments are based on these definitions. For example, the overall marriage rate of
women equals 1δM
f,y/(Sf,old + 1δM
f,y), while the overall FGC rate is given by (Sf,oldF=1 +
1
δM
f,y
F=1)/(S
f,old+ 1δM
f,y), where the index F = 1 indicates that only the circumcised women
are considered. The FGC rate of single women is defined as Sf,oldF=1 /S
f,old and married women
as Mf,yF=1/M
f,old. The other moments are calculated along these lines.
number of iterations. The updating coefficient λ is larger than 0.5 and increases with the number of
iterations to ensure convergence.
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Table 3.A14.: Further Decompositions of the Effects of the Female Education Subsidy Policy
Subsidy (sef = 0.3) Subsidy (sef = 0.4)
Fix Fix
No FGC marriage Full FGC marriage Full
Policy rule prob. Policy rule prob. Policy
FGC rate:
All 0.72 0.70 0.67 0.57 0.69 0.60 0.43
Married 0.77 0.75 0.72 0.62 0.73 0.65 0.47
Single 0.54 0.53 0.49 0.41 0.53 0.44 0.31
Marriage rate of women:
All 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.77
Circumcised 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.84
Uncircumcised 0.65 0.67 0.66 0.70 0.67 0.68 0.72
Education of married women:
No 0.64 0.41 0.40 0.35 0.21 0.20 0.17
Primary 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.21 0.20 0.22
Secondary 0.08 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.30 0.28 0.36
Higher 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.28 0.32 0.25
Education of single women:
No 0.50 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.14 0.13 0.12
Primary 0.34 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.19 0.19 0.23
Secondary 0.12 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.39
Higher 0.04 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.37 0.40 0.27
Part II.
Completed Fertility
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Chapter 4
Gender Gaps in Completed Fertility1
4.1. Introduction
There is a large literature within demography and population science analyzing fertility pat-
terns and trends. Within economics, the emphasis is placed on understanding fertility choices,
whereby fertility data is a fundamental ingredient to achieve this goal. Essentially all of
the known fertility facts are based on surveys about the reproductive behavior of women,
whereas male fertility is typically ignored. The reason is that most surveys only ask women
about their child-bearing behavior. Greene and Biddlecom (2000) already emphasized this
lack of research of male fertility as a problem more than a decade ago, pointing to several
specific directions of future research on male reproductive behavior. While this call has stim-
ulated research on men's role in reproductive behavior (i.e. it is now more common to model
reproductive behavior as a bargaining outcome between two partners), the measurement itself
has not changed. Because women may remember pregnancies and births better than men, it
is often believed that measuring fertility purely based on women's reproductive behavior is
sufficient, also to avoid double-counting. In this paper, we want to question this view.
Even though each child has two parents, for any given couple, the fertility of the husband
and wife do not need to coincide. Each spouse could in principle also have children with
other partners, either sequentially, or even simultaneously in the case of men. Especially in
societies with a high degree of polygyny, the discrepancy could be large. Even if polygyny is
banned (as in many countries today), having children with multiple partners (one could call
this informal polygyny) is still legal and indeed happens. Another possibility is remarriage
(after divorce, separation, or death) and having additional children with the new partner,
1This chapter is joint work with Erica Field and Michèle Tertilt.
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which have largely been ignored in the empirical fertility literature. A traditional household
survey only asks women about their reproductive histories and children are rarely assigned to
a particular birth father.
There are a few recent notable exceptions of surveys in which men are asked about their
reproductive histories. The Survey of Family Growth in the U.S. started interviewing men
about their reproductive behavior in 2002. Based on this data, Guzzo and Furstenberg (2007)
find that 8% of American men had children with more than one partner. The number among
poor African American men is as high as one third, and 16% of them report children with
three or more women. Recent waves of the World Value Surveys and the Population Ac-
ceptance Study also include questions on male fertility, specifically in European countries.2
Moreover, the analysis of administrative register data has become more common in recent
years, particularly in Scandinavian countries. Such data typically include information on fa-
thers and mothers. From population registers, it is possible to construct fertility measures
for fathers separate from mothers. However, this possibility has not been exploited much in
the literature to date. Two notable exceptions are Lappegård and Rønsen (2011) and Kunze
(2014), who both use Norwegian register data. Lappegård and Rønsen (2011) study the im-
portance of multi-partner fertility, finding that disadvantaged and advantaged men are more
likely to father children with multiple women. Kunze (2014) studies how births affect the
earning dynamics of fathers. Boschini et al. (2011) use Swedish register data to analyze the
connection between career and fertility for men and women separately. In this context, they
find that childlessness is more common among men than women. Interestingly, they also find
that male fertility does not differ much by education levels, while female fertility does.
In sum, while very recent surveys sometimes include information on male fertility, so far
these data have been mostly used to analyze the importance of multi-partner fertility. What is
lacking are attempts to explore systematically the extent to which conventional fertility facts
would be different if measured based on data from men rather than women. In particular,
the extent to which average fertility is any different has not been explored.
To answer these questions, we look at recent waves of the Demographic and Health Surveys
(DHS) in six different, mostly African, countries. The recent waves include a sample of
men who are asked about their reproductive behavior.3 To analyze whether there are any
2Puur et al. (2008) and Westoff and Higgins (2009) use these data. However, the main research question
is quite different from ours, as these papers focus on the relationship between men's role orientation and
fertility aspirations.
3A few other studies have used the same data. Agajanian (2002) uses DHS data from Mozambique, in
addition to qualitative field work in the Greater Maputo area, to study how men communicate about
reproductive behavior and contraception.
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robust patterns across countries, we conduct the same analysis for six different countries.
Our starting point is that the discrepancy in male vs. female fertility, if it exists, would be
largest in highly polygynous countries. To investigate this hypothesis, we analyze three pairs
of countries: two highly polygynous countries (Senegal and Burkina Faso), two countries with
a low level of polygyny (Malawi and Ethiopia) and two countries where polygyny is almost
non-existent (Madagascar and India). For each country, we piece information together from
different waves of the DHS to compare the completed fertility of men and women of the same
birth cohort.
We document some striking facts. First, we find that men have on average more children
than women in four out of the six countries considered. The gaps are large, ranging from
1.3 children in Ethiopia, 2.1 children in Malawi, 3.1 children in Senegal to 4.6 children in
Burkina Faso, but appear to be decreasing over time. For example, in Burkina Faso, we find
a gap of 4.6 for the 1944-48 birth cohort and a smaller gap of only 2.8 for the 1951-55 birth
cohort. Similarly, the gap in Malawi is 2.1 for the 1946-50 cohort, falls to 1.7 for the 1950-54
cohort and further decreases to 1.1 for the 1956-60 cohort. Positive gaps mean that men must
be having children with more than one woman. Indeed, we find that the size of the gap is
positively related to the degree of polygyny. Second, we document a larger heterogeneity in
fertility outcomes among men than women. The coefficient of variation of fertility for women
is lower than that for men in all countries, except India. In other words, with the exception
of India, women are more equal to each other in their reproductive behavior than men are.
The gap is largest in the high polygyny countries Burkina Faso and Senegal. Third, we find
that differences in the desire to have children can be explained to a large extent by differences
in realized fertility. Fourth, we document that the demographic transition started earlier and
was steeper when considered from a male perspective.
We believe that these findings are important for a number of reasons. First, investments
in children heavily depend on the resources of fathers. There is a large body of literature
investigating how inequality becomes amplified through endogenous fertility and child invest-
ments.4 The literature shows that it matters how children are spread across families. Given
that a large fraction of wealth worldwide is owned by men; in fact, it matters how children
are spread across men specifically. In other words, since men control a large part of resources,
the number of siblings who share the same father seems more informative than the number
of those who share the same mother. Second, it is often emphasized that men desire more
4See, for example, Kremer and Chen (2002) and De la Croix and Doepke (2003).
130 CHAPTER 4. GENDER GAPS IN COMPLETED FERTILITY
children than women (Bankole and Singh, 1998). Such discordant preferences are thought
to lead to conflict and are sometimes modeled as a bargaining game between spouses (Rasul
(2008) and Doepke and Kindermann (2013)).5 However, our results show that differences in
demand are often mirrored in differences in actual achieved fertility, such that there is no
innate source of conflict surrounding fertility choices. Third, much polygyny today is infor-
mal. One might be able to recover some information about the organization of the family
by looking at children. A final problem with ignoring children of men outside the household
is the assumption that transfers sent outside of or received into the household do not go
towards supporting parents' offspring. This can lead to systematic mis-measurement in the
amount that parents invest in their children when living in multiple partnership settings, and
fathers' investment in children will be systematically underestimated when their offspring live
in multiple households. In sum, we believe that these new facts will be useful when building
theories of fertility choice.
In the next section, we describe the data we use. In Section 4.3, we document the extent to
which average complete fertility differs by gender. Section 4.4 analyzes differences in fertility
inequality for men vs. women. In Section 4.5, we analyze differences in desired fertility and
how it relates to actual fertility. Section 4.6 reconsiders the demographic transition from a
male perspective, before Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2. The Data
4.2.1. Some Preliminaries
How should one compare the fertility of men and women? There are multiple possibilities.
For example, one could compute the number of births in a given year relative to the number
of women and men of child-bearing age. Alternatively, one could try to construct measures
of the total fertility rate also for men and compare it to standard female total fertility rates.
The measure that most closely captures actual fertility choices is the completed fertility rate
(or children ever born) based on self-reported fertility histories.6 When using this measure
to compare fertility rates over time, one usually compares children ever born by birth cohorts
of mothers. We follow the same approach here, i.e. we compute completed fertility rates for
men by birth cohorts and compare them to women of the same birth cohort.7 Of course,
5See also Voas (2004) on this.
6This is a commonly used measure, see for example Jones and Tertilt (2008).
7In line with the literature, completed fertility rates are computed based on all men and women, including
those with zero children.
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men and women of the same birth cohort do not necessarily have children with each other
(i.e. if there is an age gap in marriage), although we do not view this as a problem. On the
contrary, the purpose of the paper is to investigate the extent to which cohorts of men and
women born at the same time and living during the same years (and hence facing the same
economic conditions over their lifetime) make different fertility choices.
Naturally, there are some data issues. To assure that people have truly completed their
fertility, one should use data from relatively old people. On the other hand, only living people
can be asked about their completed fertility; thus, waiting until people are 70 in countries
where the average life expectancy is around 50 is not very practical. Even more importantly,
the oldest men included in the Demographic and Health Surveys, of which we make use, are
59. Wherever possible, we measure completed fertility based on men aged between 55 and
59. Women are only included in the surveys up to age 49. To compare men and women of
the same birth cohort, we thus have to piece together information from different survey years.
For example, we can construct male fertility for the 1941-45 cohort of men by using 55-59
year old men from a 2010 survey. If we used the oldest (i.e. 45-49 year old) women from the
same survey, they would correspond to a different birth cohort. However, we can use data
from a second survey (ideally 2000) to compute the fertility rate for the 1941-45 female cohort
by analyzing 45-49 year old women from the earlier survey. Unfortunately, the DHS surveys
are not always spaced exactly 10 years apart. Therefore, we sometimes have to use slightly
different ages in our comparisons. Exactly which combination of data sets, ages and cohorts
are used in our analysis will be detailed further below.
One important question one might ask is whether men in their late-50s and women in their
late-40s truly have completed their reproduction. There is a large literature on this topic
within biology and medicine. McKinlay et al. (1992) find that the median age for the onset
of menopause in the U.S. is 51 years. However, note that female fecundity is already severely
reduced in the pre-menopausal phase, which is supported by the findings of Eijkemans et al.
(2014). They show that the biological hazard of sterility dramatically increases after the
age of 38 for European and North American women, reaching almost 90% at the age of 45.
Moreover, the onset of menopause increases with development (because of better nutrition),
so that it likely occurs earlier in our samples of African and Indian women (see e.g. Sidibe,
2005). We thus believe that we are not missing many children when computing completed
fertility based on our samples of women older than 40. Male fecundity also decreases with
age, but more slowly than for women and there is no equivalent to menopause beyond which
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complete sterility occurs (see for example Kidd et al. (2001) and Harris et al. (2011)). Thus, to
measure completed male fertility, men should be surveyed at later ages than women, which we
do. To the extent that men have children beyond their mid-50s, note that this will downward
bias our measures of male fertility. In other words, we might even be understating gender
gaps in fertility.
4.2.2. The DHS Samples
We use data from six different developing countries. For convenience, we classify them by
their degree of polygyny: Burkina Faso and Senegal both have high rates of polygyny, Malawi
and Ethiopia have lower rates of polygyny, and in Madagascar and India polygyny essentially
does not exist. We use recent waves of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for our
analysis (ICF-International, 1994-2012). The spacing between consecutive waves in the same
country is typically five years, although there are exceptions. Each survey is a representative
sample of households.8 To assure representativeness on national, regional and residence levels,
individual sample weights are included, which we use in our calculations unless otherwise
noted.
Even though the DHS is a household survey, note that not all household members are
interviewed. The main target group is women of reproductive age (15-49 years). However,
recent waves also include interviews with a sub-sample of men (aged 15-54/59). The fraction
of men interviewed varies by country and year, with the fraction of households eligible for
male interviews varying from around every 1.6th to every 4th household. The final ratio of
interviewed women and men also differs due to (small) differences in non-response rates by
gender.9 The sex ratio of interviewed people for the surveys used are given in Table 4.A2 in
the Appendix.
In each of the six countries, we use all DHS waves that include a male sample. Depending
on the country, there are between one (India) and four (Burkina Faso, Senegal and Malawi)
waves that include a male sample. When available, we incorporate an additional earlier wave
with only female interviewees, since, as explained above, we use women from earlier surveys
to construct the fertility rates of the same birth cohorts of men and women. Based on these
8In most instances, the sample is based on a stratified two-stage cluster design. The enumeration areas are
drawn from Census files in the first stage and the households in each enumeration area are drawn from
an updated list of households. More detailed information on the sample design can be found on the DHS
website http://www.measuredhs.com/What-We-Do/Survey-Types/DHS-Methodology.cfm.
9Overall response rates were high, with household response rates of over 97%. However, not all eligible
individuals were interviewed. Depending on the country and year, female response rates are over 92%,
while males rates may be as low as 85%.
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criteria, we end up with four different DHS surveys for Burkina Faso, Senegal, Malawi and
Madagascar, and only two for Ethiopia and India. In Table 4.1, we provide an overview of
the surveys used.10 The table includes sample sizes by gender and the age ranges of the
interviewed people. For the majority of countries, the most recent waves of the DHS were
conducted in 2010 or 2011. Only for Madagascar and India was the latest data collected in
2008/09 and 2005/06, respectively. Overall sample sizes significantly differ, largely due to the
sizes of the countries. For example, the Indian DHS is the largest, followed by the 2010 wave
from Malawi. The sample sizes have been growing over time.
Table 4.1 also includes the polygyny rate  measured as the fraction of all married women
with at least one co-wife  and the total fertility rates (TFR).11 The highest polygyny rates
can be found in Burkina Faso (42% in 2010) and the lowest in India (2% in 2005/06). The
same pattern holds true for the total fertility rates, with Burkina Faso having the highest
TFR of 6.0 in 2010 and India the lowest, with 2.7 in 2005/06. This means that the TFRs and
polygyny rates in our sample are positively correlated, i.e. the higher the fraction of women
with a co-wife in a country, the higher the total fertility rates.
As explained in Section 4.2.1, the goal is to compare the number of children ever born by
birth cohorts of the parents. Combining men born within a given period of 5 years into one
birth cohort ensures sufficiently large sample sizes. For the reasons discussed above, whenever
possible we use men between the ages of 55 and 59 and compare them to women aged 45 to 49
from a survey conducted 10 years earlier. However, we sometimes have to deviate from this
rule for two reasons: first, in some cases, the oldest men interviewed are only 54 (Malawi and
India); and second, the surveys are not always conducted exactly 10 years apart. Table 4.2
provides an overview of which birth cohorts we actually use, from which DHS the information
is taken and the ages at the time of the interview. The table also includes the sample sizes of
the relevant birth cohorts. Note that we used surveys only around 5 years apart to construct
data for the same birth cohorts of men and women in the cases of India and Malawi, given
that men were included only up to the age of 54 in these countries, while the oldest women
in the survey are 49. Comparing surveys 5 years apart leads to the oldest men and women
respectively being from the same birth cohort. The second reason why we cannot always
compare exactly 45-49 year old women to 55-59 year old men is that the spacing between
10Note that the Ethiopian calender is different to the Gregorian one, generally being 92 months behind. For
example, the DHS 2011 is conducted in the Ethiopian year 2003 and the year of birth of the interviewed
people is provided in the Ethiopian system. For an easy comparison with the other countries, we state the
approximated Gregorian years in the table and throughout the paper (Ethiopian year +8 years).
11Women who live together with their partner but are not married are included.
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Table 4.1.: DHS Information
Polygyny Country Year Sample size Ages Polyg.a TFRb
preval. DHS women men women men (in %)
High Burkina Faso 2010 17,087 7,307 15-49 15-59 42 6.0
2003 12,477 3,605 15-49 15-59 48 5.9
1998-99 6,445 2,641 15-49 15-59 55 6.4
1993 6,354 1,845 15-49 18-97 51 6.5
Senegal 2010-11 15,688 4,929 15-49 15-59 35 5.0
2005 14,602 3,761 15-49 15-59 39 5.3
1997 8,593 4,306 15-49 15-59 47 5.7
1992-93 6,310 1,436 15-49 20-92 48 6.0
Low Malawi 2010 23,020 7,175 15-49 15-54 14 5.7
2004-05 11,698 3,261 15-49 15-54 16 6.0
2000 13,220 3,092 15-49 15-54 17 6.3
1992 4,849 1,151 15-49 20-54 20 6.7
Ethiopia 2011 16,515 14,110 15-49 15-59 11 4.8
2000 15,367 2,607 15-49 15-59 14 5.5
Almost Madagascar 2008-09 17,375 8,586 15-49 15-59 3 4.8
no 2003-04 7,949 2,432 15-49 15-59 3 5.2
1997 7,060 . 15-49 . 3 6.1
1992 6260 . 15-49 . 6.1
India 2005-06 124,385 74,369 15-49 15-54 2 2.7
1998-99c 89,199 . 15-49 . . 2.8
Notes: Individual sample weights are used for the calculations. Polygyny preval. stands for polygyny
prevalence. (a) Fraction of all women, who are married or live together with their partner, with at least
one cowife, taking out the missing values. (b) Total fertility rates are taken from the statcompiler which
is based on the corresponding DHS data. (c) Only ever married women are interviewed.
the surveys is rarely exactly 5 or 10 years. Our procedure here was to use the oldest men
for which data is available and adjust the ages of the women so that they are from the exact
same birth cohort. This logic explains why the women of the 1951-55 cohort in Burkina
Faso are aged 42-48, for example, given that the DHS are 11-12 years apart. This example
shows a further complication, since several DHS waves include interviews from two consecutive
years.12 Fortunately, the surveys include a question of the year of birth, upon which we base
our selection of men and women. However, depending on the exact birth date and the month
of the survey, 5 years of birth cohort can include people of more than 5 different ages, as
the example of Burkina Faso shows. The final sample sizes are obviously much smaller than
the size of the surveys given in Table 4.1. They range from 394 (Burkina Faso DHS 1993)
12Interviews were typically spread out over several months, which in some cases included December of one
year and January of the following year.
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to 9,312 (India DHS 1998/99) for women and from 93 (Madagascar DHS 2003/04) to 3,997
(India DHS 2005/06) for men. The small samples size for Madagascar makes inference for
the cohort born in 1945-49 difficult.
The polygyny rates reported in Table 4.2 are higher for the older cohorts than for the whole
sample (compare with Table 4.1) for all countries, except for the countries with a low level of
polygyny. This is unsurprising since polygyny rates have been falling over time and the rates
in Table 4.1 also include younger couples. Men are also asked whether they currently have
more than one wife or partner, which is shown in the last column of Table 4.2. These rates
are in line with our categorization of the six countries into high, low and almost no polygyny.
Table 4.2.: Summary Statistics
Country Cohorts Womena Menb
DHS Total Age Poly.c DHS Total Age Poly.d
Burkina 1951-55 1998/99 478 42-48 0.69 2010 350 54-59 0.45
Faso 1944-48 1993 394 44-49 0.63 2003 188 54-59 0.55
Senegal 1951-55 1997 693 41-46 0.65 2010/11 233 54-59 0.38
1946-50 1992/93 495 42-47 0.67 2005 150 54-59 0.49
Malawi 1956-60 2004/05 803 43-49 0.22 2010 401 49-54 0.12
1950-54 2000 766 45-49 0.14 2004/05 175 50-54 0.16
1946-50 1992 412 41-46 0.28 2000 186 49-54 0.22
Ethiopia 1952-56 2000 1194 43-48 0.19 2011 541 54-59 0.08
Mada- 1949-53 1997 500 43-48 0.01 2008/09 387 55-59 0.02
gascar 1945-49 1992 427 42-47 0.02 2003/04 93 54-59 0.00
India 1951-55 1998/99 9312 42-49 . 2005/06 3997 50-54 0.02
Notes: Individual sample weights are used to calculate the statistics. (a) Information is based on the
sample of women who provide information on the number of born children. (b) Information is based on
the sample of men who provide information on the number of born children. (c) Polygyny is measured
as the fraction of women, who are married or live together with their partner, with at least one cowife.
(d) Polygyny is measured as the fraction of men with more than one wife/partner.
4.3. Gender Gaps in Fertility
We now compare the average completed fertility for men and women of the same birth cohort.
As Table 4.3 shows, men have many more children than women in almost all countries that
we consider. The gap is particularly pronounced in countries with high levels of polygyny. In
Burkina Faso, men born in 1944-48 have on average 12.18 children, compared to only 7.55
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for women. Of course, men often marry younger women; in fact, the average age gap at first
birth is 8.6 years, as shown in Table 4.4. However, this cannot explain the gap by itself,
since women of the 1951-55 cohort, i.e. those on average 7 years younger, also have only 7.48
children each. Clearly, men are having children with more than one woman. Moreover, this
is true for the average man, i.e. it is not only the case that some rich men have children
with multiple women while other men do not. It should be emphasized again that the data
includes all men and women, including those who remain childless. Thus, the data shows that
on average men must have children with more than one woman. The data looks similar for
Senegal, another high polygyny country. Men born in 1946-50 have on average 10.26 children,
while women of the same cohort have only 7.21, i.e. men have on average 3.06 more children
than women of the same cohort. Five years later, the gap has shrunk, yet is still a sizeable
1.92 children.
We see a similar pattern in Ethiopia and Malawi. Men born between 1950 and 1954 have
8.69 children while women have only 7.02, i.e. a gap of around two children. In Ethiopia, the
gap for the 1952-56 cohort is only 1.32, which is nonetheless still a high number  larger than
total fertility rates in some European countries.
Finally, the table shows that women in Madagascar and India have more children than men
do. However, recall that the sample size for Madagascarian men is extremely small; in fact,
the differences across gender are barely significant.
We can also use the data to check how reasonable our assumption of completed fertility is
at ages (depending on the country/year) 50-54/59 for men and 41-49 for women. The survey
includes a question on the age of the youngest child. We calculate the fraction of men and
women of various ages who have a child below one, based on the most recent DHS for each
country. The numbers are given in Table 4.A1 in the Appendix, which shows a hump-shaped
pattern in all countries and for both sexes. The peak fertility occurs for women between the
ages of 20 and 29 in all countries, before falling rapidly after age 34. For example, while a
quarter to a third of all 25-34 year olds have a child that was born in the last year, this has
declined to 11% or less by 40-44. Very few women aged 45 or older have young children. The
highest percentage is in Malawi, with 3% of 45-49 year old women having a child born during
the previous year. Therefore, we think that it is fairly innocuous to use completed fertility
rates of women aged 42 and older as a proxy for completed life-time fertility rates.
The corresponding figures for men look somewhat different, particularly in the highly polyg-
ynous countries. For men, peak fertility occurs at later ages, between 25 and 49 depending
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Table 4.3.: Average Fertility by Gender
Country Cohort Fertility Gap
Women Men
Burkina Faso 1951-55 7.48 10.24 2.76 ∗∗∗
1944-48 7.55 12.18 4.63 ∗∗∗
Senegal 1951-55 7.00 8.92 1.92 ∗∗∗
1946-50 7.21 10.26 3.06 ∗∗∗
Malawi 1956-60 6.76 7.81 1.06 ∗∗∗
1950-54 7.02 8.69 1.67 ∗∗∗
1946-50 7.15 9.20 2.05 ∗∗∗
Ethiopia 1952-56 7.07 8.39 1.32 ∗∗∗
Madagascar 1949-53 6.99 6.78 -0.21
1945-49 7.12 6.37 -0.75 ∗
India 1951-55 4.61 3.98 -0.63 ∗∗∗
Notes: Fertility is measured by the average number of chil-
dren born to the cohort, also considering men and women
with no children. The significance levels are denoted by ∗∗∗
1%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗ 10%. The means are tested on equality
based on a two-sample t-test with sampling weights.
on the country. In some countries, there is still a large fraction of men in the oldest age group
who have a child aged one or younger, which is as high as 22% for 55-59 year old men in
Senegal. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that men have truly completed their fertility by
this age. However, note that this finding biases our results concerning the average fertility
of men downwards. In other words, adjusting for children that men have at even older ages
would further increase the male fertility rates and thereby increase the gender gaps in fertility
reported in Table 4.3. Note also that for countries with low levels of polygyny, the fraction of
men with a child born in the previous year peaks at an earlier age and is considerably lower
for the older ages and thus even less problematic for our assumption that fertility is completed
for men in their mid-50s.
4.3.1. Polygyny as Driving Force of the Gender Gap
The main channel through which men achieve higher fertility than women is by continuing to
have children beyond their mid-40s, at ages when women are essentially no longer fertile. To
observe this, we depict the number of children born over the life cycle. Since the Demographic
and Health Surveys are not panels, but rather consist of repeated cross sections, we cannot
compute fertility rates for the same cohorts over their life cycle. Instead, we construct an
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artificial life cycle by piecing together different cohorts. Figure 4.1 depicts one life-cycle
profile for each country, based on the most recent DHS wave in each of our six countries. To
make it more transparent how these graphs were constructed, we have labeled them with the
birth cohort of the mothers and fathers, respectively. To convert this into ages, note that
these profiles start at the age 15 and continue to 59 for all countries apart from India and
Madagascar, where the highest age is 54. Furthermore, for women, we have data only until
the age of 49. However, female fecundity after the age 49 is essentially zero.13 Thus, to make
the increasing gap between men and women at older ages more visible, we have added figures
for the older cohorts of women to the graphs by assuming that fertility does not grow after
the age of 49.14
The first thing to note from Figure 4.1 is that men start having children later in life than
women. Accordingly, young women have more children than young men, which is true in all
countries that we consider. For example, in Burkina Faso, women in the 1986 cohort, i.e. those
aged 24 when asked about their children, already have 2 children, whereas men of the same
age have less than one child on average. However, the gap closes as age increases, which is of
course unsurprising given the age gap in marriage. What is more interesting is that the gap
eventually reverses sign. In other words, men continue to increase their fertility well into their
50s, while women stop in their mid-40s. This pattern is most pronounced in Burkina Faso and
Senegal, the most polygynous countries. However, we even see the same pattern in Ethiopia,
Malawi and Madagascar, albeit to a lesser degree. Such a reverse cannot be explained through
an age gap alone. An age gap in a monogamous marriage without remarriage would mean that
the fertility of men and women converges with age. While each individual man can deviate
from this pattern by mating more than one woman (and in particular having children with
younger women as he ages), it seems that the same cannot be possible at the aggregate level.
With a balanced sex ratio, one may think that on average men cannot have children with
more than one woman. However, that is a fallacy. With a growing population, it is indeed
possible for a large fraction of men to have more than one wife.15
To see that this is possible even in a steady state, let fm be the fertility of the average
male and ff the fertility of the average female. Let n be the number of wives per man and
η the population growth rate. Assuming an age gap of g years between husband and wife, it
13As previously discussed, assuming it is zero thereafter seems a relatively innocuous assumption.
14In the graphs, this corresponds to the 1960 cohorts and older for Burkina Faso, Senegal and Malawi, the
1958 cohorts and older for Madagascar, 1961 for Ethiopia and 1955 for India.
15This paper is not concerned with formal marriage; rather, we are interested in those women a man has
fathered children with. Since this is a cumbersome expression, we often write wife instead. However,
this does not mean that she is an official wife or even a cohabiting partner.
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Table 4.4.: Age at First Birth by Gender
Country Cohort Age at first birth Gap
Women Men
Burkina Faso 1951-55 19.8 28.4 8.6 ∗∗∗
1944-48 19.8 . .
Senegal 1951-55 19.6 30.2 10.6 ∗∗∗
1946-50 19.4 28.1 8.7 ∗∗∗
Malawi 1956-60 19.5 24.7 5.2 ∗∗∗
1950-54 19.6 24.6 5.0 ∗∗∗
1946-50 19.9 . .
Ethiopia 1952-56 18.8 26.2 7.4 ∗∗∗
Madagascar 1949-53 19.7 25.5 5.9 ∗∗∗
1945-49 18.6 28.4 9.8 ∗∗∗
India 1951-55 19.4 26.2 6.8 ∗∗∗
Notes: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗ 10% significance level. The means
are tested on equality based on a two-sample t-test with sam-
pling weights.
is possible for the average man to have children with n = (1 + η)g women. The number of
children per man then relates to the number of children per woman as follows:
fm = (1 + η)
gff .
For example, if the age gap was 10 years and annual population growth was 3%, then fmff =
1.34, i.e. men have on average 34% more children than women.16 Table 4.4 shows the average
age at first birth by gender and the resulting age gap for all six countries. The age gap is
highest in the high polygynous countries, which suggests the importance of this channel.17
Finally, what does all of this mean for the essentially monogamous countries India and
Madagascar? Do the negative gaps, i.e. the finding that women have more children than men,
imply that women in these countries have children with multiple men? Even if polyandry is
not legal in these countries, sequential polyandry is of course possible in the sense that women
first have children with one man and then additional children with a second husband after
the death of the first husband or divorce/separation. However, divorce is relatively rare in
these countries. A more likely explanation is again offered by the large age gaps reported in
16This point is also made in Tertilt (2005).
17For the low and almost no polygynous countries, only Madagascar's age gap for the cohorts born in 1945-49
is at a comparatively high level. However, since the underlying sample size for men is below 93, this age
gap should be interpreted with caution.
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Table 4.4, whereby the negative fertility gaps could result from the age gap in combination
with the demographic transition. If men have children with women of a later cohort (due to
the age gap) and fertility is falling over time, then it is necessary for any given cohort that
the fertility of women is higher than that of men.
4.3.2. Alternative Explanations Based on Measurement Issues
In this section, we explore whether the large gender gaps in fertility could be an artifact
of measurement. First, it could be the case that differential mortality biases our estimates
of average fertility. Naturally, by using retrospective fertility outcomes of men and women
aged between 41 and 59, we focus on those people who survive to that age. If high fertility
increased mortality for women, then we could be systematically missing the high fertility
women, which would downward bias the female fertility estimates. We find this an unlikely
explanation, because if women die for pregnancy-related reasons, then they often die when
pregnant with the first child. This would bias results in the opposite direction and could
clearly not explain why the fertility of men is higher than women. Furthermore, the fact
that the fertility gap is very different across countries, and in fact negative for India and
Madagascar, makes differential mortality unlikely to be the main explanation, unless one
considered that such differential mortality only existed in some of the countries.
Second, it could be the case that the DHS is not representative of men and we are system-
atically missing those men who remain childless. As one indicator, we compare the sex ratios
(number of men per woman) based on national census data published by the UN with those
in the DHS. We calculate the ratio of interviewed men and women, adjusting for the fraction
of sampled households in which men are supposed to be interviewed. These sex ratios are
presented in Table 4.5, with the left two columns presenting the ratios for the age group of
15 to 49 years and the right two columns only for those aged 45-49. Such a comparison is not
possible for older cohorts (50-59), namely those of relevance for our analysis, since women are
only interviewed until age 49. Even though the DHS sex ratios are systematically lower for the
whole age group 15-49 in all countries, which indicates that the DHS covers fewer men than
would be representative, this is mainly driven by the younger cohorts. For the cohort aged
45-49, being closest to the relevant group of people, the discrepancies between the sex ratios
is less pronounced and even negative for the surveys in Burkina Faso in 2010 and Senegal
in 2010/11. Thus, we do not believe that the large gender gaps could only be explained by
missing men in our analysis.
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Table 4.5.: Sex Ratios
Number of Men per Women
Aged 15-49 Aged 45-49
Country Year Census DHS Census DHS
Burkina Faso 2010 0.99 0.76 0.86 0.92
2003 0.97 0.73 0.80 0.66
Senegal 2010/11 0.94 0.74 0.82 0.87
2005 0.94 0.70 0.84 0.84
Malawi 2010 1.02 0.86 0.92 0.88
2004/05 0.99 0.79 0.87 0.70
2000 0.97 0.88 0.91 0.91
Ethiopia 2011 1.0 0.78 0.94 0.87
Madagascar 2008/09 0.99 0.88 0.96 0.95
2003/04 0.99 0.83 0.97 0.94
India 2005/06 1.08 0.89 1.08 1.05
Source: The Census sex ratios are published by the United Na-
tions, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division
(2013), World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision and based on
national census data.
Third, could there by some systematic over-/underreporting of fertility, which differs for
men vs. women? Given that women spend nine months in pregnancy and typically another
year or more nursing, and since giving birth itself can be a long and painful process, it seems
unlikely that a woman would not remember all her children. These arguments do not apply to
men. Moreover, a man can never be absolutely sure that a child is truly his own. Thus, there
could be double-counting of children if several men claimed the same child. Alternatively,
there could be underreporting of male fertility if some children were not attributed to any
father. A small body of literature exists concerning the issue of reporting bias in male fertility.
There seems to be some evidence of male underreporting of fertility (for example, Rendall
et al. (1999) find that men tend to severely underreport their non-marital births in data
from the US and the UK), although other papers find no difference in reporting bias between
men and women (e.g. Fikree et al. (1993), based on a small sample of men and women in
Vermont). Probably more relevant for our study is evidence based on other African countries.
Ratcliffe et al. (2002) analyze data from the Gambia, a highly polygynous country, finding
no difference in the reliability of male vs. female fertility reports. Similarly, Hertrich (1998)
finds no difference in the reliability of reporting live births between men and women in Mali.
Given that none of the studies find that men overreport fertility, it seems highly unlikely that
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the gender gaps we find in fertility are an artifact of male reporting biases.
4.4. Higher Fertility Inequality for Men
Thus far, we have established that on average men have more children than women in all
countries that we analyze, apart from Madagascar and India. Furthermore, we have argued
that it is indeed possible that all men have more children than women in polygynous countries
with high population growth. In reality, of course, there is important heterogeneity, whereby
some people have many children, while others have very few or even none. We now turn to
analyzing the heterogeneity in fertility decisions separately for men and women. Specifically,
Table 4.6 displays two measures of fertility inequality for the six countries: the standard
deviation and the coefficient of variation (CV). The first thing to note is that the standard
deviation of fertility of men is much higher than for women. For example, the standard
deviation of the 1951-55 cohort in Burkina Faso is 5.25 for men, compared to only 2.63 for
women.
To better compare fertility inequality across gender and countries with very different means,
the table also includes the coefficient of variation. Even controlling for the fact that mean
fertility is lower for women, we find a larger degree of inequality for men than women in all
countries.18 Accordingly, women are more similar to each other in their fertility behavior
than men are to each other in almost all countries that we consider. Again considering the
example of the 1951-55 cohort in Burkina Faso, we find a CV for men of 0.51 compared
to only 0.35 for women. Interestingly, the coefficient of variation for men is very similar
across countries, at around 0.5. The finding that male fertility inequality is larger than
female inequality is strongest in the high polygyny countries. In Burkina Faso and Senegal,
the difference between the male and female CV is 0.10 or higher, depending on the cohort
considered. In the low polygyny countries (Ethiopia and Malawi), it is only between 0.02 and
0.06.19 Finally, the almost no polygyny countries (Madagascar and India) only display a gap
of 0.02 to 0.04.20 Put differently, high male heterogeneity in fertility directly translates into
high female heterogeneity in monogamous countries. This is not the case in countries with
a high degree of polygyny where men have another margin of adjustment. Those men who
want many children do not necessarily need a woman who agrees, but rather they can have
18There are two exceptions, namely the 1950-54 cohort in Malawi and the 1945-49 cohort in Madagascar.
19Again, the 1950-54 cohort in Malawi does not follow this pattern, as female fertility inequality is higher
than male.
20The 1945-49 cohort in Madagascar shows a higher inequality for women than for men. However, this result
needs to be regarded with caution due to the small male sample size.
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Table 4.6.: Fertility Inequality by Gender
Country Cohort SD CV
Women Men Women Men
Burkina Faso 1951-55 2.63 5.25 0.35 0.51
1944-48 2.83 6.23 0.37 0.51
Senegal 1951-55 2.91 4.94 0.42 0.55
1946-50 3.01 5.36 0.42 0.52
Malawi 1956-60 2.87 3.75 0.42 0.48
1950-54 3.17 3.66 0.45 0.42
1946-50 3.08 4.20 0.43 0.46
Ethiopia 1952-56 2.81 3.50 0.40 0.42
Madagascar 1949-53 3.77 3.82 0.54 0.56
1945-49 4.04 2.61 0.57 0.41
India 1951-55 2.42 2.23 0.52 0.56
Notes: SD represents the standard deviation. CV is the coefficient of
variation, which is the standard deviation divided by the mean.
children with multiple women.
To gain a better sense of how male and female fertility behaviors differ, Figure 4.2 displays
the distribution of fertility outcomes. For each country, we have plotted only one distribution,
based on the most recent cohort for which we have data. Each panel includes separate
distributions for men and women. The first thing to note is that the distribution for men is
flatter than the female distribution and shifted to the right. Again, the differences between
men and women are most striking for Burkina Faso and Senegal. While there are no women
with more than 14 (16) children in Burkina Faso (Senegal), many men have higher fertility
rates, with some having up to 27 children. The percentage of men with more children than
the highest fertility of women is quite large, at 19% in Burkina Faso and 10% in Senegal.
Figure 4.A1 in the Appendix shows the fertility distribution, which is censored for the gender
with the higher maximum number of born children at the highest fertility reported by the
opposite gender. While 24% (12%) of the men in Burkina Faso (Senegal) have more than 13
(15) children, only 0.7% (0.2%) of the women do so.
The pattern in Ethiopia and Malawi are less pronounced but qualitatively similar. In each
case, there is a sizeable fraction of men having more children than the highest fertility women,
at 2% in Ethiopia and 3% in Malawi. What is also interesting is that no large fraction of
childless men is observed in any of the four polygynous countries. One might have thought
145
that high male fertility inequality means many men with high numbers of wives and children
and equally many with no wives and children, although this is clearly not the case. On the
contrary, the fraction of men without any children is lower than the fraction of women with
no children in both Burkina Faso and Ethiopia. In Malawi, the fractions are essentially the
same. Only in Senegal and India do we have a higher fraction of childless men than women,
although the numbers are still small in absolute terms, with around 4% of men having no
children.
Finally, turning to our no polygyny countries, Madagascar and India, it is striking how
similar the distributions are for men and women.
As a side note, it is interesting to compare the distribution of children across women against
other countries. Jones and Tertilt (2008) provide fertility distributions for a series of cohorts
of U.S. women, from 1826-1830 to 1956-1960. The shape of the distribution substantially
changes over the century, in parallel with the declining average fertility rate. The first cohort
(1826-1830) has the highest completed fertility rate, namely 5.6 children per woman, and
thus is closest (in mean) to the rates of the countries considered in this paper. Nonetheless,
the distribution looks surprisingly different (see Figure 4.3). First, the fraction of childless
women is much higher in the US. The data analyzed in Jones and Tertilt (2008) shows that
this is not an anomaly of this particular cohort, as the rate of childlessness is above 10% for
almost all cohorts, which is much larger than for the six developing countries analyzed in this
paper. Furthermore, the US distribution is much more concentrated to the left. The fertility
distributions are almost flat at low parities and falling thereafter. In contrast, Figure 4.2
suggests that the distributions are much closer to a normal distribution in the six developing
countries analyzed here.
4.5. Gender Gaps in Desired vs. Actual Fertility
It is well-known that the desired fertility of men and women often does not coincide in survey
data. Especially in developing countries, men tend to say that they desire more children
than women (Bankole and Singh, 1998).21 The typical interpretation is that women bear a
higher share of the cost of child-rearing, which makes children relatively more expensive for
women. For example, one cost is the risk of dying in child birth, which is obviously born by
women only. But, how is this discrepancy in preferences resolved? One could view the actual
21Although Mason and Taj (1987) find little differences in desired fertility in an older meta-analysis. However,
this finding might be due to the paucity of data at the time of this study, almost two decades ago.
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148 CHAPTER 4. GENDER GAPS IN COMPLETED FERTILITY
Table 4.7.: Desired Number of Children by Gender
Country Cohort Desired Number Desired Actual
Women Men Gap Gap
Burkina Faso 1951-55 6.48 10.16 3.68 ∗∗∗ 2.76 ∗∗∗
1944-48 6.73 8.75 2.02 ∗∗ 4.63 ∗∗∗
Senegal 1951-55 5.77 9.60 3.83 ∗∗∗ 1.92 ∗∗∗
1946-50 6.48 10.72 4.23 ∗∗∗ 3.06 ∗∗∗
Malawi 1956-60 5.33 5.90 0.57 ∗∗∗ 1.06 ∗∗∗
1950-54 5.63 5.37 -0.26 1.67 ∗∗∗
1946-50 6.35 5.62 -0.73 ∗∗ 2.05 ∗∗∗
Ethiopia 1952-56 6.64 8.56 1.92 ∗∗∗ 1.32 ∗∗∗
Madagascar 1949-53 6.54 6.64 0.10 -0.21
1945-49 6.78 7.53 0.75 -0.75 ∗
India 1951-55 2.92 2.53 -0.39 ∗∗∗ -0.63 ∗∗∗
Notes: People are asked how many children they would like to have in life.
Those who answer `whatever god wants' or ` don't know' are not considered
here. The significance levels are ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗ 10%. The means are
tested on equality based on a two-sample t-test with sampling weights.
example, a person who has many children might be quite reluctant to report having wanted
fewer, although this caveat should apply equally to men and women. Since we are interested in
the difference between men and women, we do not see the reporting bias as a major concern.
As in our previous analysis, we report averages by birth cohorts. In other words, we are not
comparing gaps within couples, but rather analyze average gaps within cohorts of men and
women.
Table 4.7 shows the mean desired number of children for men and women for all countries
and cohorts under consideration. The first thing to note is that we indeed find a large positive
and significant gap in the desired number of children in six of the cohorts that we consider.
However, we also observe no significant gap or even a negative one (women wanting more
children) in some countries. In India, we find that women want more children, while this
difference is not significant in Madagascar.24 In Malawi, the results differ by cohort: for the
youngest cohort, we find a significant positive (though relatively small) gap of half a child,
while the gap for the older cohorts is negative or insignificant. Note that the size of the gap
again seems quite systematically related to polygyny. The two high polygyny countries have
extremely large gaps. In Burkina Faso, men of the 1951-55 cohort want on average 3.68 more
children than women. Similarly, in Senegal, men want between 3.8 and 4.2 more children
24Recall that the male sample size of the cohort born in 1945-49 is very small.
 
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?????????????? ???? ?????????????????
????????
???????????
? ???
???????
??????????
????
  	  
  

 
  
   
 
 
    
 
 
fi
 ff  ! "
  	    	
   	
 
 	
  	  		 	   
	 
    
	  	 	  	  	 	       
	      	 fi 	  		    
 !  	  
	 	 	  	 	  
  
	 
  "	 	   		 	   fi 	 
#  $	  
    
 	
   	 %
 ff  '	 	$   	       	
    %    $ (	
      
  $	
     	 	      %  
	        '    	  	%	  
   	       )*    $
+ 	 
 	    	 $ % (    	 	 	 $
     %  '    	  
   

	  	 
    
 	
 	 	 ,  	  '
	  	
 fl   )*      $  	
  fi  
 
   
 
  fi
 ff  ! "
  	
  		
   		 	

?
???
?
???
?
???
?
???
?
??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
?????????????????????
?????????? ?????? ???????????? ???????
  	
 
 
  
 
   ff 
 
  ! "

  #$  %
!
  	
  	
 

    

 
   !" #$ $% #" !&"$ %!$ #$ $ % !"% '% #$ !(
#" !&"$ %!$ #$
  	
 	

$($%$ &#  %!% %! &#)"*! %"$%$ $ #% "$ +$%" %"%&
"%(' % $& % * ! ,$ " %!$ $ %!" ")$ - %"$ -. / $&
0$)"% -.1//  +! %%#$% " ++' ,& $ %% "%%' "%  $ #2
+"  # "%%' )+"  *% %% "%%' "% " &)"  0+"3$
 $& $) (" %! $& !  %! .%! $%+"' 4%! %! 5*%$  &)2
" "%%' "% && $% %"% $) +$% %! %2 61 $& ($ %!$ %  "%('
' " 5#* $ 0+"3$  %% "%%' % % *3 $ %! #&2 61  ,+%
7. !&"$ *" #$ ," $) %!$ %! $5% % && % $' 8    %%
#" %!$  $ !& &$ ("  *"&  %$%' '"
4 ,( %!% %  $% $' "($% !$ ! " #& - !$ !&"$ " ,"$/ 
    &$
 ''(   ) $
 *  $ +$ 

 
 $ 




!
  
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
??
???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
??????????????????
??????????
???????
???????
???????????????????? ?????????????????? ??????????????? ?????????????
?????????????? ???????????? ?????????????????? ????????????????
  	  
  

     
      
   
     !"
  	
  	
 

   	
    
 	 
	  	 	  	 
     	 
	 	

	  	 	
 
 		 	   		 	    
 	   	   		 	  !"#  $   	
     	 
	   	  %  	   
	 		  	   fi 	 	   	  	   	
	  %	 
 	     	  	   

 	 '    	       	 	 	

	 	 
  (   ( ) 
     	  	   		 
 	  * '  	   (+, 		  - 	   ..
 	          	  ). #  #

    	  )/ 	 ,( 
 	 fi    *
   	
    	 (. 	 0, 
   $ 	 1	 	   
*  	 
 	 	 	 
   	
   	 
 
	 	   		  
  	    
 # $
 
 %
  	  

   
  
 
 &     
& 


   
152 CHAPTER 4. GENDER GAPS IN COMPLETED FERTILITY
Overall, the idea of a slow demographic transition, or even a stalling fertility decline, which
has been much emphasized by demographers, might be an artifact of focusing exclusively
on female fertility. From men's perspective, fertility has been falling quite sharply earlier.
We believe this distinction is quite important, since it is men who own most resources in
those countries. Lower fertility typically goes hand-in-hand with higher child quality, i.e. with
higher investments into each child or higher bequests to each child. If this quantity-quality
trade-off is at work and if men have more resources than women, then the fact that fertility
is falling steeply for men should be more relevant than that it is stalling for women.
4.7. Conclusion
We use novel data provided by the DHS male questionnaires to analyze differences in com-
pleted fertility by gender. For Burkina Faso, Senegal, Malawi and Ethiopia, we observe on
average higher completed fertility for men than women of the same birth cohorts. The empir-
ical analysis shows that this discrepancy is largest in high polygynous countries. While the
fertility gap is large in countries with high polygyny rates (Burkina Faso and Senegal), it is
non-existent or even negative in countries with almost no polygyny (Madagascar and India).
We document that an important factor for the large gender gaps is that men have children
beyond their mid-40s, i.e. beyond the onset of menopause for the majority of women. We
show that in countries with a balanced sex ratio yet growing population, a large fraction of
men can potentially have multiple and younger wives, which renders a higher average male
than female fertility possible.
Second, for high polygynous countries, we document a notably higher inequality in male
than female fertility, measured as the variance of fertility. This is less pronounced in countries
with low and almost no polygyny. This means that for (almost) monogamous countries, a
high heterogeneity of male fertility is translated one to one into female heterogeneity, while
men in high polygynous countries have an additional margin of adjustment that breaks the
link between male and female heterogeneity.
Third, the difference in average fertility provides a novel explanation for the gender gap in
desired fertility. Existing explanations are based on the assumption that the realized fertility
does not differ between spouses. We show that average realized fertility between men and
women of the same cohort can differ and that there is a positive relationship between the
average desired and realized fertility gaps. In line with the literature, we find that men want
more children than women in most of the countries. However, a disagreement in these desires
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can be resolved by men having children with more than one woman.
Fourth, we find that the size and speed of demographic transition depends on the gender
considered. In Burkina Faso, Senegal and Malawi, the size and speed of the fertility decline
have been much more pronounced for men than women of the same cohort.
We believe that these results may be important for researchers building theories of fertility
choice, which are necessarily informed by the facts. Indeed, this paper shows that the facts
may look somewhat different depending on whether they are derived based on men or women.
Take the facts relating to fertility inequality as an example. Our results show that hetero-
geneity in fertility outcomes is much larger for men than for women. How does this affect the
resource distribution in the next generation? Historically, the relationship between income
and fertility is negative in most societies  see Jones and Tertilt (2008). Thus, endogenous
fertility leads to an amplification of income inequality over time. Taking the distribution of
children across men into account, this amplification could be even more severe than estimates
based on women would suggest. However, if it is precisely the rich men who have most children
in those societies where men have children with multiple women, then this would mitigate the
endogenous inequality propagation across generations.
In this paper, we have analyzed fertility gaps across gender in six countries. Conducting a
similar analysis for other countries would be very interesting and is left for future research.
Finally, while we speculate that polygyny is the most important factor in explaining gender
gaps in fertility, we have not formally investigated this hypothesis. Other possibilities are non-
marital child-bearing, divorce followed by remarriage and death with subsequent remarriage.
Decomposing the observed gender fertility gaps according to these various possibilities would
be an interesting avenue to pursue, although data constraints will not make this an easy task.
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4.A. Appendix
Table 4.A1.: Indicator for Completed Fertility
Country DHS Fraction with a child aged one or younger
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59
BFA 2010 f 0.10 0.26 0.30 0.24 0.20 0.11 0.01
m 0.00 0.13 0.36 0.51 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.31 0.21
SEN 2010/11 f 0.08 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.16 0.07 0.02
m 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.35 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.25 0.22
MWI 2010 f 0.11 0.29 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.10 0.03
m 0.01 0.22 0.46 0.40 0.42 0.35 0.29 0.12
ETH 2011 f 0.06 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.11 0.02
m 0.00 0.10 0.32 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.31 0.17 0.09
MDG 2008/09 f 0.13 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.14 0.07 0.01
m 0.02 0.22 0.37 0.35 0.30 0.26 0.16 0.06 0.02
IND 2005/06 f 0.07 0.22 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00
m 0.01 0.14 0.31 0.29 0.16 0.07 0.03 0.01
Source: Own calculation based on DHS. Notes: The fraction is an unconditional measure, meaning people
with no children are also included. BFA: Burkina Faso, SEN: Senegal, MWI: Malawi, ETH: Ethiopia, MDG:
Madagascar, IND: India.
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Table 4.A2.: Sample Implementation
Sampled Households Interviewed People
Country DHS Female Sample Male Sample Ratio Women Men Ratio
Burkina Faso 2010 14,947 7,475 2.00 17,087 7,307 2.34
2003 9,470 3,297 2.87 12,477 3,605 3.46
Senegal 2010/11 8,212 3,129 2.62 15,688 4,929 3.18
2005 7,859 2,614 3.01 14,602 3,761 3.88
Malawi 2010 27,307 9,387 2.91 23,020 7,175 3.21
2004/05 15,041 5,029 2.99 11,698 3,261 3.59
2000 15,421 3,872 3.98 13,220 3,092 4.28
Ethiopia 2011 17,817 17,817 1.00 16,515 14,110 1.17
Madagascar 2008/09 18,985 9,494 2.00 17,375 8,586 2.02
2003/04 9,295 3,102 3.00 7,949 2,432 3.27
India 2005/06 116,652 73,974 1.58 124,385 74,369 1.67
Source: DHS. Notes: The sampled households include the number of households that have been sampled for
the women's and men's questionnaires, respectively. This might differ from the acutal responding households.
Only the DHSs that we use for the information on men are considered. The very right 3 columns represent the
people who were finally interviewed.
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